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Abstract 
This paper tries to answer some perplexing questions surrounding the Algerian civil war of 
the 1990‟s. The country went through a civil war that descended into a bloody chaos that few 
can reconcile with. It is this “decent” that is explored in the paper. By relying on a set of 
categories and rules for these interactions set forth in the selectorate theory the negligence of 
the people at large by the government is sought to be explained. Particular actions like the 
massacres, assassinations, bombings, killings and sabotage are put into a context that however 
grisly it may be portrays a rationale making sense of the violence. It discusses the rationale 
behind the massacres that took place from 1995 and the inaction to prevent these. To find this 
rational it is necessary to start the paper with a political analysis that can identify the key 
players and to link the political happenings as an extension of politics to acts of war. 
Therefore the first part of the paper is primarily concerned with the reasons behind the 
conflict, aligning the different parties of it and describing their primary motives. It then goes 
on discussing in what way their inherent structure manifested in strategies and methods 
applied throughout the war. What has been coined as the “Let them Rot” strategy is widely 
discussed in this framework that can explain a strategy that became detrimental to the regimes 
survival and to the misery of the population. The paper does the same for the insurgents, 
identifying their main strategies to clearer understand the results of the two. The main finding 
of the paper is that due to a weak link between the actual leadership - the army whose main 
concern is to stay in power - of the country and the institutional leadership - the president - of 
the country creates a dynamic that prompts the institutional leader whatever his intentions are 
to challenge the position of the actual leadership by strengthening his own position. In the 
case of the civil war in Algeria this happened twice, first with President Chadli and then with 
President Zeroual and this is unequivocally the main reason for Algeria‟s civil war and the 
political effects of the dynamic spurred by this weakness is the reason for the way in which 
the civil war was fought. 
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1 Introduction 
The topic I have chosen to approach in this question concerns Algeria, a north- African 
country on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. More precisely it concerns the latter part 
of its modern history. The country in itself is not particularly ancient, as it was historically an 
uniquely annexed part of France. That is until as one of the first third-world countries it 
liberated itself through a war of independence (1954-1962). From that time until the period 
under discussion in this paper much could be said, and indeed more will be later. However, 
for now I will say that the events between 1989 and 1999 stands out as the pivotal moment in 
the modern history of Algeria. I claim that this was partly due to the way in which they 
unfolded and partly due to the effects they have had on the Algeria we see today. The moment 
I write of is the civil war of Algeria that took place in the 1990‟s. In it we find several 
incidents of notable violence enacted against civilians, insurgents and government forces 
alike. The violence peaked in the last years of the war, 1996-1998 with several appalling 
massacres that makes one wonder; why? It also serves as a rather curious historical example 
to what we see unfolding in present day Syria. I will not be as forthright as to say that both 
conflicts are the same, but certain parallels can be drawn and as such I look into the past to 
answer one particular question that baffled commentators of the Algerian Civil War - “Why 
did the Algerian civil war 1989-1999 descend into what has been called a “savage war”?” I 
must note that even though the current situation in Syria makes it an interesting parallel, and 
one that could be interesting to approach, this is not addressed, focused on or made into a 
comparison in this paper. 
The preamble has several underlying points to it; first, it establishes that it was a „civil war‟; 
second, it establishes the time frame of this civil war and, third, with the word “descend” it 
implies that there was less violence in the beginning. This is all intentional. The first two 
points I will grapple with when I discuss the secondary literature further down. The third 
means exactly what it implies. The civil war is, in my hypotheses, a clear decent from what 
started out as a struggle for progressive reforms in a country which, along with many others in 
the world at the time, had experienced a fall in living standards due to the oil price crises of 
the 1980‟s. The late 1980‟s and early 1990‟s was the time for the second wave of democracies 
and so the question is an important one in that it can explain why this halted in Algeria. I 
believe this happened due to a largely unaddressed and crippling trait of the Algerian base of 
power, a base of power, that was so concerned in being sovereign or all powerful that it let an 
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entire country‟s population wreck itself rather than actually share any of the power because it 
saw this as the most rational choice in maintaining its self-interest. The power base in Algeria 
is and has been since their independence in 1962 the Algerian Army.1 It exerted its power 
through an old institution expressed in the Algerian culture as the jema’a, meaning that one 
governs and decides as many rather than one.2 This may sound counterintuitive to a country 
that up until the reforms of the late 1980‟s had been governed officially by a single party 
state, however what is meant by this term is not overall power sharing, but that a small group 
governs together. If the question has a clear answer and it is the above, then knowing the 
reasons and processes that lead to it may help one understand, prevent and perhaps even 
untangle similar events as we see them. If the hypothesis holds, one can try and identify why 
the people in this instance were not part of the army‟s self-interest and if so how one could 
make it part of it. These are some of the possibilities and benefits I see coming from asking 
the question and trying to answer it. 
The question is a hard one, however. It may not even have a clear answer. To answer it here 
we must take a sound look at the politics of Algeria leading up to and during the civil war 
beside the actual violence in the conflict. As we need to first understand if or how the 
population, or the majority of it, was not important to the army jema’a in particular only the 
structure of what maintained their presence and ability to be the jema’a can answer that. Once 
we have identified how they maintained their position we will have to address what led to the 
war, if it was a challenge to their position, to something in the structure that held them there 
or even something else( as discussed in chapter 2.3). Once this question has been adressed the 
next step is to figure out how exactly they reacted, if any changes occurred in the structure 
that maintained their position so as to alter their possible responses in the civil war. The army 
was not the only actor in the war; rather it was one of many. I will have to approach these as 
well to further see how they influenced the decent with their methods, perspectives on the 
population and the army. Once I have described who were fighting who and why they were 
fighting I will go on in more detail on exactly how they fought to satisfy the “savageness” of 
the preamble. In chapter 5 I will draw upon the political set up I have laid out in chapter 3 and 
4 to explain why the army responded with strategies seen as unbecoming of any nations‟ 
army. The unintended results of what is described in chapter 5 and what it led to for the 
population, the insurgents and the further decent into savageness and the result of it will be 
                                                 
1
 Martin Stone, The Agony of Algeria (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 129. 
2
 Ibid., 103. 
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addressed in chapter 6. Just how these results affected the war will be discussed in chapter 7 
where the worst atrocities of the war will be addressed.   
As mentioned above, the politics must be scrutinized to make sense of the events throughout 
the civil war. The actions, the reasons behind them and their results will in chapter 8 be 
looked at through an economical perspective as the economic situation of the country without 
a doubt contributed to the start of it and the strategies executed in it. I will discuss the major 
economical happenings of the 1990‟s and see why they happened and how they led, directly 
or indirectly, to a further promotion of violence before I end my inquiry with chapter 9 that 
deals with the conclusion of the war and what it may tell us about the direct and indirect 
reasons for the violence throughout it.   
1.1 Choice of Theory 
As is abundantly clear there are many sub questions to the overlying one that needs to be 
answered. There are many complicated processes at work and to help me answer all these 
questions I have chosen to apply “The selectorate Theory”.  I suspect the theories‟ categories 
will fit the context of Algeria both with regards to its politics and war parties. As I hope to 
communicate throughout this paper, this is by no means a theory exempted from faults and 
gap.3 The theory proposes that any leader has a winning coalition that is drawn from a 
selectorate pool. These categories may all vary in size and it is with these variations that we 
see the biggest changes. The selectorate is everyone viable for a position in the winning 
coalition and the ones that willingly or unwillingly chose the winning coalition. 4  Though it 
can be applied to any type of society or group – a democracy serves as an illustrative 
example. The selectorate are those eligible to vote, the winning coalition are the politicians 
getting the votes providing the leader with political support so that he may maintain his 
position of power.5 In this example, any individual with suffrage does have a say to some 
extent in who is the leader, but the winning coalition are the party members that actually pick 
the candidate and so have a direct influence in getting him and keeping him there.6 The 
relationship is however a two-way street, the leader gets the support he needs and he supplies 
                                                 
3
 A discussion of the theory, its faults and critique of it will be offered further down. 
4
 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, The Logic of 
Political Survival (The MIT Press, 2004), 41. 
5
 Ibid., 51. 
6
 Ibid., 38–39. 
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the winning coalition directly or the selectorate in general with private and public goods.7 
Public goods are what in democracies appear as roads, schools and hospitals, basically 
meaning policies that make the selectorates‟ life better. Private goods do exist in democracies 
as well but are typically lower as they often represent corruption or backdoor negotiations 
where the leader will serve key individuals what they want for what he wants. The theory 
establishes through empirical studies that a leader‟s main interest is to stay in power. That 
good policies(public goods) are such a large part of democracies is attributed to the fact that 
good policies tend to keep one in power. Therefore if the leader is a “good” leader, he 
enriches the selectorate here being the ones that elect the winning coalition that again elects 
the leader helps one maintain the leadership.  
This example was one in which the selectorate and the winning coalition were big. If the 
situation is different, however, so are the results. In a state or group where few have a say in 
the election of a leader or those electing the leader the ratio between public and private goods 
tends to be opposite. If only a handful of people help one maintain the leadership – which the 
theory claims is the main goal of a leader – it is cheaper to hand those few individuals private 
goods rather than use resources on public goods that serves no purpose in maintaining power. 
This is why maintaining control of and having resources is absolutely paramount in any state 
governed by a smaller number of people, because if you do not there are no private goods to 
buy support. The private goods do not need to be actual money however, and having few 
resources is an impediment to anyone trying to provide public goods as well but it is the direct 
control that distinguishes the two. 
The results of the latter example have some dire effects, especially if the leadership has 
resources. If the example is to be found in a nation state it means that very few people are 
getting benefits from the one supposedly leading them as they are not important to the 
leader‟s goal of staying in power. The only scenario they might have some influence in -even 
if the winning coalition and the selectorate are small - is if they contribute with resources, 
meaning tax in a nation state.8 If the leader has another source of income there really is no 
mechanism as there is no incentive found in the theory that can make the leader produce 
beneficial public goods.  
                                                 
7
 Ibid., 78. 
8
 Ibid., 44–45. 
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The simplicity of the theory is its greatest strength but also makes room for criticism. Many 
disagree on its usefulness, of particular note is Ryan Kennedy who has argued quite strongly 
against the theory as he finds inconsistencies within it. In his view it is not as applicable as 
first stated across regime types. He claims that his findings from an extensive use of the 
theory across time and different regime types produces different results than those projected 
by the theorys‟ authors.9 This, however, is not as relevant to this paper, or at least not 
conclusive. Since his findings were the result of introducing different measures of democracy 
into the equation, as Algeria by no means is a democracy his second finding is more 
interesting. As he in the second finding concluded that the measures used for the winning 
coalition‟s size has a correlation with the stability of leaders in non-democracies. Kevin A. 
Clark and Randall W. Stone however argue that the theory‟s most important findings are all 
wrong due to miscalculations on its authors‟ part.10 This is a technical mathematical argument 
against the foundations the theory‟s findings rests upon, and as I do not intend to utilize it in 
any mathematical fashion throughout the paper I am not risking the same fault. It can however 
imply that the “rules” or findings of the theory are at best inconclusive as to usefulness across 
regime types. On the other hand, further critiques of the theory more or less emphasize the 
shortcomings of the theory, as the authors themselves also do. As they acknowledge in the 
book themselves the theory treats the leader as an actor with sole control over policy.  It also 
situates questions of ideological competition outside of the model, as public goods are normal 
goods meaning ideology is only touched upon when finding similarities between leaders and 
followers. It is lacking with regards to the separation of powers as there are no checks and 
balances among powerful actors. These questions exceeds the boundaries of the theory, for it 
is assumed that all members of groups are identical except for their own affinities for one 
another.11  
These are all critical points that are worth mentioning in relation to my own paper.  In this 
paper however the theory is used to clarify fundamental categories of different groups within 
Algeria. Thereafter I take advantage of the trends and mechanisms the theory suggests and I 
apply these to the interaction and rationale behind acts done by or to other groups. I go 
beyond the theory in several instances - especially with regard to checks and balances - as I 
                                                 
9
 Ryan Kennedy, “Survival and Accountability: An Analysis of the Empirical Support for „Selectorate Theory,‟” 
International Studies Quarterly 53, no. 3 (September 1, 2009): 695–714, doi:10.1111/ j.1468-2478.2009.00552.x. 
10
 Kevin A. Clarke and Randall W. Stone, “Democracy and the Logic of Political Survival,” American Political 
Science Review 102, no. 03 (August 2008): 387–92, doi:10.1017/S0003055408080131. 
11
 Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival, 60, 74, 75. 
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see these groups functioning beyond the dynamics of the selectorate theory. In addition, I 
freely use it as a tool to explain a separate set of the categories with regards to the insurgents 
whose reasons and rationale are easier to explain in the context of the theory. The categories 
and definitions from the selectorate theory are to some extent also modified to suit the paper‟s 
needs. Although the leadership of the army is as mentioned above one of the jema’a and not a 
single leader, the theory dos not suggest that it has to be. However, if one were to scrutinize 
the inner workings of the jema’a one might reach findings that made the theory less useful. 
As this is near to impossible due to the informal way it operated I will have to trace its 
opinions, actions and methods through the empirical evidence and what it suggests according 
to the theory. This also means that political in “Political survival” is to be understood as both 
formal and informal politics here. So it is seen  as a categorization that identifies the simplest 
elements in a functioning group - that seeks its own interests whatever they may be- , and so I 
derive from the selectorate theory some “rules” as to how these elements function towards 
each other. The theory‟s disregard of ideology has no immediate effect as it would only 
concern the insurgents in Algeria, as they were all too some extent aligned with some form of 
islamism. When the ideology carries weight in the analysis however it will be appropriately 
discussed. What I suspect will become evident however is that ideology was not a major 
variable that pushed in towards any outcome – at least not concerning my predicament -, as I 
will argue the reasons for the war in Algeria were more practical than anything else.  
With this theory in mind, I think that several things will become clear. First I think that the 
economic and political reasons for the civil war will become evident as the first suggest an 
affluent and so a less-able leadership that had to cede political power since it could no longer 
provide the private goods it had with higher oil prices. I think that their ability to do this as the 
theory suggests affects their position greatly and as the start of political liberalization with a 
less sturdy economy is a natural outcome. However I believe this liberalization went too far 
and involved a new set of actors that demanded too much control over the army‟s resources 
due to an understanding of a real expansion of the selectorate. I argue that the army misjudged 
to what extent this expansion would cost them in terms of resources and so reneged on the 
process they had allowed to unfold as will be discussed throughout chapters 2 and 3. I also 
expect to see that any betterment of the fiscal situation will embolden the army to reassess its 
power, as the theory suggests that leaders with small winning coalitions with access to 
resources have no need for the population at large. I think it is this lack of contribution to the 
leadership‟s position that above all allowed for the decent into a savage war.  
7 
 
1.2 Review of sources 
My preamble assumes that the conflict that ravaged Algeria during the 1990‟s was a civil war. 
This definition is contested however. And if it is agreed upon the start and end of it is also 
widely discussed. Hugh Roberts an analyst of the country for one has some issues with it 
being a civil war. He especially makes a case against the insightful book The Algerian Civil 
War by Luis Martinez, in which he rightly critiques the definition Martinez puts forth and 
then the following data used to describe the alleged civil war. Hugh Roberts maintains that the 
factional politics and violence negate the thesis that it was a civil war according to Martinez‟s 
definition, and that according to it the war is a rivalry to consolidate the state.12  In this 
specific case he might be right, that Martinez is a bit off the mark applying the definition he 
does, but still it is here maintained that a civil war was indeed the product of the insurgency 
that took place. I have come to this conclusion based on the death tolls that stand above 
200 000 lives, the geographical expanse of the conflict and the fact that some areas were not 
only ungoverned but governed by others than the state. 
The books that make up most of my secondary literature disagree on more than just this 
definition however; the reasons for the war are contested as well. Cathrine Løchstøer in her 
book Ved Deomkratiets Grense concludes that the war was a result of socioeconomics and 
international variables like oil prices and foreign support and control from the IMF and The 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that unravelled the politics. The civil war in her regards did not 
start until around the year 1995 as this is the point where the “bumper” function of the trade 
unions and political parties no longer can ease the pressure from the population.13 Her 
explanation for the violence during the war is in my regard an oversimplified one. She holds, 
for example, that the experiences from the war of independence lay the foundations for and 
set the standard for the same type of conflict later on.14 Although I agree with her on the first 
point I find the second point lacking as there is no clear correlation between the two other 
than rhetorical anecdotes like the fact that the same villa used by the French for torture was 
used by the army during the civil war.15 This is a curious fact but proves nothing, in addition 
she also assumes that the political liberalization was not in fact genuine, the main argument 
behind that conclusion is however not finding any good reasons for it to be genuine 
                                                 
12
 Hugh Roberts, The Battlefield: Algeria 1988-2002, Studies in a Broken Polity, 1 edition (London ; New York: 
Verso, 2003), 353. 
13
 Cathrine Løchstøer, Algerie: ved demokratiets grense (Aschehoug, 1995), 251. 
14
 Ibid., 255–256. 
15
 Ibid., 256; Roberts, The Battlefield, 313. 
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something this paper in fact does.16 I think the main weakness of the book is how close it is to 
actual events, as the empirical foundation yet is not as big as one should like the regretful 
outcome of the democratization process is what‟s being dealt with at large and these two 
points make some of her comments more confusing than enlightening as in general her 
categories of islamists in particular seem to overlap, be faulty and untidy. 
Michael Willis on the other hand presents us with a brilliant work that clarifies a lot of the 
confusion surrounding the early events of the civil war make. In his book The Islamist 
Challenge in Algeria he traces the different islamist factions and ideologies throughout 
modern Algerian history up to the civil war, something that makes the divisions among them 
and their mixed actions easier to understand.17 This book was out one year after Løchstøers 
book so it also suffers from being close up to the events described in the latter part of it. This 
also sets a cloud of premonition over the analysis - as the civil war was not over at the time of 
writing, the tentative future is often interpreted into the past. Concerning the reasons for the 
civil war Willis claims that the FLN and the army had hoped to achieve some sort of 
equilibrium with the islamists in politics, politics that they controlled. This would mean that 
the FIS would be welcomed in the political system as long as they recognized the army‟s 
position and behaved accordingly. That conclusion leaves any real sentiment towards 
democracy out of the equation but for different reasons than those proposed by Løchstøer. As 
an example he describes how both one General in particular, Khaled Nezzar meant that the 
FIS had no place in politics as well as negative comments from the members of FIS pertaining 
to the privileged position of the army hampering any cooperation.18  
Another eminent researcher in the field is Luis Martinez who is himself Algerian. His book 
has less of an overall political approach to the conflict as he goes more in-depth and utilizes a 
large amount of first hand sources such as interviews of actual victims and perpetrators, 
drawing on their experience to paint a picture of the situation of the population at large. He 
divides the civil war into two periods where one can trace different tactics from a destitute 
people. In the first he shows how people in a pragmatic way only try to survive and get 
resources to do so in a situation that is all out war between the army, insurgents and local 
emirs that govern like the mafia with racketeering, fake roadblocks and heavy informal 
                                                 
16
 Løchstøer, Algerie, 256. 
17
Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History  (Washington Square, N.Y.: NYU Press, 
1999), Xv. 
18
 Ibid., 239. 
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taxation.19 The second period is characterized by the economic changes that took place after 
1994 when the IMF rescheduled Algeria‟s loans enabling the government to target the youth 
in economic programs to avoid more insurgents. This was a period of economic and social 
improvement. Before this period, Martinez sees violence as being the means to achieve one‟s 
aims, and traces this cultural trait all the way back to the country‟s Ottoman history, 
something which also aligns to some degree with Løchstøers conclusion.20 I however find 
issues with the conclusion as it does not take into account why the Emirs of the first period 
actually gathered resources and what they spent them on, namely supporting and upholding 
their insurgency against the state not on luxurious villas and other indulgences.  
I think the Martinez‟s books greatest asset also detracts from its value to it in some respects. 
As most of his sources are interviews with locals in Algeria, I find that he lends the arguments 
in the interviews too much credit. They are often oversimplified and do not explain many of 
his major points. The book, however, is a treasure trove of valuable interviews. What I find 
most trouble with is the conclusion he draws from them. 
Contrary to the close up perspective of Martinez, Hugh Roberts in The Battlefield Algeria 
1988-2002, Studies in a Broken Polity has as solid a political overview as the title implies. 
The jema’a term I have introduced is to be found in this book as well as Martin Stone‟s The 
Agony of Algeria though none of them concludes in the same way I do they also identify it as 
a key variable in explaining the political changes in Algeria.21 Roberts‟s book is a collection 
of articles he wrote during the civil war so that explains some of inconsistencies between 
them but one we disagree on is the civil war definition. As he not only refutes Martinez‟s 
definition of a civil war but that it was one at all.22 He consistently avoids the term, but this 
results in him calling the insurgents by many names as well. Sometimes they are insurgents, 
sometimes they are guerrillas and then terrorists.23 It is not a major flaw on his part and he 
simply does not see the definition as useful, so abstains from it, it is also as said partly 
excused by the article format of the book.24 One point on Algerian politics he tackles better 
than others however is the secretiveness of it.25 This enables him to be much clearer in vague 
aspects of the analysis compared to others such as Martin Evans and Jones Philips in their 
                                                 
19
 Luis Martinez and John Entelis, The Algerian Civil War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 102. 
20
 There also is a quote on bottom page 128 that discredits his thesis. Ibid., 88–89, 106, 126. 
21
 Stone, The Agony of Algeria, 103. 
22
 Roberts, The Battlefield, 127. 
23
 Ibid., Xiii. 
24
 Ibid., 259. 
25
 Ibid., 132. 
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book Algeria Anger of the Dispossessed. Although he does to some extent fall into the same 
pitfall of alluding to mysteries and leaving the reader hanging in suspense over some covert or 
incomplete fact but not to the same extent as the above mentioned.26 Evans and Philips‟ book 
offers a solid analysis in my regard of what happened in Algeria, but however sound their 
conclusions may appear I have found several instances in which they have tenuous factual 
support. They are prone to recount speculations as facts, use witness accounts as definite 
proof even if there is only one verification.27 Being somewhat uncritical as well as having a 
bit of a dramatic writing style it is still a book with several interesting facts and conclusions 
but not one I have drawn heavily on due to these reservations.  
The two last works I have utilized in my analysis of Algeria both stand out in different ways. 
William B. Quandts book Between Ballots & Bullets, Algeria’s Transition from 
Authoritarianism though containing a considerable amount of interesting empirical evidence 
and some mind interesting conclusions it is heavily biased. As the author says in the 
introduction Redha Malek, one of the key players at the onset of the civil war is a personal 
friend of the author, this would not necessarily make him biased but I think, simply, that it 
did.28 The entire book presents the army more or less as an innocent bystander that in the end 
has to tackle the islamists who, in the book are compared to fascists.29 This is an 
oversimplification and a misunderstanding that leads him to make false conclusions as he 
does when he claims that Benhadj and Madani who were to jailed FIS leaders “couldn‟t 
agree” on negotiations with the regime he forgets that contrary to being all powerful fascist 
leaders they were in fact the heads of a shura council that would have to be consulted before 
any decision was made, so not necessarily because they did not want to.30 He also claims that 
Algeria after the French colonization was left without any societal or cultural order in a chain 
of arguments that concludes with the army and the single party state being the salvation of an 
almost barbaric land who could not take care of itself in total opposition to what Hugh 
Roberts claims on the subject.31 
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The other book is Anthony H. Cordesman‟s A Tragedy of Arms, Military and Security 
Development in the Maghreb. As the title implies, the book‟s main focus and outlook is a 
military one. It does not focus solely on Algeria either but rather grasps the entirety of the 
western part of North Africa in one analysis with this perspective. The strengths of this book 
include a wealth of empirical evidence relating to the army‟s sphere of influence, much of 
which I have used in this paper. The weakness of this book, however, lies in its often myopic 
focus on military matters - something that often renders its conclusions too narrow and 
lacking.  As the main conclusion of the book is that too much money was spent on the army, 
meaning more than the country could afford resulted in poor policy choices and a civil 
war.32The focus does however give one some surprising facts not found in other works on the 
area from the same period.33 
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2 Where did it all begin? 
The events to be discussed here began on February 23rd, 1989 with a ratification of the new 
constitution. In it, all references to socialism (which the prior was laden) were removed and 
with it the single party that had been the official government of Algeria became part of a new 
multiparty political system. As the new constitution recognized the right to form 
„associations‟ of political character any party could in theory now vie for power. That same 
year from February to March the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was formed, eventually to be 
legally recognized in September of same year. The new constitution was a reformist project 
spearheaded by President Chadli who dismissed several officials that tried to stand in his way, 
like Kasdi Merbah the Prime Minister until 1989, Moulod Hamrouche was then appointed 
prime minister. Even though the new constitution dethroned the FLN it approved of the new 
radical economic liberalization that went hand in hand with the political liberalization from 
the start of the project. 
In June 1990 the FIS won a major victory in the municipal elections to the shock and disbelief 
of several of other involved parties. Not long after this President Chadli relinquished the 
defence portfolio to Major-General Khaled Nezzar something that would have major 
consequences for his political office later on. Before we discuss the events of the late 1980‟s 
at greater length I will address the lack of single actors. I will also describe the “Algerian 
Powerhouse” spelling out who it consisted of and identify those who made up the different 
categories of the selectorate theory in Algeria. Thereafter I will turn to a discussion of just 
how the reform program executed with the new constitution by President Chadli‟s initiative 
challenged the army. 
2.1 Establishing a point of departure 
In this analysis it is important to understand how the Algerian powerhouse worked, how it 
changed and who its members were throughout and before the Algerian civil war. Here we 
must first look at the actors or groupings that represented power in Algeria with the categories 
given in the selectorate theory. Before the coup in 1992 the selectorate mainly consisted of 
party members from the FLN and high ranking officers and generals in the army. This is 
evident by the sheer amount of politicians in the winning coalition with an army background. 
13 
 
In addition there may have been certain influential families that were part of the selectorate. 
This however, is one point in which Algeria comes across as “egalitarian”, as the war of 
independence (1954-1962) reshuffled the elite by way of positions and influence acquired 
through it. Nevertheless these influential families amount to no distinguished family names 
compared to other “bunker-states” and as such won‟t be addressed here.34  
If we take a closer look at the one of the main pools of the selectorate starting with the army 
we find a distinct lack of family names. However, do note that it is more important to look at 
the political rivalry through a prism that makes a clan rather than an individual the single 
actor. Information on this is, however, scarce and one can be certain that even though the 
selectorate can be large in some regards, it automatically shrinks with this phenomenon in 
mind, as only certain fronts or patriarchs have the ability to represent larger parts of it like 
villages or communes.35 Hugh Roberts could be said to discuss topics in Algeria in this 
manner to a certain extent. He moves in this direction when he with good evidence rejects the 
claims that a French cultural massacre took place during their annexation. He clearly 
identifies several key titles and positions that stem from a tribal culture predating the French 
annexation in the current institutions. These two points put together could be an answer to the 
lack of the same family names coming to the fore in the top echelons, that there indeed is a 
group thinking or action, though it isn‟t necessarily tied to a specific family name but works 
as one. Other authors on the subject - such as Martin Stone - point to the fact that a very high 
percentage of leaders stem from a certain geographical area called the TBS (Tebessa-Batna-
Skikda) -triangle in northern Algeria. Which would indicate that at least some clans have 
more sway than others considering that they stem from the same areas.36  
At the beginning of the eventful decade of 1980‟s, there was an attempt to modernize the 
Algerian army of which a large part of the selectorate consisted. When I write that they were a 
large part of the selectorate, it is meant as a potential part, since I naturally don‟t mean that 
the lowest ranking private could be called upon to serve in the winning coalition. But they had 
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the opportunity to climb the hierarchy at a later stage. As a result of this modernization the 
army received a large influx of high ranking officers whom did not fight during the war of 
independence, or came to ALN‟s (National Liberation Army) assistance at a very late stage of 
the independence war.37 Now the privates that theoretically had the opportunity to rise in 
ranks and one day be viable picks from the selectorate to be in the winning coalition would 
only be such if they gave the “higher ups” what they wanted.38 Therefore every promotion 
hinged on loyalty and political view thus maintaining a rather homogenous view and the same 
motivations.39  
The officers were a large and important part of the selectorate that promoted their own into 
the winning coalition during the end of the 1980‟s which may be part of the explanation of the 
developments during the 1990‟s. They were not the only large group representing the 
selectorate at this stage though, as the state allied party FLN (Front de Libération Nationale) 
also contributed with people serving in the winning coalition. They had done so for decades, 
though their tasks were always beholden to the unquestioning hegemony of the armed forces, 
they served as a secondary apparatus providing key figures when it came to public relations, 
diplomacy and state officials.40 
2.2 The Algerian powerhouse 
What is called “the winning coalition” seems slightly confusing when considering Algeria 
pre-1991. The confusions stem from the fact that parts of it were “public” and parts of it were 
hidden.41 Key members from the FLN, the president and key backers as mentioned in the 
army were what constituted the winning coalition. The leadership that should follow as a 
natural category was even more hidden. Beneath a political facade there was the army, FLN 
and the presidency which operated by a system of checks and balances.42 The army had held 
the strongest position therein – as an entity – making the strongest generals the de facto 
leadership and as such the leadership will hence forth be termed “the army”. 
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2.2.1 Identifying the winning coalition 
As mentioned earlier in the selectorate certain key members like patriarchs or similar fronts of 
it represented many others from the same selectorate, in what was a complex and shifting 
network of clans.43 These members mainly came from the army as officers or from the FLN. 
This was the case with the president who held the reins after Houari Boumediene, Rabah Bitat 
during the 1980‟s and with President Chadli. The latter was a somewhat perplexing figure 
with regards to the selectorate theory, as he certainly held real power but more as a front 
figure for the secretive army. He was a part of the leadership as their front figure but in effect 
primarily part of the winning coalition– with regards to his background in the army.44 He 
started to put in effect what in reality was a challenge to the current leadership of the army as 
he with his reforms no longer served as a proper proxy for the leadership but rather an 
obstinate part of the winning coalition.  
The army‟s representatives in the winning coalition also consisted of officers educated in 
France and the Soviet Union, ushered into their position by the self-maintaining system of the 
officer‟s jema’a.45 This education served as a connection between them that made a wing 
within the army itself have a certain bond between themselves. The leadership tends to form 
coalitions with people like them; therefore as they were accused of at several instances 
Algeria had a somewhat French influenced leadership sharing common values and 
backgrounds.46 These served as ministers and military leaders in key areas. The overlapping 
between individuals in the army and the political sphere makes it hard to separate the two, but 
there were professional politicians who were a part of the winning coalition as well. The 
president and the cabinet could do as the army wanted, forming an obedient winning coalition 
by showing loyalty and by ceding any real or interesting decisions to them.47 But in this 
clockwork the president had a far greater role than any party member. This stemmed from 
President Houari Boumedine‟s efforts back in the 1960‟s. 48 He certainly concentrated what 
power there was in the visible political apparatus onto the president. The once influential 
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“Oujada Group” was one of the last major power brokers before this happened.49 With no 
such groups existing in the same way the 1980‟s, the parts of the FLN party in the winning 
coalition was restricted to members appointed to ministers besides the president.50  
A final point on the winning coalition, especially towards the late 1980‟s was the focus on 
technocrats. An increased proliferation of them happened to face the very real state issues 
arising with drops in oil prices and the tension already felt due to the unemployed youth. This 
environment made room for technocrats that in addition to loyalty were appointed for their 
skills as well as their loyalty. Some of these really wanted political change, especially with 
regards to the political economy. Reforms addressing problems in it would have to be 
followed up by political reforms, or so it was believed. The role “outsiders” played when 
creating a winning coalition is a point to which I‟ll return in greater detail in chapter 4. For 
now, it is instructive to note that it was probably the pretext and the arguments from this strata 
that convinced the army to go along with President Chadli‟s reform project at the outset.51  
2.2.2 Who were the leadership? 
According to the information at hand, the leadership in Algeria according to the information 
at hand is by no doubt the army, and so it was during Chadlis presidency. This was contested 
at least once by the politician Abane Ramdane who tried to put the military under civilian rule 
early on after independence. He would, like so many other leaders of the FLN rise high just to 
be put down when trying to bestow too much power upon himself rather than the jema’a.52  
After Boumediene‟s coup in 1965 the army solidly became - and has been since - the 
principal source of power in Algeria.53 This is an elusive truth most analysts of the country 
nevertheless agree on, that the army and not the people are sovereign though not at first 
glance. Its main purpose it would seem has been to shuffle the winning coalition as it saw fit 
in addition to manipulating the political issues concerning it.54 
Although the above is true, there has been as there usually are some checks and balances 
impeding an absolute sovereignty. This conclusion rests upon the fact that as much as the 
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actors in the winning coalition and the selectorate need the leadership to gain private goods, it 
is nonetheless a two-way street. Within a certain framework one could say that the checks and 
balances have operated between the army, president and party. The president‟s role has to 
some extent been an arbiter between the other two as he would have a background in the army 
and operate in the purely political sphere upon taking office. The framework is of course 
dictated by the army, as became all too clear from what followed when the political 
liberalization program failed.55 However, the FLN‟s historical rejection of individual 
leadership and the culture for jema’a in the civilian and military selectorate and the leadership 
certainly played its part in making room for the challenge President Chadli put forth.56 
The way in which the army led the country certainly bore some negative consequences both 
for the country - as is widely discussed in literature on authoritarian states with elite classes 
pertaining to most of the countries resources and power, but also with regards to army 
capacities. Since an army so involved in politics, an army who emphasize loyalty and support 
promotes just that and not the necessary skill sets an army should have it results in poor 
military capacities rendering its ideal existence less useful as was clearly demonstrated during 
the onset of the civil war.57 In this regard one could say that rather than serving the country 
the army owns it, but not as a Prussian state, just as the determining variable for power 
without actually governing making it an organization that only meddles to serve its own needs 
rather than those of the country at large.58 
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2.3 How did President Chadli Challenge the status 
quo? 
What President Chadli effectively was doing amounted to an expansion of the selectorate and 
in a democracy setting the winning coalition itself. He thereby increased the amount of 
private goods in need of being doled out if there was to be no price drop in the purchase of 
loyalty, which the leadership did not want.59 Previously the selectorate had been exclusively 
from the party or the army‟s top echelons with a few and controlled exceptions. Chadli 
disrupted the natural order of things, party, army, politics and checks and balance by inviting 
other parties into the equation making the balance between the president, army and party 
powers more precarious than ever.  
In addition it could be an indication of Chadli disrupting the direct money flow of the army. 
Just before the onset of the military coup the military budget dropped, oddly enough, from an 
average of 5% of BNP to an all-time low at 1,7% in 1991. This in itself was half of the direct 
funds spent on the army, and it could be part of Chadli‟s failed plan in which he sought to 
show a willingness to control the money flow himself through political power.60 
When delving into Algerian politics the only thing one can be absolutely certain of is that 
Algerian politics are extremely secretive, there‟s a saying the Algerians have on the topic;” 
Tirer la couverture vers soi”, meaning the quarrels of a couple between the sheets, are hidden 
in the les coulisses (the corridors of power).61 The only thing we can glimpse is the actions 
taken, and sometimes the actors executing them. On this note there was an attempt at political 
opening in Algeria starting in the late 80‟s, and it is clear that President Chadli was the man 
behind the initiative.  
So it is now clear that the army and not the people were sovereign; there was a power play 
between the president, the party and the army - with the army being concerned with itself 
more than anything else. Due to the October Riots in 1988 stemming from a dissent with the 
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living conditions in Algeria, there was a definite will expressed by the people; change was 
needed.62 Precisely how or if President Chadli convinced the army that political opening was 
the solution is unclear however.  
What the army did not see or at least did not feel threatened by was the fact that President 
Chadli was trying to wrest the power from it. By instigating a pluralist political platform he 
would have radically changed who the selectorate consisted of and thus who made up the 
winning coalition and its size, giving it a stronger position. This can be derived from the 
selectorate theory as it amounts to a change in balance of power between the leadership and 
the winning coalition, when the winning coalition is big it is a seller‟s market with the right 
mechanisms in place, whereas a small winning coalition is a buyer‟s market. This might have 
been the reason why the FLN didn‟t protest as much at the reforms since they also were under 
the power of the army. In this regard President Chadli must have taken great care to tread 
lightly regarding the party as no leader in his position had been able to grab power and come 
out of the fray in a stronger position.63  
Another point that has been the subject of some discussion – explaining the willingness of the 
FLN - is the lack of ideology within the FLN.  The ideological void would make for no 
inherently conflicting arguments towards a plural political environment other than concerns of 
its own wellbeing. Cathrine Løchstøer writes of the FLN‟s admiration of the Baath parties 
handling of the islamists in Syria during in the 1980‟s and Hugh Roberts says they “admired it 
(the Baath party)” but other than that there is little academic writing to suggest that any 
overall ideology other than it being the first political machinery of a new state.64 The only fact 
saying something else the author has come across from the FLN towards President Chadli, is 
the suggestion that they encouraged the FIS as a counterweight to the growing power of the 
presidency.65 This may be correct but counter to it, it is also clear that the army would have 
felt secure enough. By continuing to manipulate all actors, reaching for important positions no 
matter what political affiliations they claimed to have, trusting in their ability to dole out 
private goods to ensure loyalty and their own position as long as they controlled the flow of 
money. 
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This process resulted in something none of the actors would have predicted, or at least not 
counted on. The competition for power in Algeria is and always has been a zero-sum game 
where the winner takes all and the looser nothing.66 So with the new possibility for real 
choices, President Chadli‟s political liberalization in fact opened up cleavages that were not 
seen as clearly or certainly not expressed to any significant degree in the political sphere. The 
state had never before been a channel for public expressions as it now was, making the 
distinction between it apparent for all.67 
In line with the reforms the army removed all its representatives from the Central Committee 
and Political Bureau of the Party FLN; this was in accordance with the new pluralist 
constitution that removed the army as such from any formal role in the government.68 As they 
themselves describe in their Algerian historical account; “…it became necessary with a 
division of powers.”69 In the historical account they go on about how they in respecting the 
constitution of February 1989 they expand and uphold their mission; “…to the defence of the 
sovereignty and national unity…” stating that the ANP (The Peoples National Army former 
ALN) had been raised above the political discourse.70 The effect it had contrary to the starting 
point was that the formal coalition - with regards to the winning coalition - was revoked, and 
that there were no longer any immediate links between the leadership i.e. the army and the 
winning coalition institutionally. President Chadli had in effect severed the ties between the 
apparatus the army used to control its winning coalition and the army. The crux of the matter, 
to which we will now turn, is that President Chadli didn‟t account for, or at least had too little 
support in the leadership to handle, the ability to muster the forces which could and would be 
essential for his political project.  
Since the army in itself was separated from the civilian world, and existed for itself more than 
anything else what President Chadli failed to recognize was that the ability to muster forces 
was paramount. Especially when challenging an institution that in itself had no other major 
attributes than just that. For the army‟s part, the importance of this ability is what shaped the 
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coming decade, in that it made its selectorate aware of the fact that for the defence of the 
current system, with the skillsets many in their selectorate had they would have to support and 
defend it to maintain their current level of private goods and or the possibility to get even 
more.71 On the other hand, the necessary desertion from the winning coalition to cripple the 
army is as claimed in The Logic of Political survival not considerable. However there is a 
premise for getting senior officers who control forces to join the desertion, something that 
was close to impossible with the way the jema’a worked.72 
The ability to muster armed fighting forces has in some ways been reduced post World War II 
as the proliferation of cheap automatic weapons made up for skills before needed with trained 
knights or archers.73 Something the insurgency that followed made vividly clear. Before it 
came to that though the islamists as mentioned might have played the part of the FLN‟s 
counterweight to President Chadlis growing powers. Or there might have been another reason 
for their allowed participation in the new pluralist environment. The islamists were nothing 
new in the sense that they were an unknown variable that no one had any idea how to counter. 
As mentioned above the FLN at least were well aware of what had happened in Hama, the 
islamists workings in Egypt and neighbouring Tunisia were also known to both the army, the 
party and President Chadli.74 But while opening up politically it was widely believed that it 
would mean less effort used at beating any islamist sentiments in the political sphere. As 
parties in political competition rather than in any other form of contest as insurgency with 
islamist sentiments had been a prevailing factor throughout the 1980‟s with the then 
insurgency leader Mustapha Boyali and his movement the MIA (Mouvement islamique 
algèrien).75   
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3 In what way did the army respond, 
and why? 
As established in the previous chapter, President Chadlis initiative had challenged the army‟s 
power position in Algeria for several reasons, more of which will be discussed here. Despite 
the progression towards political liberalization the people in the Algerian capital took to the 
streets in October 1988 to express general discontent with their living conditions. The 
response led to a tension between the army and the Algerian citizens as they massacred 
hundreds of protestors. Despite this show of brute strength the army continued to be willing to 
proceed with the political liberalization. This was commenced by allowing new parties to 
register in 1988 and 1989 when both the FIS with Ali Benhadj and Abbassi Madani serving as 
party leaders and the RCD (Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie) with Said Saadi 
were accepted as legitimate parties.76 The formal recognition of the multiparty system came 
with the constitutional reform of February 1989. 
The FIS won landslide victories in June 1990 and January 1991, both elections boosting their 
political capital immensely. However it made opposing forces in Algeria nervous and led to 
the arrests of prominent leaders in the FIS as well as public outcry from more secular lenient 
parties. These government arrests and political opposition, not to say outright encouragement 
to ban the FIS, led to hidden schemes on their supporter‟s part as well. Guemmar is an 
infamous border station in Algeria and was the location of the first violent strike at the state in 
November 1991. In it 25 islamist insurgents attacked the border station leaving several 
soldiers dead. 
The second round of the elections was never to be held. Regardless of public outcries due to 
the FIS‟s victory and the actions of islamist supporters, the army moved and shut the process 
down in a coup lead by a General Khaled Nezzar who served as Minister of Defence from 
July 1990. The army forced President Chadli to resign and created an interim counsel to serve 
in his stead consisting of five members all handpicked by the army. There was a constitutional 
law saying that after any president was removed from office, new elections should follow 
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within 45 days of his downfall. This was disregarded so the HCE (The High Council of State) 
started on already dubious legal grounds.77 
In this context I will through my set of categories and the way they interact try to explain the 
rationale behind the immediate reactions of the army following the riots and the project 
President Chadli started describe in the last chapter. I will attempt to find the key elements in 
this new political reality and say something about what they meant and how the army sought 
to benefit from them as with the unhinging from the FLN party. Furthermore I will try to 
make sense of the FIS‟s actions throughout the election period one in which one could say 
they took a bold stance. They mainly did this by threatening the army‟s resource pool. I will 
also discuss their involvement in the attack on Guemmar. These topics and the most curious 
question of all, how could the FIS win such a landslide victory in the first round of elections 
will all be addressed in this chapter that tries to figure out why the army responded in the way 
it did. 
The aspirations of the army are somewhat unclear, but it should by now be established that 
the army in fact were in a very comfortable position both before and during President Chadlis 
office - even when his changes began to take effect. Before their problems started their 
aspirations amounted to nothing more than upholding the status quo with them firmly as the 
power base. That developments on chemical weapons of mass destruction took off 
significantly from 1988 - which is the year before the political liberalization commenced - 
could indicate some aspirations or reactions.78 The focus on weapons of mass destruction 
could have been a demand from the army in return for any political opening or it could have 
been an expression of the army‟s concern regarding the October riots in 1988, seeking a 
means to safeguard itself or remove any threats by this last resort. Though the development 
never got far enough for usage, the situation as we shall see went from bad to worse. 
As in any country there were several issues at hand before the pluralist constitution was 
implemented, some problems of which President Chadli allegedly hoped to solve.79 The most 
heated topic were the previously mentioned October riots. They neither had a clear agenda nor 
a single cause igniting them, but socioeconomical causes are put forth as a complex reason by 
analysts on the topic. It was said that they were an expression of the people‟s despair due to a 
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drop in oil prices, which the previous year greatly affected their living conditions. The army 
handled these riots “poorly” seen from a conventional “western human rights” point of view, 
with hundreds of casualties. Therefore the army could have felt pressured to agree with the 
political solution offered by President Chadli. This also follows in the selectorate theory as 
they would have had to try and appease the populace somewhat, if not they could be subject 
to international reactions to a continuation in handling the problems as they did in 1988.80 
3.1 What was the leadership’s initial reaction? 
Following the acceptance of the pluralist project the situation with the people did not improve 
significantly, and the man in charge or at least blamed for not being able to handle the 
situation was Prime Minister Hamrouch. The army demanded that he be removed and 
replaced by Ahmed Ghozali.81 The move by the army clearly indicated their grip on the 
winning coalition, and prompted an alliance between the FIS and President Chadli  which 
again more or less guaranteed that President Chadli wouldn‟t run for a fourth term no matter 
the outcome of the upcoming elections. This in effect removed the man who had become the 
army‟s greatest opponent.82 With a reshuffle of the winning coalition the army asserted the 
vulnerability of everyone else‟s position. This meant that they all understood that as 
challengers they would be replaced – if they failed – since the leadership first and foremost 
needed loyalty from their winning coalition.83 The army however still believed that the FIS 
could be beaten or controlled politically and that they were another actor seeking to dine at 
their table.  
The single most important move by the army with the new instituted system was their total 
withdrawal from the party FLN, severing all ties in an attempt to show that they would adapt 
to the situation and that the seats in the winning coalition now could belong to “anyone” they 
deemed worthy.84 Some scholars hold that it was the FLN itself that tried to wrestle the power 
from the army, meaning President Chadli was a mere front figure. I find this unlikely as I see 
the severed ties more as a natural response to a multiparty reality.85 This meant that they de 
facto accepted an expansion of the selectorate that now consisted of all political parties, in 
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theory even the FIS. This move also removed all restraints on the army, the checks and 
balances were now in effect gone due to the expansion of the selectorate, it was a “sellers‟ 
market” for high ranking positions and not the other way around.86 This rings especially true 
since the influx of candidates for the winning coalition came from exile and as such from a 
weaker position which made them easier and weaker recipients of private goods. 
As the first round of elections drew near it seems that the army even flirted with the FIS, 
making a question quoted in Hugh Roberts The Battlefield Algeria, Studies in a Broken Polity 
relevant; “Why did the army allow the FIS to win a landslide victory?”87 Now this question 
assume as does this paper that the army is sovereign and that all power stems from it, so how 
can one answer this question? The answer could be as some have suggested that the army 
wanted political equilibrium, where a domesticated FIS was integrated into the institutional 
system and as such didn‟t challenge the army‟s own right to wield power and ability to muster 
forces. In other words, the FIS could be used as the upcoming underdog that made for a 
fiercer competition for spots in the winning coalition against any secular, or other politically 
oriented actor that before had been groomed in the FLN instead of insurgents.88 The situation 
didn‟t unfold in this manner at all, in fact the entire project of President Chadli collapsed due 
to one single factor and that was the overwhelming and unexpected electoral victory of the 
FIS. In retrospect this victory at seems unexpected, but it could also be that it indeed was a 
ploy to counter the growing powers of President Chadli executed by an army that suffered 
under a new political identity after the October riots, as the people‟s executioners rather than 
their erstwhile liberating heroes.89 
3.2 Why did the leadership feel threatened? 
The army felt threatened, and saw its position as being weaker on two accounts. First it would 
be bound to one party – the FLN – in the multiparty reality that President Chadli set about 
creating. To the army, this must have seemed like putting all your eggs in one basket. Second, 
the expansion of the selectorate is threatening as it can be harder to control who gets to be in 
the winning coalition resulting in less control. 
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When the FIS won its landslide victories in the first round of elections the army felt acutely 
threatened due to the fact that the FIS had been outspoken with regards to the army and their 
privileges. The victory made them likely candidates for the winning coalition which would 
hamper the army‟s efforts to dominate since that coalition wouldn‟t be interested in seeing the 
army benefitting from their work and as such be an adverse winning coalition. 
The army as has been mentioned practiced jema’a, leadership in a group, in this case a group 
of generals. This group had throughout the 1980‟s undergo a series of changes. Most of the 
generals in it had a French military education, and with it french secular values. When the FIS 
won the first round of municipal elections and got bolder these values seemed threatened. The 
FIS‟s reasons for boldness could have been either a real belief in that the purely political 
position was strong in itself or they could have been relying on traditions of covert insurgency 
from Bouyali in the 1980‟s - prepared to fight as some facts points towards.90  
With this in mind it seems prudent to point out that although the FIS looked like a cohesive 
political organization it was not. This meant that both reasons could have made them bold and 
that in this situation it in reality probably made for one of their weaker points. In any case, the 
boldness allowed members and leaders both before and after the elections to speak out against 
the army specifically, threatening the positions of top generals outright.91 These threats were 
seen in speeches containing predictions, like the quote from the FIS cleric Imam Mohammed 
Said who encouraged the population to prepare for changes with regard to attire and food.92 
The first changes the FIS made when actually governing their municipalities like sex-
segregating classrooms, banning alcohol and closing sports for women in several places also 
made for a stark contrast to the French-adopted values of the power holders as it 
foreshadowed what political power in the hands of the islamists could look like.93 
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These policy changes were not encouraging for the army who now saw that parts of their 
selectorate would be unruly. This made for worse odds for the army and higher chances for 
the FIS in gaining positions in the winning coalition. Despite the fact that they had no natural 
loyalty towards the army and most likely were quite resistant to any private goods the army 
would seek to manipulate them with. On that point however there were instances of FIS 
members being more cooperative with the army than others, but the most important parts of 
their leadership were jailed throughout the civil war. On a general level the mere numbers of 
insurgents early on suggests that any success on the army‟s part was meagre in this regard. 
The danger of losing the resources they controlled through their proxies was certainly a threat 
not taken lightly. The army had tried to safeguard against this by making any provision of 
political power at the cost of corporate interests to the army, giving them the ability to keep 
the winning coalition loyal – if corruptible that is.94 This was done through positioning army 
loyalists in state corporations as owners and directors, as well as through heavy army 
influence in the HCE who controlled the state‟s finances. 
These factors came to a head where control of the winning coalition and the selectorate was at 
stake. The advantage of a sellers‟ market for the leadership would evaporate if there was no 
market, meaning the selectorate were numb to any incentives given by the power brokers and 
as such could wrestle control out of their hands.95 The islamist were looking to control the 
army as well as not letting themselves be controlled, so the indulgence of the FIS became an 
apparent mistake that made the army move as they did.  
Cathrine Løchstøer accredits the army with a new political identity from the old identity of 
them being the people‟s liberators from the independence war to; “the peoples hangman”.96 
This was a label given with regards to the handling of the October riots in 1988. It‟s worth 
noting that by allowing the FIS to win the election they could be said to have killed two birds 
with one stone. They got rid of President Chadli who lost his backing, and they managed to 
mobilise secular sentiments against a common enemy, the FIS as they would “radically” 
change Algerian society. Even if this was the case with the identity of “the hangman” the 
common folk gave the army, it seems like the FIS did not understand or at least might not 
have been as opposed to the army as previously discussed. This leans on the fact that most of 
the FIS propaganda was aimed at the former regime party FLN and not towards the army 
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continuing well into the civil war.97 This could be attributed to the FIS misunderstanding the 
picture but more likely it was that they chose to tread carefully towards the fulcrum of power.  
In addition, the threats discussed earlier stemmed from only parts of the non-cohesive FIS. As 
we shall see, this changed not long after the situation had turned bloody; all propaganda was 
aimed at the army from 1993 and onwards. 
Preceding the coup there were several confrontations in the political sphere. Arrests of FIS 
members were carried out on accusations of instigating unrest leading to several strikes and 
more demonstrations, some that were successful and some that were not.98 This was not 
encouraged by the army who knew well of the mass support of the FIS but handled by the 
internal security forces.99 Now for their power in general the masses meant little, but unrest 
and mobilization of large numbers of people is frightening for any ruler. Therefore warnings 
were issued throughout the autumn of 1991 that if FIS should encourage more of these 
confrontations there would be consequences.100 Similar concerns were found – especially with 
Abdelkader Hachani -with the FIS as they noted with concern that troop movements before 
the election in 1992 were ensuring that whatever the outcome, the army most likely would 
have its way.101 
3.3 A point of no return? 
Before the FIS could finalize its victory by the second round of elections the army forced a 
coup to stop the proceeding of this situation. The army found itself in an unfamiliar position, 
on the centre stage. President Chadli‟s stance on the gulf war – the opposite of the FIS - made 
getting rid of him easier as he lost his best political capital whit their support because of it.102 
The coup and the election results were not foreseen by everyone as I see it, as the ad-hoc 
unconstitutional coup indicates. It could be that the army allowed the FIS to win so that they 
could force the usurping president out of power with support from the elite groups (the 
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selectorate for the winning coalition at the time) due to the imminent threat to the winning 
coalition and the selectorate of the islamists.103  
The threats above spurred the army to go ahead with the coup, spearheaded by General 
Nezzar and those later known as the “eradicator” generals. The common denominator for all 
these actors in what was then the “leadership” was a French or Soviet education. Laden with 
French influence and Soviet “camaraderie” they all had a shared interest in maintaining their 
political power, in controlling the money flow which gave them just that and their privileged 
western life style of which they were prepared to use violence to protect.104 
Although the army was behind the coup, and though they had enough will and manpower to 
see it through, the way in which it was done and what followed was not single minded. 
Something that stood out with regards to the prime minister – put in his position by the army 
after Hamrouche – who seemed to be more consensual and independent from the army than 
what they preferred - a probable reason for his demise.105 Another argument on this point is 
that later in the conflict there were generals how would show themselves to be more lenient 
towards the islamists; wanting negotiations and peace rather than the diehard line set forth by 
the French educated generals. 
William Quandt in his book Between Ballots and Bullets has a somewhat optimistic approach 
to the entire project and believed that there were sincere efforts at making a multiparty system 
for the sake of actual political opening and as such a sovereign people. In his book he sees all 
the mishaps of the 1990‟s as resting on a single “mistake” made by the “Algerian reformists” 
as they: “sought to outmanoeuvre both the old guard of the FLN, the radicals of the FIS” with 
their gerrymandering of the election. The Algerian reformists here are President Chadli, his 
technocrats and those supporting the reforms. This apparently backfired on the reformists as it 
gave the winners whom they thought would have been them a lot more than they would have 
otherwise gotten. He sees this giving the army no other choice than to intervening due to the 
landslide victory of the FIS.106 There is something to it, that there were miscalculations with 
regards to the gerrymandering no doubt, their actual effects were not the wanted effect. But as 
discussed above, it is more likely that the army allowed the FIS to run and win the election for 
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their own reasons. The coup and the following decade of horror had more to do with the 
normative stance of the FIS and less with what they “actually” won or not. They acted in a 
way the army simply could not tolerate, and as such rendered the outcome with the FIS in 
power a problem no matter how much or little power they would have held. If they had only 
won some municipalities the army would still have acted against a power holder criticising 
and starting initiatives that hampered their own positions, so I propose that the stance the FIS 
maintained after winning was their demise.   
It was a zero- zum game so the radical coup of the army changed everything. The selectorate 
changed, the winning coalition changed and the eradicator voices in the leadership‟s jem’a 
were even stronger than before, especially when the insurgency started as will be discussed 
further down. With regards to the new selectorate it became apparent immediately that some 
of the parties that had run in the elections understood the changes, and so the positions in the 
winning coalition were coveted. Said Saadi the leader of the RCD had even thrown in his 
support with the sceptics before the coupe. He called for strikes and demonstrations and even 
“any means, including violence” to prevent the holding of a second round of voting which he 
claimed would bury Algeria.107  
These could have been sincere statements but they certainly maintained the attributes a 
member of the winning coalition should have; namely loyalty and support. The reshuffling in 
the winning coalition as mentioned with the Prime Minister Ghozali - who was too 
independent and therefore replaced by Prime Minister Abdessalam who depended entirely on 
the power he gained through the army as he had no popular base himself - showed that 
opportunities that hadn‟t been there before were now present.108 These gave strong incentives 
to vie for power. 
The coup in itself was executed thus; General Nezzar pushed through with a “divide and rule” 
policy in the political establishment that was thoroughly disoriented due to the victory of the 
FIS and the new multiparty reality to which they were all newcomers.109 At the onset 
President Chadli wouldn‟t sign the army‟s attempt to remove the FIS from the elections 
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showing his obstinacy toward the current will of the army. The little power he had was then 
stripped from him in what was a poor attempt at trying to make the coup seem legal.110  
Since President Chadli‟s term was due in December 1993 and a new presidential election 
constitutionally needed to be held within 45 days of a president‟s departure they had a legal 
issue at hand. They circumvented this by establishing the HCE representing the presidential 
powers.111 With the HCE functioning as a new winning coalition within the political sphere in 
place consisting of several key members including General Nezzar himself it was easy to 
control the game politically. They used the new political powers to close down all 
institutional bases of the FIS and all other islamist affiliations, including private companies, 
their trade union (SIT) and cultural and charitable organizations, in effect wiping them off the 
political map.112 With the HCE in a governing position it gave them the opportunity to use 
constitutional mechanisms to achive the above, gathering what little institutional power held 
by the regional councils to the HCE.113 This could point to two things; either a naive attitude 
reckoning the FIS would see themselves beaten “legally” and concede their loss. This would 
have meant that they didn‟t expect an insurgency. Or it meant that the army expected the 
insurgency and just wanted to remove all who dared to challenge them at their own game and 
that this was the first step in that direction with the jem’a agreeing on “eradication” as a 
method for what quickly followed. 
President Chadli‟s fall was not as abrupt and sudden as I might have portrayed it here. There 
were several factors that led to his final downfall, including the threats the army felt with 
regard to him, his direct challenge to their hegemony and his continued support of the FIS. 
This final point actually made it all the worse, since he took the opposite stance with regards 
to the Gulf crisis than they had; this made it hard to maintain an “alliance”. So due to this, one 
his allies that aided his challenge of the army also withdrew their support.114 His decisions 
made perfect sense since his tentative winning coalition - or the coalition he would have been 
a part of – would after a hypothetical victory over the army have become the islamists. But as 
head of state in the Arab foreign politic milieu he could not simply take another stance 
towards Iraq. So having divorced himself thoroughly from the FLN already after the gulf 
crisis he stood without any support.  
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Others like the above mentioned William Quandt has linked President Chadli‟s fall to the 
democratization process itself, seeing him as an authoritarian figure in effect committing 
political suicide to enforce a new reality. It could be said that it was this that happened but the 
process on the surface with the expansion of the selectorate into a multiparty reality looks 
more like a pragmatic approach within a game of positioning oneself correctly, a game which 
he lost.115 
The HCE was a governmental organ replacing or taking on the role of the president, again 
more aligned with the tradition of jema’a as it consisted of multiple members. There were five 
members, two of them senior generals, Khaled Nezzar and Larbi Belkheir. The first also held 
the two offices of Defence Minister and Interior Minister which plays directly into the ability 
to muster forces of which the army now held an even stronger hand as the internal security 
forces were subjugated under the Ministry of Interior affairs. The fact that they had two 
generals serving on the HCE gave them direct control into what now only bore a poor 
semblance of a legal ruling organ.116 The extraordinary powers of the HCE resulted in what 
has been discussed earlier – that is to say, no checks and balances whatsoever – effectively 
giving the army free reign.  
The coup nevertheless resulted in an insurgency; this shows that whatever the army had 
planned it most likely failed. They had already stated that they thought the islamists would be 
beaten with less effort in the political arena rather than in pitched battles.117 Now that they 
had beaten them, or cancelled the contest in the political arena it followed that there would be 
an insurgency. I base this on the will to take up arms that had been seen in the 1980‟s as well 
as in the sheer audacity of the army and the effect of stripping a huge victory away from such 
a large group of people. And as a final point when the islamists struck, one gets the 
impression of a coherent large group executing asymmetrical warfare with precision and 
planning.  
One of the first of these asymmetrical attacks was the attack on the border post Guemmar. 
This was used as an argument by the army to excuse its actions, saying that the islamists were 
indeed terrorists and had planned for insurgency if they didn‟t get what they wanted all along. 
It may be correct that the attacks were planned for a long time, but the FIS and the loose 
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category “the islamists” doesn‟t fit the argument. For one the FIS certainly was a somewhat 
synthetic grouping gathered by some basic common denominators and not as suggested a 
strong and coherent organization like the Muslim brotherhood. They consisted in the main 
part of a nationally oriented djezarist direction and then again of people willing to take up 
arms and people not willing to take up arms of which the djezarist were a large portion.118 
The cohesiveness of the FIS will be discussed at length in chapter 4. 
Whether it was planned or not, the attack led to an uncompromising stance by the army; total 
extermination of all armed groups.119 This very hard-line attitude from the onset leads to what 
has been called “a savage war” in which the French analytical categories to the situation that 
followed, divided the state actors into “eradicators” or “negotiators”.120 This can be a useful 
analytic approach, but with the theory I am applying it becomes redundant. The reason for 
this is that the interpretation rests on the actual arguments used in the debate concerning the 
islamists and the coup from the actors instigating it or being the victims of it themselves. This 
is somewhat irrelevant data when looking at it with the perspective I am, they might say one 
thing but here it is more of a pretext to positioning themselves where they want to be within 
the winning coalition. Therefore there are completely different reasons for the hard-line stance 
in this instance; this approach also better explains the shifting positions of several of the 
actors along the way, like Zeroual and the political opposition that would come at a later 
stage.121 I will continue to use the terms only to denote a grouping of politicians and generals 
that acted in a somewhat cohesive way, rather than showing normative traits towards the term 
bestowed upon them.  
That the stance was a clear expression of the army‟s interest in maintaining its position as 
sovereign was clear on several accounts. First the very forceful “eradicator” stance made it 
clear that they wanted to be where they were, the second was the promotion of figures that 
accepted the stance and held it themselves – something as mentioned Rais Saaid tried to 
capitalize on.122 In all the arguments I made for the threatened position they felt only one 
solution comes forth as a plausible way to deal with the islamists. If they would back down 
for precisely that way, they wouldn‟t expand the selectorate to individuals that weren‟t willing 
to work or be part of it on the army‟s terms, since this could entail loss of control, resources 
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and the lifestyle they had learnt to cherish in France - something both Hugh Roberts and Luis 
Martinez agree on.123 
The protection of all revenues was already in play in Algeria, as all production facilities are 
located in the remote south, for which the geographical locations of the oil reserves are not 
the only reason.124 There are a host of perplexing questions with regards to the oil facilities, 
such as why the islamists didn‟t strike at more vigorously, or why there was such a small 
number of incidents harming the oil sector this however will be addressed in a separate 
chapter. For now we shall look at the more immediate channelling of these resources and 
what happened to it after the coup. The state funding for the local municipalities of FIS was 
cut off shortly before the coup leaving the FIS without funds where it was supposed to 
govern. If this was in order to dissuade the FIS from continuing to do so as the citizens would 
experience a worse governing apparatus, or if it was a show of strength or the start of a 
meticulous plan leading up to the coup it certainly shows what power the army had. I say this 
as it could deprive legally elected officials from the funding they needed to do work on behalf 
of - or as - the state.125 Another way to look at it is if it was an action required by necessity. 
The Algerian economy was not doing well by the end of the 1980‟s and even worse at the 
onset of the 1990‟s. Having already explained the lack of importance which the people in 
general attached to the army it stands to reason that any decision not to fund them in a 
municipality would not be a hard one to make, especially if it hurt the challengers.126  
The dire economic situation was somewhat mended shortly after the coup, as they received a 
550 million USD aid relief package from France and a western consortium.127 This 
strengthened the army and its loyalists at a critical point as the winning coalition as a rule 
only is as loyal as the flow of private goods offered to it is steady.128 The relief package was 
not only an immediate resource to be utilized - it also showed that somehow the regime had 
managed to win the support of the international community despite transgressions and so the 
future appeared one of economic stability. 
The foreign aid was not without its troubles, as the influence from abroad was not a welcome 
point for the opposition, especially with regards to FIS who used it in their propaganda 
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campaign against the state. Saying that the regime was a puppet for foreign forces (with some 
truth to it, as the western world dreaded islamists in power evidently more than they wished to 
see the third wave of democracy succeed).129 Some analysts even went as far as to say that the 
French were in fact in a “hostage” position under the Algerian regime.130  
Several things became evident once the dust had settled. Firstly, the army had shown clearly 
that it preferred to be sovereign in its own right; the sentiments of the supporters gathered 
behind the FIS had shown willingness to challenge both the political sphere and the way in 
which the army only took care of itself. Secondly, we can see that the army distanced itself 
from its traditional allies or selectorate in that it expanded it to its own ranks and basically 
everyone else showing loyalty and something to contribute to their cause. This 
“independence” and the new way the selectorate shifted are essential for what is to be 
discussed, as it lays the foundations for all the choices made by the army and the insurgents 
spanning the violent part of the conflict. Following the coup there were two groups with the 
ability to muster forces. They were both interested in being in a position to lead through a 
winning coalition stemming from a selectorate, what they differed on was the respective sizes 
of these. The vital point to notice though is where they acted in the same manner. In that those 
who positioned themselves or were kept outside of their thought paradigms and served no 
purpose for keeping or potentially putting them in a place of power – the disenfranchised had 
no apparent value at all.  
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4 War, the continuation of politics 
The coup and its surroundings have been clarified, as have the first moves on the insurgents‟ 
part with the attack on Guemmar. Following the establishment of the HCE the army needed 
someone with legitimacy to don the fig leaf in the form of the position of leader. They called 
upon Mohammed Boudiaf, an Algerian living in Morocco in political exile. He was known as 
a freedom fighter from the War of Independence 1954-1962 and carried with him some 
legitimacy to smooth over the unconstitutional coup. He was one of a new group of people 
who were occasionally allowed into the fold - these had spent time abroad either willingly or 
in exile, and all were vying for a return to power. Therefore several came willingly to do as 
the army commanded.131 With a working HCE the multiparty system was not totally 
disbanded but delayed as control needed to be established following the tumult of the coup. 
As such the political parties that had emerged in the late 1980‟s had no actual political control 
but neither were they disbanded except from FIS for obvious reasons.  
The presence of these political parties did however play a role in the public discourse 
following the coup, where some sided with the army in that a coupe was necessary others held 
that the election result of the first round should be recognized, FIS should be let back into the 
fold and a second round of elections should be held. This however amounted to little as they 
had no real power to enforce this in addition to a rather strong presence of coup-supporting 
parties. The burnt bridges between the army and the FLN - the nation‟s single ruling party for 
decades - had however amounted to them opposing the army with regard to the FIS question 
as they also wanted recognition of their electoral results. On a broader scale, one can note that 
a clear political division emerged among those who have been called the “eradicators” and the 
“negotiators”. The names are derived from their stance on the islamist insurgents. The 
negotiators - as the name implies, wanted to barter a political truce stopping the escalating 
violence, whereas the eradicators saw no other way than a total obliteration of the sentiments 
feeding the FIS‟s and the insurgents‟ support. 
Institutionally this was easy to achieve as all public displays of FIS and every institutional 
aspect gained after the first election round as governors were unravelled, fired and disbanded. 
This included their worker union SIT and even commercial enterprises know to be FIS driven. 
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A trade monopoly on paper importation was also established to undercut any media campaign 
through officially but paperless regime critical papers besides outright banning of newspapers 
that made the fight against the insurgency “harder”.132 
The HCE as mentioned only served as a shadow leadership, for the power as ever lay in the 
hands of the army who only inserted their proxies into the ruling council of Algeria first with 
Boudiaf and then General Nezzar who both came from the army. Even though their role in 
politics had been removed with the separation from the FLN and only partially re-established 
with some former army members in the HCE their presence in the public sphere was 
nevertheless felt in the conflict that in the following years would grow worse and worse. The 
figurehead of this institutional presence was General Mohammed Lamari who served as the 
supreme commander of Algeria‟s forces. He was renowned “eradicator” and his promotion to 
supreme commander is a vital sign showing that the jem’a preferred this position. The forces 
he commanded were enlarged in 1992 when all forces formerly under the Ministry of Interior 
came under General Lamari‟s command following a state of emergency declaration allowing 
him to assume command legally. 
The conflict itself had escalated after Guemmar with an increasing amount of attacks on 
government positions, personnel and resources. This was made possible partly due to alleged 
preparation but also a natural occurrence as several prisoners from the earlier insurgency with 
islamist sentiments had been released after the October riots in a move to appease the 
population. In fact the group called MIA which had been active in the 1980‟s found itself 
reinvigorated with its old members free under the command of Abdelkader Chebouti who 
without a doubt made the extension from politics to war when he lead his insurgents into the 
conflict following the coupe. They sought victory in two ways, and much like the political 
parties the FIS itself was divided. On one hand were the people wanting to push for 
negotiations and on the other hand were members that supported MIA that came to be known 
as AIS (Arme islamique du salut) in a less articulated fight.  
Chebouti himself was declared Emir in 1993 with the establishment of his own Islamic state, 
something discussed at length further down. This was only possible as the ANP found 
themselves in a bit of trouble and could not or would not protect all of its citizens something 
that will be addressed in chapter 5. The vacuum this created enabled the insurgents to fill the 
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gap and establish their own ruling institutions in areas from which they could later launch 
their attacks. These attacks were diverse, striking both at government owned industries, army 
personnel and members of the winning coalition. 
In this chapter I will first try to give an overview of which parties sided with the army and 
which sided with the insurgents politically. Thereafter I will comment on what this meant in 
terms of the selectorate theory, for the changes had clear effects on which groups now could 
be said to be part of the army‟s selectorate as well as the insurgents. Following this I mean to 
discuss how the decision to insert Boudiaf worked out for the army, and in what way he 
challenged them as all other leaders that had been inserted in the political apparatus. The 
importance of the state of emergency will be addressed as this gave the army control of all 
civilian forces. 
Second I will go through more thoroughly the insurgents‟ immediate reactions to the coup, 
describing their divide in more detail. I will interpret their actions and what they meant 
according to the selectorate theory and as mentioned analyse what Cheboutie‟s declaration of 
an Islamic state can be said to have meant for their overall strategy as a third point. In the last 
part of this chapter I will address the insurgents more operational strategy in which one will 
start to see the decent into a savage war. 
4.1 Who sided with whom? 
The selectorate of the army did not change significantly when compared to the situation 
before the coup, although it became even more loosened from the FLN as it was. The 
disassociated way of the selectorate became more important and is discussed as a rare 
phenomenon in Algeria. In the self-imposed or imposed ostracism one would try to increase 
one‟s value by increasing connections abroad and knowledge so that the leadership hopefully 
could make use of you later on and therefore bring you back into the fold. This is a 
phenomenon of which the second HCE leader Boudiaf is a prime example. 
One could argued that each member as part of the visible leadership had beneath it a winning 
coalition keeping it in the position with its own selectorate watering the theory down 
somewhat  – though I think this only a descriptive reflection of the tribal aspect of Algeria 
further enriching the analysis rather than making it ineffective or void. Beside the 
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disappearance of the FLN and the increasing numbers of people like Boudiaf, the new parts of 
the selectorate were the political parties established when the multiparty system was initiated 
In addition a much more flexible usage of all non-FLN personnel was possible as the army no 
longer were committed to a single party, basically meaning that anyone picked by the army 
could potentially support it. Martin Stone in his book “The Agony of Algeria” sees these; 
“political parties as pressure groups for minor clans or shadowy elements within the regime”, 
and to some extent he could be correct that this was their function between President Chadli‟s 
imitative and the coup.133 After the coup however they had little actual power to assert 
themselves with. If there was any agency it was in what they could offer in return for private 
goods in what was a seller‟s market of power - not the other way around – therefore excluding 
“pressure” as a viable modus operandi.  
The comments before the coup and afterwards with the positioning of the different parties 
must also be understood in the context of the selectorate theory. As all those who aligned 
themselves with the “views” of the army - meaning an eradication of the islamists without 
them actually ever having a political foothold - would make themselves more attractive. This 
was now possible as they were part of the selectorate that was now expanded and so 
potentially could contain them. 
Although not all the political parties opted for this stance, to a certain degree some put their 
bets in much the same way as above. - With the islamists or at least on a reality in which the 
army would not have as much power as it now had. This becomes evident when the result of 
the stance was no headway given in the current system, but the hopes of a new system that 
recognized the political parties as it by the constitution actually should do. This would at least 
mean that there would be a fairer competition and a much larger selectorate giving all of them 
a chance to rise. Others may have had sincere support for the FIS hoping that with their 
eventual victory the “loyalty” shown with their persistent demand of FIS recognition would 
curry favor in a new selectorate. 
Other organizations such as the ONM – war veteran organization who strongly supported the 
regime certainly made for potential members of the winning coalition as Ali Kafi the 
chairman of the HCE after Boudiaf actually was the chairman of ONM before assuming the 
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HCE position. Therefore it as an organization was also a selectorate pool the regime could 
draw upon.134  
By the French definitions the eradicators - meaning those who thought islamists did not 
deserve a place in politics - consisted of the following important organizations and actors; 
UGTA (Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens), RAFD (Rassemblement Algérien des 
Femmes pour la Démocracie), RCD and PAGS (Parti de l’Avant-Garde Socialiste).135 In one 
way or another all of these represented interests that were more aligned with the “French” 
values held by the influential generals. UGTA had been the sole union for decades – at the 
onset illegal as the union SIT became legal only for a short period during the late 80‟s - and 
had been and continued to be a strong ally of the army‟s leadership.136 RAFD had taken a 
blow in the 1980‟s when the family law was changed to appease the islamists to a certain 
extent. This direction the country was heading in was unacceptable so they were also firm 
eradicators.137 Ettehadi formerly known as PAGS (Parti de l'Avant-Garde Socialiste) were a 
communist party found the entire islamist agenda foreign and disturbing.138 
It is worth noting that the FLN were actually of the opposite opinion, demanding the 
recognition of the election results from 1991 and a continuation of the elections. This shows 
just how severe the break between the army, the president and the FLN had been. This could 
also be a mature FLN, recognizing being beaten at their own game. Here it is more likely that 
they least of all saw themselves returning to the army‟s favour due to its earlier actions, 
giving them only one option as to where it could hope to return to any power at all, through 
the reality in which FIS won the election. 
Following this overview of the selectorate it should be apparent just how little power anyone 
beside the army had. As there was nothing they managed to execute other than verbal critique 
that had no immediate effect, there was an iron grip on all power except the insurgency which 
will be discuss in more detail in the next chapter.  
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4.2 Who made up the new winning coalition? 
The army chose to substitute President Chadli with the establishment of HCE along with a 
heavy army presence and the insertion of Boudiaf as its leader. This was to last until President 
Chadli‟s original term was out.139 The HCE effectively became the new winning coalition of 
the army leadership.  
As the army was naturally uncomfortable with being in the immediate front of the country‟s 
leadership, they established the HCE and veiled their leadership behind it, in effect making 
them their new winning coalition. As touched upon earlier they were responsible for exerting 
the army‟s political power but formally they represented state power. With the leadership in 
this model being a jema’a - a council of peers - within the army one could say that the 
presence of General Nezzar for one now blended the boundaries between the leadership and 
the winning coalition since his prior position was within the jema’a tradition among the high 
ranking generals of the army. Though with the swap in position – taking on a political office – 
his interests might have been self-serving and thus deviating from the role he was to serve in 
the HCE. He was however a proxy serving the army jema’a in the new found institution of the 
HCE, so a part of the winning coalition helping to execute the will of the jema’a. However it 
was this weakness in the power system that again and again was behind much of Algeria‟s 
troubles in the 1990‟s as General Zeroual would be a clear example of later on.  
It should also be mentioned that the army led in a passive and peculiar way. The HCE did not 
convene often, in fact the first meeting after its establishment did not commence until months 
after it had been established. Therefore one could see at least parts of the HCE, as General 
Nezzar and General Belkheir only functioning as army proxies ensuring that the army got its 
way when important decisions were made. This insurance proxy was visible to a point as the 
army was accused of staging the assassination of the leader of the HCE – Boudiaf - whom 
they brought into the fold from exile in Morocco. This removal could mean that their 
influence and their self-asserted right to it was put forth as an argument for them killing him 
off themselves as he strayed somewhat from what is perceived to have been the army‟s 
wishes.140 Whether or not they were actually behind the assassination is beside the point. 
Moreover it clearly illustrates that this mechanism, though not formal, was indeed present. 
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The accusation also shows that the wining coalition of the army created time and time again 
was hard to control.  
Setting speculations of blame aside, it was apparent that Boudiaf had an agenda independent 
of his army benefactors. He started a harsh campaign against corruption that affected one high 
ranking general in particular - Mustapha Bellocif - who had funnelled millions of dollars into 
private accounts. This meant that any general in the leadership most likely could fall prey to 
his anti-corruption campaign. Boudiaf‟s reasons for this could have been honest 
statesmanship and wanting a better Algiers, but in the selectorate theory it is again tempting to 
look at some ulterior motives for his actions. Boudiaf was an outsider, not invested in the 
situation as he had been in Morocco for several years. He fit into the role of what the 
leadership conveyed as a legitimate leader after a political upheaval. They wanted it to end 
with some semblance of legitimacy to staunch opposition.141  His position as chairman of the 
HCE, though, empowered Boudiaf, offering him as many opportunities as restrictions.  The 
restrictions were not much more than being loyal to the army of which there was no inherent 
reason he should be now that he had obtained a position. As money flow is paramount to 
control, the move against corruption could therefore have been a move to tap into the resource 
flow securing his position and making him one of the patrons rather than a client in the 
relationship he was cast into.142 Beside the political challenges with their proxies in the 
winning coalition being the only possible political opponents the army also faced more 
physical challenges. 
The areas that concerned the army due to their hard-line stance had largely been taken care of 
politically with the disassembly of the political and private organizations of the FIS. What 
was left was to fight the insurgency. The army obtained absolute control of all state forces 
after the state of emergency was declared. That included all forces under the ministry of 
interior – though that too was led by a former general. In that way they would probably have 
held some sway in this sector in any case, but the move to a state of emergency made it 
lawfully under the direct control of the army. These forces consisted of all internal security 
forces, namely; police, secret police and different squads that were developed throughout the 
insurgency serving multiple tasks. One general in particular became well known in 1993. His 
name was General Mohammed Lamari, and he was the front figure for the hard-line stance of 
                                                 
141
 Løchstøer, Algerie, 243. 
142
 Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria , 265. 
43 
 
total eradication of the jihadi opposition and as of 1993 he was the formal supreme leader of 
all forces in Algeria.143 
The winning coalition was not restricted to the members of the HCE, although they provided 
the army with a legalistic façade for their leadership in turn for some amount of restricted 
political power and private goods. The limited political power is apparent; the private goods 
will be addressed in chapter 8. There were several other eminent individuals that made up the 
coalition. The inner workings of the army are hard to pinpoint, but it is natural to think that 
there was support from certain key individuals that contributed with the ability to muster 
forces giving generals more or less power in the leadership. Here the premise is that the 
hierarchy of the army didn‟t work in the conventional manner as briefly discussed in the 
introduction (2.1) rather that the officers as before threw in their support in exchange for 
private goods either in monetary funds or key positions, promotions etc. guaranteeing the top 
echelons their support in the direction they were leading. These officers were as mentioned 
overwhelmingly French educated, as were any professional politicians like former Prime 
Minister Redha Malek, HCE member Ali Haroun and the former Interior Minister Aboubakr 
Belkaid.144   
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4.3 The divide 
4.3.1 What was the opposition’s reaction to the coupe? 
When the islamist party FIS realized what had happened it forced the state‟s hand when it 
rebelled physically; in a reinvigorated MIA – later to become AIS. The AIS was in reality the 
continuation of an insurgency that had lasted through the first half of the 1980‟s. Many of its 
members seized the oppertunity to participate in politics when President Chadli started his 
reform program. They backed the insurgency together with numerous other groupings – AIS 
fighting with Abdelkader Chebouti made the extension of politics apparent for all.145  
The islamists in Algeria had rebelled several times – though on a small scale and 
unsuccessfully - in the short life span of the independent state. The last insurgency led by the 
now dead Boyali during the 1980‟s saw several islamist insurgents arrested. These prisoners 
were released during the tumults towards the end of the 1980‟s in an effort to try to ease the 
strain the FIS put on the state with their strikes and protests. It followed the bloody handling 
of the October riots as well as the imprisonment of several of their key leaders who were 
accused of agitating the unrest.146 There were also several Algerian fighters returning from the 
battle in Afghanistan from 1988 and onwards providing skills in adding to the fighting ability 
with the proliferation of cheap weapons. Of these several had connections to the FIS and a 
somewhat confusing group called the “Takfir wal-hijra”.147 There has been much conjecture 
over who exactly was behind the incident at Guemmar on November 29th, 1991. The tendency 
is to attribute it to 25 of these “Afghan” warriors. One of these who got imprisoned for the 
assault, Aissa Messaoudi aka Tayeb Al-Afghani was a member of the FIS trade union SIT – 
the only connection found by the author between FIS and Guemmar. The incident left several 
border guards working at the station dead, and started a spiral of accusations from the regime 
saying that the FIS had conspired all along to use violence even if they lost the elections.148 
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The validity of the argument should not be the focus of our discussion here as the incident and 
its actors are irrelevant to the question at hand. Its only relevance here is in terms of what it 
led the opposition to do; to commence with an insurgency. The decision to release captives 
from the prisons during the tense periods between the start of the political reforms and the 
coupe together with the influx of fighters brought voices and capacities to the fore that bore 
some weight. The actions that were supposed to appease the FIS were in large part an 
important variable leading to the insurgency to come. The islamists (or more precisely in this 
instance the FIS) reacted in two ways – reflecting the heterogeneous mix of the Algerian 
islamists. During a meeting in Batna several members such as Benazous Zebda and Hachemi 
Sahnouni who later went on to the more extreme version of insurgency in the group called 
GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé) were kicked out of the FIS due to their opinions on the way 
forward but still within it there were members and leaders who were willing to take up arms 
to demand what they saw as just, namely their rightful place in politics – though some were 
less willing to commence with violence.149 Those who saw violence as the appropriate modus 
operandi either supported the insurgency as politicians or outright joined the reinvigorated 
MIA led by the “Lion of the Mountains”, Chebouti.150 Those that weren‟t willing to take up 
arms certainly capitalized on the fact that someone had taken up arms against them and 
applied pressured to start negotiations. As both of these stances were apparent in the dual 
leadership of the FIS in Ali Belhadj and Abbassi Madani both of who were imprisoned in 
1991. They were imprisoned for “threatening state security” where Belhadj certainly was 
more in favour of rebellion than Madani, it made it harder or easier all with regard to one‟s 
aim at handling the conflict. 
4.3.2 Contested selectorates 
The opposition‟s actions demand answers, some of which will now be provided in the context 
laid out so far; why did the war turn out so grisly? Since the FIS rebelled something happened 
to the entire paradigm, effectively their obstinacy changed several things. First of all it created 
a parallel set of leadership, winning coalition and selectorate. This is true when you take into 
account that the FIS didn‟t lean on any existing state structure, for they were without a doubt 
ejected thoroughly from it making them the disenfranchised. Therefore what they did was to 
create their own contest to win, when they couldn‟t be a part of the other. As discussed in 
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“The Logic of Political Survival” the disenfranchised seek to replace one selectorate with 
another.151 A point supported by the competition between the insurgents and the ANP in 
recruiting the youth.152  
The leadership was as in the army made up of several individuals in a jema’a. Two of its 
members have been mentioned already - Benhadj and Medani - but then there were the 
leaders not imprisoned. There were leaders abroad in France and the United States creating 
another winning coalition while the selectorate were de facto any member of the FIS and to a 
certain extent the fighters behind the insurgency at least at the onset. The selectorate theory 
does not factor this kind of scenario, as it consists of competing paradigms of the same model, 
the mechanisms working in-between them are therefore partly derived from logic, and partly 
by extrapolating some key aspects from the theory. As stated in the introduction since the 
theory is merely used to categorize the different groupings of the conflict and their relation to 
one another this does not negate or confuse any findings.153  
Several things happened that made this significantly more complex. Shifting goals and 
alliances and other actors came to the fore making it even less clear who was aligned with 
whom. In short any member who aspired to be a decision maker within the FIS – naturally 
being an islamist – was a part of the selectorate. During the insurgency the commanders of the 
forces were certainly part of the winning coalition in which they contributed with the ability 
to muster forces in return for funds gained through the FIS‟s extensive networks and 
connections. What this all amounted to will be addressed in the next subchapter. Before that 
however there is another case to be made for the actions of the opposition.  Here I am 
pointing to the fact that they wanted back into the “old” system.  
The argument rests on the function of the AIS. It states that the logic of the AIS-strategy is to 
put pressure on the state. There is no intention to aim for a popular uprising, which in fact my 
thesis neither states.154 In the instance above with the insurgency amounting to pressure in the 
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form of nuisance value it is curious that no moves are made towards people with actual 
power, there are some moves towards the army but there it is killing of soldiers from their 
selectorate and not much more.155 The public discourse captures few imaginations other than 
the ones already agreeing on the message; the very fact that Chebouti declared himself 
“national emir” in addition to speaking of higher intentions than merely getting a concession 
from those governing to allow the FIS into the fold.156 The reasons behind the declaration and 
what it entailed will now be addressed. 
4.3.3 What did this entail? 
What the insurgents effectively did was not only accosting the formal winning coalition 
taking its current status, but also to create a parallel winning coalition, thus making for a 
competitive market. This is visible when several authors on the subject write of a state within 
the state. The framework set for this competition holds not only winning political support 
through votes and favours, but violence is introduced as a means of obtaining or inducing a 
bigger selectorate. Killing off enough of the opposing winning coalition is a decapitation 
strategy implied by the state and the insurgents as the conflict unfolds with the goal of 
removing or crippling the competition.157 On the parallel dimension of the “real” opposition, 
meaning the ones that actually acted against the current system and not only sought favour 
from the current power structure there are several important points supporting this argument. 
They show not only how the FIS tried to topple the existing power structure with their own 
structure, but also how other players acted in between the two. 
As already mentioned Chebouti declared himself “national emir” which could mean actual 
prince in the historical “head of state” configuration, or more likely – due to his alliance with 
the FIS – more like a chief of the armed forces. He did however as Hugh Roberts puts it; 
“establish an Islamic state” from 1992-1993, so the roles could either be blended, subversive 
or a direct front of the separate paradigm for the selectorate theory.158 First the reality might 
not be as tidy as we would have liked, meaning that the title meant both chief of arms and 
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leader. Second that it could be a very real fact that reveals more than a wish to be reintroduced 
in politics but rather a separate system dictated by an emir outside of Algeria‟s political 
traditions. Although he was not the only representative for the FIS, he might have been the 
figurehead or the national emir in a military sense; there certainly were insurgents that 
answered more directly to the FIS. They were situated throughout Alger, near the Atlas 
Mountains south of the capitol. Their area of operations stretched as far east as Lakhdaria in 
the Bouira province towards Kabyles and covered most of the Mitidja plain that includes the 
municipalities of Alger, Blida, Tipaza and Boumerdes.159 In these areas some were subject to 
an especially brutal tactic on the government‟s part by being abandoned. This spurred the 
insurgents to create substitutions for state institutions, and more contested places experienced 
one government at night and another during the day.160 In the outer regions that were sparsely 
populated the population saw less of the insurgency‟s violent actions and experienced their 
rule as the only one in a calmer environment.161 These instances and actions all support my 
argument in the previous subchapter, saying that the FIS parts fronting the insurgency 
challenged the entire system and with it fronting an entire new set of selectorate, winning 
coalition and leadership stemming from a different source of power. This becomes even 
clearer when the targets of their violence come under scrutiny. 
The targets of the AIS via the FIS were state personnel; first and foremost police officers, 
soldiers and other representatives of what they knew or believed represented the selectorate or 
winning coalition of the army. To make the competition for places in their own winning 
coalition more lucrative the logical thing to do would be to give incentive to actors with 
something to bring to the table be it economical goods, the ability to muster forces or political 
power to join them instead of the parallel structure. The tactic seems to have been to 
undermine the leadership and the winning coalition by killing of their members. They 
attacked the origins of the resources keeping the winning coalition loyal and ruined their 
support by way of removing their selectorate‟s security. Attacks like the one at Sidi Moussa 
one of the first attacks on the regime point to this fact, another indication would be the 
number of casualties the police incurred by the end of August 1992, in total 70 dead 
officers.162 This would be one of many ways to show the selectorate that they were not safe. 
By attacking government infrastructure - as a large part of industry was governmental not 
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only the hydrocarbon sector – they tried to disrupt the money flow. Several factories were 
sabotaged, and logistical routes disrupted. This has been described as one of their failures in 
hurting the regime, though the effort put into it showed a clear will impact upon the regime in 
a fiscal way.  
Other than that, the security situation also prompted international actors doing business in 
Algeria to reconsider their efforts, scaring away foreign skills and foreign money. The attacks 
on two French surveyors, who were kidnapped and later killed in September 1993 near Sidi 
Bel Abbes and the killing of two Russian military advisors and three foreign contract workers 
in SONATRECH‟s employment a month later certainly points to this as well. This had a 
negative impact both on the foreign presence and FDI.163  
The will to sustain losses at the regimes winning coalition‟s expense should already be 
apparent with regards to Boudiaf, especially if one accepts that this was indeed done by 
islamists with connections to the FIS and not through some covert government plot. Although 
several attacks on the selectorate within the army also show the same will, even officers 
betrayed their fellow soldiers by allowing islamists into army barracks at night to kill.164 The 
state of the army itself amidst the insurgency is a somewhat discussed topic, where Anthony 
H. Cordsman claims that the army was divided in more than opinion as the instances above 
could imply.165 Several others like Roberts, Stone and Quandt make no mention of this or 
deem the deeds too few or minor to have any analytic weight to imply such a division. The 
actions nevertheless show a clear will to hurt the selectorate. They robbed them of definite 
security even amongst their own and the reigning attitude within the FIS that said the war 
should not be waged against the people made it clear that they differentiated between who 
were effective targets. This precondition might just as well be a definition of “legitimate” 
targets, appealing to a sense of right and wrong, and the very reasons for the people being 
illegitimate targets in a state such as Algiers amounts to the same as effective targets.166  
Some such assassinations and tendencies to kill off the selectorate and the winning coalition 
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were seen from the onset of the insurgency. Just spanning from February 1992 to April 1993, 
a total of 860 people were killed in ambushes presumed to be carried out by “Islamic 
extremists” of whom 315 were killed in addition to 170 civilians and the remaining 375 
casualties were sustained by the security forces.167  
These questions of allegiances are important in terms of understanding the violent 
developments that took place shortly after the coupe. When we see why certain political as 
well as societal players chose to stick with the one side or the other the results will become 
easier to understand. We essentially have two stances on each side of the conflict, where one 
is to fight and the other is not to give up but to sue for negotiations. On both sides we find that 
the will to fight is the stronger. The reasons behind the allegiances then explain why 
assassinations, sabotage and strategies of fear and violence were employed on both sides as it 
became a contest of the selectorates more than anything else. In the following chapter I will 
try to go into more depth in describing these strategies, how they “complimented” each other 
and fuelled a continuation of violence ending in “a savage war”. 
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5 Why the “Let them rot” strategy? 
In this chapter I will first put forth a more detailed historical account of the regime forces‟ 
immediate clampdown on the insurgency, where I will present several brutal tactics which 
were employed against the insurgents and the population at large to apprehend them. In it the 
“let them rot “ strategy will be described thoroughly. This is followed by a short historical 
investigation into from where the “eradicator” stance stemmed and a discussion of it. To 
further clarify the dynamics between the army forces and the insurgents I will address the 
FIS‟s modus operandi as a counter balance to the government strategies. This is followed by a 
discussion of why the army responded in the way first described in the historical account 
based on that modus operandi. I will facilitate the discussion in the selectorate theory 
framework in which a rational for it may be found and the success of it addressed. As a final 
point I discuss the army‟s cohesiveness facing the internal challenge. All this serves as good 
preparation for the darker side of the insurgency which will be addressed in chapter 6.  
5.1 COIN- Algerian civil war: 
The COIN capabilities of Algeria in the early 90‟s saw a tremendous challenge coming their 
way.168 The Algerian army had some experience in what are called LIC – low intensity 
conflicts – from Bouyali and MIA‟s insurgency in the 1980‟s. Still it was an unprepared, 
uneducated and ill-equipped army that faced an insurgency rising to civil war levels in the 
matter of a few years.  Here I shall try to explain the development of COIN-strategies from an 
army point of view. The period starts with sporadic and unstructured responses to an 
unknown and growing threat – other than the obvious solutions to certain problems it is hard 
to see a thorough going thought process and plan coming from the army. Towards the mid 
1990‟s there was however a significant improvement both in army methods and in 
cooperation between civil and military power. 
Sources on the specifics of this strategy and the following operations are rare, random and 
incomplete. The following is therefore Algeria‟s COIN based on what my research has 
allowed me to glimpse, and admittedly not the whole story. Even so there are several facts 
                                                 
168
 COIN is short for Counter-insurgency 
52 
 
that tell us much about their reaction at the outset of the insurgency and the following 
struggle. I will start with a discussion their capacities.  
5.1.1 Capacities: 
Anthony H. Cordesman‟s main point when writing about Algeria in his book A Tradgedy of 
Arms is that the ANP was a force without meaning, adequate training or equipment.169 There 
are few encouraging words pertaining to either of these points, the situation was as of 2001 
improved when it came both to training and equipment and in the insurgency the army could 
be said to have found a meaning in protecting the interests and personnel of a certain strata in 
the Algerian society.170  
First things first, the army was not the organisation behind most of the early fighting.171 As 
mentioned in the previous chapter the army gained control over the Ministry of Interior which 
again controlled all national security forces such as the gendarmie – police – and all their 
specialized units. This immediately became another asset for the military leadership since a 
state of emergency was declared shortly following the coupe. This force was at the beginning 
the size of 16 000 men. They were used as anti-terrorist forces both in the desert and the 
mountain areas. Another group previously under civil command were the GIS (Groupe 
d’intervention et de Surveilance) which had an elite force that became infamous during the 
course of the civil war, going by the nickname; “Ninjas”.172 
The problem of the army‟s lack of training would be the same for the police, though they at 
least had a certain amount of experience in doing what they had trained for, making them of 
better quality. In addition their day to day business in some ways was better suited to handle 
the urban challenges with the insurgency. They already had informers and people trained on 
intelligence gathering such as GIS – trained in Eastern Europe – who knew the urban 
environment well. Such capabilities would become a huge asset.  
In my view, the reason why conventional forces were used to a lesser degree rests on two 
facts, the first being their inadequate training that had more of a political content resulting in a 
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hierarchy that rewarded loyalty more than any professional skills.173 This was such a powerful 
concern that officers and soldiers alike with any notion of sympathy for the cause of the 
insurgents were moved to the border stations of Morocco and Libya at one point.174 The other 
that the training they actually received was short and conventional in nature. Conventional 
training has its uses in conventional warfare where it can be quite effective if done correctly, 
in this sort of LIC environment the training has few advantages. They would be more in the 
nature of having a ready infrastructure that could consume the correct training to adapt into 
this new environment so it‟s more of a potential than an actual advantage. The 18 months an 
Algerian conscript spent in the army after enlisting consisted of 6 months of military 
conventional training proceeded by 12 months of civil works in alignment with ANP being 
the people‟s army. If and when both the conventional as well as the forces under the ministry 
of interior were used there was also room for improvement. The command process lacked 
efficiency due to strict command lines giving officers on the ground little room to manoeuvre 
in addition to the commands coming from the top having a heavy set of politics involved as 
well as any military concerns.175 
A point in the military leadership‟s direction is the fact that only two years into the insurgency 
they had seen the need for more specialised competence in their armed forces towards LIC. 
The academy at Biskra started its training of officers with COIN theory in April 1993, the 
result of this academy would come later but measures to increase its fighting capacities were 
taken early on.176 They also recruited several foreign advisors, though this was done in a more 
covert manner. There were several listed up with covers and “real” positions working for 
ANP to help them with this unknown type of conflict. In the book An Inquiry into the 
Algerian Massacres the experience of several of the officers stems from similar conditions 
fighting insurgents in South Africa which would be valuable advice. The role would 
previously have fallen to soviet liaisons and advisors but after the fall of the Soviet Union 
several of Algeria‟s former liaisons officers and educators left the country and as such created 
a vacuum that they were not able to fill themselves until Biskra rolled out their first class of 
officers in 1996.  
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5.1.2 Geographical: 
I will now approach what methods the forces above implemented at the onset of the 
insurgency and explain how and when they changed and became more focused. Before I get 
into the specific methodology I will explain how geography played a part in its execution and 
focus.  
At first any commune that FIS had won during the first round of elections was occupied and 
controlled by security forces – not the army. 177 Algiers the capital was also encircled to keep 
MIA fighters out creating an iron wall to maintain order after conducting large scale security 
sweeps in urban areas resulting in mass arrests. This became an overall strategy, 
concentrating on bigger cities and leaving much of the countryside to fend for itself.178 This 
move is one of the reasons why some writers like Luis Martinez point to what he calls the “let 
rot them rot” strategy which will be discussed at length further on. 
Another point that should be made is that the increased focus on the nomenclature and foreign 
enclaves in the cities recived even more specific attention.179 This fits to a certain degree with 
the “let them rot” description but it is more specific and more a strengthening of measures 
taken in small parts of bigger areas that were not to “rot and die”. This could easily be 
criticized and certainly was both during and after the insurgency. Although the increased 
security for certain VIP‟s certainly is not uncommon in any emergency. However the total 
lack of security elsewhere certainly makes this harder to defend. My arguments against any 
critique on this point would be a rational following to what I have already said about 
capacities. There were few combat-ready soldiers, most security forces and military forces 
lacked proper training and equipment, and given the huge geographical area Algeria covers it 
is a clear example of making the best of a bad situation with what you have. Claiming that it 
“is the best” rests on two things, first that VIP‟s are in themselves a high value target which 
became blatantly clear not too far into the LIC. Because of assassinations and threats more 
security was needed in accord with their positions. Foreign enclaves are not necessary more 
exposed to threats (at least they did not know that at the time) but any incidents affecting 
foreigners bears ramifications on a different scale than any national ever would however 
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cynical that may sound. This was and is especially true for Algeria with the need they had for 
ever more FDI due to and hampering foreign debt. 
The final and in some ways most controversial measure they took to gain more geographical 
control was to “encourage” migrators from the districts to return from whence they came to 
relive the pressure on cities in addition to filtering out any insurgents coming in to strengthen 
cells in the cities. This also makes sense if one considers the election results from the first 
round combined with the “let them rot” strategy. Rural citizens above all sympathized with 
the FIS - something that could be established if one looks to the elections results - and as such 
were probably seen to represent a more potential threat than the average urban dweller.180 
5.1.3 Methodical: 
Wherever the forces made their presence felt they operated mainly in two ways, one way was 
covert operations resulting in arrests or eliminations and the other was maintaining 
checkpoints at important road sections in addition to upholding a curfew. The curfew got 
expanded and prolonged several times during the first years starting with a curfew of the 
capital before expanding to Algerois (north Algeria). 
The police forces adapted to the challenge by adopting the islamist look, with full beard and 
islamist attire. This helped them infiltrate certain circles of sympathizers as well as spread 
confusion as to who was doing what towards whom.181 Another strike against any supporters 
the insurgents had was done by replacing radical imams in addition to a general lockdown on 
mosques. Police would both visibly and covertly observe who attended Friday sermons, what 
was said and try and sabotage this point that was the meeting place for radical leanings.182 
They seem to have had some success at this point, though strict paperwork on constructing a 
mosque had resulted in thousands of informal, or unregistered mosques and prayer rooms 
being erected all over Algeria in the 1980‟s, exempting many from being monitored at all. So 
even if it worked where the measure was implemented it did not cover all of its intended 
targets. It should be noted that a large number of these illegal prayer rooms that had been 
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tolerated for some time were demolished, but the sheer number of them secured the result 
above.183 
The relative strength of the police and their usefulness in fighting the insurgents meant that a 
great deal of their time and resources went into the fight; this again meant that their regular 
duties to a large degree were neglected.184 The thesis that the Algerian people knew violence 
as a means to gain riches as Luis Martinez upholds rest on those that filled the vacuum left 
after the police. Several blocks of cities, suburbs and entire regions were left to themselves 
entirely and there was little or no security being offered from the state. Some lean towards 
this being a conscious decision from the regime, making security a commodity gained by 
cooperation and loyalty. The fact that the regime released criminals early on makes for a good 
argument.185 There are two counter arguments that could be made against the release of 
prisoners as an argument for security as a commodity though. It is not clear from my source 
on this last point what kind of criminals they were. A fact, I find to be an important point 
here, for if they were islamists arrested during the insurgency in the 80‟s that had a previous 
history of being released to appease the forces that now exacted violence in the country it 
would be a self-destructive argument – though maybe not a smart move on the governments 
part. The other point refers to the capacities mentioned above. When the immediate threat to 
the sovereignty and the welfare of the state was insurgents that elevated the level of violence 
and criminal activity to a peak height and if their the capacities were faulty in the prison 
sector as well it would make sense to make room for this new more threatening type of 
criminal. Something both the release of criminals and the establishment of new massive 
prison camps in the southern parts of the country could support. 
Not long after the insurgency started with the assault on the Guemmar border station it was 
used as a pretext to shut down the FIS on all fronts. Most FIS leaders were isolated or 
stigmatized in the state media, while more moderate forces within the FIS were helped along 
the way. From June over 2500 FIS members were arrested and allocated to fresh prison camps 
in the southern parts of Algeria.186 The way the police went about gathering intelligence that 
lead to these arrests and the slander on the leaders they wanted brought down is no secret and 
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is supported by an abundance of sources. Torture was the preferred method.187 Described as 
“the only way to defeat an invisible enemy” it was utilized to a large extent.188 When 
precision and collateral damage were not a concern the success rate of this method was 
obvious for the army command as they saw thousands arrested, hundreds executed and some 
broken to such an extent that they swapped sides to all intents and purposes. 
Strategies stemming from a French officer Paul Leger who had great success with the same 
methods during the Algerian Independence war were implemented. The strategy rested on 
two basic precepts. Firstly, that a turned enemy was more valuable than a dead enemy, and 
secondly, that everyone could be turned. The security forces had great success with this 
method, capturing insurgents and breaking them. Thereafter they returned and served as 
informants.189 In addition to the focus on gathering as much information as they could on the 
insurgents, later on especially from 1993 when there were several actors executing the 
insurgency with different goals, and different methods they manipulated the groups in a 
“divide and conquer” way. There were not many instances of conquering any group until later 
on, but some were decimated and became marginalized after a while when an especially 
violent and powerful group called GIA challenged AIS through several major conflicts with 
AIS taking the brunt of the losses.190  
The weakness of this tactic was that the state forces were not the only ones implementing it, 
both in terms of informants and the proxy warfare in divide and conquer. GIA and AIS 
executed operations several times that would not have been possible without inside 
knowledge giving proof for informants within the army off which there was more than one 
instance of disciplinary action. In addition they used their channels to make government 
forces fight for them in their own internal rivalries.191 
As mentioned earlier the importance of controlling the flow of people by regular check points 
was also - as expected – one of the methods used shortly after the escalation of the 
insurgency.  Entire neighbourhoods were cordoned off, making for more systematic and 
effective searches leading to arrests of suspects/insurgents by the infamous ninjas. All willing 
informers operated under great personal risk so during operations they would be veiled so not 
                                                 
187
 Martinez and Entelis, The Algerian Civil War, 59. 
188
 Phillips, John, Algeria, 216. 
189
 Ibid., 207. 
190
 Martinez and Entelis, The Algerian Civil War, 219. 
191
 Ibid., 214. 
58 
 
to reveal their identities.192 The policy of isolating and controlling communes was not always 
followed up with the presence of security personnel within its borders; this resulted in armed 
bands and lawlessness creating an environment of fear and abandonment - an environment in 
which fighters leaning towards the methods of GIA rather than MIA ruled. This will be 
addressed at length in chapter 6.193  
On a larger scale the security checks with bomb searches were one thing, trees along 
roadsides were also cut for safer transportation removing possibilities for easy travel and 
ambush for the insurgents and the railroad between Algiers and Oran was also protected by 
erecting a security fence.194 Since any COIN procedure recognises that routine is a predictable 
advantage for the insurgent, high value targets were encouraged to break any.195 Though 
faulty to some degrees in that they left thousands in the hands of brutal insurgents‟ bordering 
on nothing more than violent criminals in addition to some degree of double play in that their 
strategies were also used against them, the security forces had great operational success 
during the summer months of 1992. The prioritizing of high value targets such as state 
officials and foreign workers detrimental to the economic survival of the state had a certain 
rational to it. So did the choice to use torture and compartmentalization of the country and 
especially cities as they did. If we consider the lack of competence and men with operational 
value the state had – though of course it is not hard to argue as to who was responsible for the 
lack of both of the above. The success they had in 1992 was due to good intelligence as well 
as a realistic approach to which methods and procedures needed to be implemented with 
regards to the capacities they had at hand.196 
There was also a more legal effort to support these methods as the government enacted 
several important laws. All the perpetrators involved in the incident that had provoked the 
start of the armed insurgency, Guemmar, were sentenced to death, a precedent that would be 
applied on several insurgents soon after their capture. This became possible because the 
security personnel were legally strengthened with laws giving them authority to detain any 
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suspect without trial. New secret courts were established in which the judge was anonymous 
and much freer to pass the death penalty on perpetrators as young as 16 years old.197 
Politically speaking, the authorities were given new powers to close down any institutional 
basis of the islamist. As of November 29th, 1992 several private enterprises, organisations 
(like SIT - the FIS's labour union) in addition to several cultural or charitable organisations 
were shut down as well as a curtailment in citizen‟s right of association.198 The APW and 
APC regional councils were shut down or the power invested in them was transferred to 
appropriate actors.199   
The curfew was extended twice, the second time including three more regions, Cheliff, M'Sila 
and Djelfa in addition to Algiers, showing both willingness and the means to apply this quite 
serious measure as needed. These measures gave the authorities the means to arrest several 
suspects and detain them for as long as they wished if they were not executed immediately. 
To facilitate the bulging new pressure on the prison institutions detention centres were erected 
in parts of the Sahara dessert housing as many as 30 000 by FIS estimates or a somewhat 
smaller but dubious official number of 5000 inmates.200 
5.2 What were the origins of the hard-line stance?  
Before we explore what was done, let us take one step back and see if we can identify any 
origins to the particular sentiments held in the leadership. One thought on the origins of the 
dramatic hardliner stance would be that the previous experiences of the regime from the 
1980‟s – with Bouyali‟s insurgency – had promoted the voices in the army leadership that in 
times without insurgency were not as needed and thus weaker. They maintained their 
positions when the situation escalated into a coup, and then again when it turned violent. 
Regardless of why certain opinions were promoted during President Chadli‟s presidency, the 
question of the selectorate became the determining variable for the Algerian civil war. 
The so called hard-line stance or the group called the “eradicators” is in what Hugh Roberts 
claims to be a French analytic approach to the situation in Algeria, one of two sides. The other 
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one the “negotiators” creates a dichotomous view of the conflict, neat and easy to grasp. 
Though the situation to any well-versed reader appears to be far from it, still the name of this 
group still communicates something, not least the policy of those in power; with control of all 
state forces indeed saw it as their own job to liquidate all insurgents. They tried to do just that 
through a strategy that‟s been coined “let them rot” by Luis Martinez, in which a troubled 
area is bereft of any security and any state sponsorship or governance whatsoever. What lies 
behind the “let them rot” strategy was that it not only held for the islamist insurgents but 
“liquidation” of all islamists – within the army‟s understanding of the term - likening it to 
genocide.201 This is reinforced by the fact that they seemed to go to any length ensuring this, 
fighting what was called an “invisible” enemy with torture, unlawful arrests, etc. making 
security a commodity that only certain people could afford.202  
However, the way they went about the strategy is certainly more confusing, as there seems to 
be a half-hearted effort to it. This gives rise to speculations of what the conflict really was all 
about. It seems they wanted to at least confine the situation to tolerable proportions rather 
than actually resolving it altogether. This could be a manifestation of what is suggested in the 
selectorate theory, where it is stated that autocratic leaders do not rely upon military victory to 
the same extent as democratic leaders. This however is only true so long as they have enough 
private goods for their supporters.203 I want to make it clear that there was no quarter given in 
the conflict, and that the population at large was unimportant in this fight.204 There will be 
more on the logic of this in chapter 5.3.1 for now we will look more into the “eradicators” 
themselves.205  
These “eradicators” or “Les eradicateurs” were voices in the leadership that held on to their 
secular values and egocentric methods which they carried with them from their military 
education in France, both with regards to a secular lifestyle and their preferred military 
method of keeping it. Prominent among them were the key officers promoted to commanding 
positions in the ANP from 1988 and onwards. Among them were Major-General Mohamed 
Lamari who became Chief of Staff in 1993, Gendarmerie Chief Major-General Benabbas 
Selim Saadi in addition to the French educated wing of the political class; Prime Minister 
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Redha Malek (1993-1994), Ali Haroun a HCE member (1993-1995) and Aboubakr Belkaid 
who was served in a multitude of ministerial posts from 1987 to 1992.206  
The circumstances that lead to this hard-line stance and the positioning of these particularly 
opinionated individuals as leaders are complex and many. Some are worth highlighting in 
order to get a better understanding of the development. First of those is the persistent presence 
of islamist insurgency all the way from 1963 till the insurgency in 1990‟s functioning as a 
constant threat to the governments. The size and effects of the insurgency in the 60‟s and the 
80‟s were not as encompassing as the insurgency during the civil war, but the fact that it kept 
reappearing could have prompted a “final solution”.207 The army‟s encounter with Bouyali the 
former leader of the MIA was especially frustrating as he rendered the security forces helpless 
with the help he got from the locals until a harsher method was applied. 208 This concluded the 
insurgency and most likely set a precedent for the oncoming civil war. What certainly 
reinforced the view on the conflict was the legitimacy or the presumed loyalty from the vast 
selectorate gained by the islamists in the elections. As this also would have given them room 
for support even within the army‟s own ranks, it also increased their strength and numbers in 
what was always perceived as a zero-sum game.209  
The French military education of the promoted leaders also came with a French understanding 
- or at least an attempt at or interpretation –of French COIN (Counter insurgency). This 
entailed a similar approach to the insurgency to that which the French applied during the war 
of independence in the 1950‟s. An example often used to make this vividly clear is the 
utilization of the same villa for torture as the French applied during the independence war.210 
However, this final argument is somewhat dubious if one looks at the resources available 
though. The method and approach has more to it than a French military education in the top 
echelons of the Algerian army applying the same strategies that lost Algeria for the French - 
something I will argue extensively for at a later stage. It is worth mentioning though, and the 
education could at least explain the rise of the officers to their respective positions as they 
were a counter pole to the opinions of the islamists and thus seen within the leadership and 
the winning coalition a reassurance facing the threats lined up in chapter four. Before we 
delve further into the army‟s method it is enlightening to look at the insurgents‟ methods first, 
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since they had the initiative rendering the armies response to just that, a response to 
something of which we will now consider. 
5.3 How did the FIS go about making their coalition 
the winning coalition? 
FIS sought favour, and support with the promise of a new reality that consisted of a larger 
selectorate, in some ways using the same strategy as Lincoln did with the emancipation of the 
slaves but without the economic aspect to it. The sitting regime on the other hand was not 
interested in expanding its selectorate as it clearly stated with the coupe. However this 
restricted their ways of appeal; therefore one can see the harsh and brutal clampdown as 
nothing but a natural course of action having made these choices. The FIS knew this, and it 
also knew that the regime favoured a prolonged situation that would thin out their strongest 
asset; the positive promise of a big selectorate fading away when the selectorate was forced to 
pay a huge price for it by experiencing the conditions of a harsh insurgency and lack of 
governorship for an extended period of time. The FIS knew that time was working against 
them and so that the strength ratio only was on their side during a very short window, so from 
the onset they were always open for negotiation.211 The fact that conscious or not the 
insurgents applied both the major points of Guevara and Marighella in their insurgency  made 
them very effective.212  
First of all it is assumed in this subchapter that the FIS through MIA in fact wanted to do 
more than just exert pressure on the power holders, as argued earlier with the establishment of 
Caliphates and tittles of “Emir” and “President” and in building new institutions parallel to 
the existing ones.213 Before the coupe in 1992 the islamists had not been in the position they 
were now in, with a legitimate claim to govern and a large selectorate to lean upon. Before the 
coup the situation had been what Guevara in insurgency method initially claimed were bad 
conditions for a “revolution”; 
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“Guevara, initially however, would concede that not all the conditions for a revolution 
could be created though the methods of guerrilla activities alone: “Where a government has 
come into power through some form of popular vote, fraudulent or no, and maintains at least 
an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted, since the 
possibilities for peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted”.214  
Following the coupe the break in the constitutional legality of the regime if not apparent was 
doubtful in the least, and even Guevara expanded on the previous quote three years later 
saying that one might still be able to create a successful revolution ”simply by causing the 
government to overreact to the insurgency”.215 If the insurgents read Guevara or if they didn‟t 
what they achieved was nonetheless an “overreaction” from the government. Although the 
overreaction had a certain logic to it, it was executed in such a way that it did not benefit the 
insurgents to the extent Guevara would have it. The outcome he aimed at was a population so 
aggravated that it would throw in its lot in with the insurgents, giving them enough agency to 
topple the regime by way of a mass revolt much in the same way as Carlos Marighella 
argued:  
 
“[It would be] necessary to turn political crises into armed conﬂicts by performing 
violent actions that will force those in power to transform the political situation of the country 
into a military situation. That will alienate the masses who, from then on, will revolt against 
the army and police and thus blame them of the state of things.”216  
In Algeria on the other hand what happened in this regard was closer to what intelligence 
expert Christopher Ford claimed was a premise for insurgency victory, namely a neutral 
population.217 This did not lead to the certain victory of the insurgents, but it certainly gave 
them some headway. The population at large was not unaware of the regime‟s overreaction, 
nor was it unaware of the legitimacy of the insurgents and the promise of an expansion of the 
selectorate should the FIS win. The disenfranchised on the other hand as suggested in the 
selectorate theory remain safer if they remain passive, something that could explain parts of 
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the lacking “mass revolution”.218 This boils down to a risk assessment, in that the 
disenfranchised and potential selectorate members face oppression or even death if the 
insurgency persists or fails counter to the unlikelihood that it might actually succeed. So even 
if there were incentives prompting several of the former disenfranchised to cooperate with the 
FIS, it did not amount to a mass movement that won the day because passivity was safer. This 
could have been a result of the conditions during the Algerian civil war, where the 
proliferation of insurgency groups with diverging goals and methods created an environment 
where support was not given but taken and every actor in the carnage was an unpredictable 
and potentially dangerous enemy. This was by no means the well thought-through strategy of 
the MIA, but rather the result of several of the government‟s desperate responses to the 
insurgency. The stakes made them desperate.  
They did not do as Guevara had done in his last endeavour, that is to run to the hills believing 
in extending the momentum and a slow build up (and sit it out until they were caught). They 
did this with Chebouti but also followed patterns that are close to what is called the “Foco 
theory”, concentrating on urban areas. This pressured the security forces everywhere, making 
them the “invisible enemy” that had to be fought with torture.219  From the rural areas they 
gathered support where the government had abandoned them; in addition they hampered the 
logistics of both government industries and private enterprises. In the cities they tried to rob 
the selectorate and the winning coalition of their security. Their winning coalition would then 
benefit from these measures by way of stepping in where the government could not or would 
not. They would facilitate the security of private enterprises; they would govern as best they 
could where there were troubles. The islamists‟ would eventually have their winning coalition 
by victory over the government‟s winning coalition which they tried to undermine with the 
measures above. 
5.4 How did the army respond in force and why? 
Although the army did not want this development, it set out to crush it from the onset with a 
very brutal stance – no negotiation. This was done because the army could not afford to 
expand the selectorate which any negotiation would arrive at. As the army knew that any 
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negotiations would negate their favoured positions as the fulcrum of power in Algeria, their 
own political survival was prioritized as fighting had no clear downside for the jema’a.220 So 
it was completely natural for it to act the way it did, protecting its own selectorate and 
resources physically and politically by holding on to the same size with the same amount of 
private goods in return for power. This, in my view, was the first inevitable mistake made by 
the government however, as will be shown later on. The army did in fact rescind to a certain 
degree on the selectorate‟s size something that will be addressed in chapter 9. 
The way the army set about making sure their winning coalition and thereby that it would stay 
in power rested on three separate goals. First the army had to protect its selectorate physically; 
second protect its resources and lastly to protect the members of the winning coalition. As 
long as all these chips were in place nothing could disrupt their position. Now as shown 
above, the insurgents attacked all three of them, threatening the security of the selectorate and 
members of the winning coalition and seeking to hurt the resource pool by attacking 
infrastructure and government businesses. The definite military tactics are neither published 
nor thoroughly explained in any English literature on the topic, but from certain instances and 
facts it is possible to construct an analysis that points to important elements in the combined 
military and civil actions of the army. They did however state that they would (in a very poor 
translation of which the original text cannot be found online): 
 
“As for the terrorist crimes and the subversive actions from which the countries and 
the population suffer daily, it is clear that in fact there plagues can ,in no form, have right of 
city under the banner of the algerian State. ….will continue to deliver to them, whatever the 
price, the combat which they deserve to restore safety, stability and peace, for the safeguard 
of a republican, democratic, pluralist State guaranteeing the fundamental values …"Decided 
to fight the crime and the criminals, the NPA[ANP] " gets busy since the crisis which the 
country saw, to defend the institutions of the State and to give by more consistency to the 
principle of the exercise of popular sovereignty within the framework of an authentic 
democracy " will declare the general of the armed corps, Mr.Mohamed Lamari, chief of staff 
of the NPA.”221  
How the army protected its selectorate as has been defined here as; officers - and soldiers as 
potential members of the selectorate, exiled politicians and officers, politicians and 
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organization leaders with similar values and loyalties was through several means. Firs it 
focused its capacities on protecting the selectorate, areas where they lived at the expense of 
populace in general.222 Where they protected the selectorate the army enforced a curfew and 
later expanded it several times both due to better capacities and due to the increased threat. It 
also policed the radical mosque to better keep control of the masses and the recruitment of 
them.223 It also removed thousands of instigators or sympathizers to detention centers located 
in the Sahara far away from any areas populated by its selectorate, thereby decreasing the 
immediate threat level. In the army any officer or soldier know to have sympathy for the 
insurgents cause were displaced near to the borders of Libya or Morocco.224 With the same 
sentiment in mind, to maintain a cohesive selectorate, a crackdown on any teachers 
sympathizing with armed groups following the first HCE meeting. The unlawful arrests were 
maintained in special anti-terrorists courts that several magistrates criticized as unlawful. This 
resulted in the suspension of magistrates not a revision of the method as “whatever the price” 
apparently was the winning argument.225 
One of the armies more successful operations that certainly weakened the insurgents in the 
beginning was an operation executed towards an insurgency meeting in Tamesguida. The 
different groupings of islamists that had spawned through the first few years conveyed to 
make alliances and better cooperation, this meeting was disrupted by security forces whom 
also killed several prominent leaders from multiple groups, removing trust and will for any 
cooperation among them.226 This was part of something called the “Turkish technique” the 
oriental version of the divide and conquer strategy. By causing a division between the groups 
they sought to make them fragment and fight each other, Luis Martinez goes as far as saying 
that;” The regime hoped to induce the AIS to surrender by causing it to lose its base of 
support as a result of the impact of GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé) violence”.227 Now these 
other groups and the part they played will be put into context, but first we must address the 
two other points the government had to address, resources and the protection of their winning 
coalition but before we do the price for this strategy should be highlighted. As Jerome T. 
Moriarty correctly asserts in his article on the subject of army tactics during a civil war: 
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“A government can get away with being passive to insurgent attacks in rural areas 
given the lack of mass media coverage, however, in cities they are forced to respond… In 
short, the government beat the insurgents at their own game by becoming overly aggressive to 
the point where the vanguards could not survive. While this overly aggressive method has 
proven successful at defeating urban-foci insurgencies, several problems arise from utilizing 
it. First, while the government is able to defeat the insurgents, the extreme and complete 
disregard for human rights further accelerates, or in some cases, creates the loss of 
legitimacy for the government. In time, this loss of legitimacy and increased public 
disenfranchisement for the government creates new and possibly even stronger insurgencies 
in the future. Thus, this approach might gain a tactical victory for the government, but 
strategically it is counter-productive. And second, there are the obvious ethical and moral 
considerations.”228  
What he criticizes with the method is its temporary effect and the moral cost of executing it. 
As discussed, so long as the selectorate and the winning coalition are made happy by way of 
private goods the moral dimension of it becomes irrelevant in that they solely are trying to 
obtain what they want, this will be addressed in length in a later chapter. Here I wish to note 
that he is correct in that an enormous price was paid for the relative success of the army, by 
violations of human rights comprised of torture, random arrests with undue process and no 
concern for collateral damage, but the important thing is that it wasn‟t paid by the army‟s 
selectorate, rather it was paid by the FIS‟s selectorate.229 
These measures surely went a long way in protecting the members of the winning coalition, 
but for those more measures were taken. Sidi Fredj, a seaside resort west of Algiers became 
the secure haven for politicians and senior civil servants. It was heavily guarded by the army 
who also protected itself by letting the lowest ranking members or the internal security forces 
and later on the militias take the brunt of the attacks.230 Now this was not always successful as 
several members of even the HCE were assassinated, Boudiaf for one as already discussed. 
Ladi Flici and Hafid Senhadri members of the HCE were also killed in March 1993 and the 
Defence Minister, Major-General Khaled Nezzar was close to dying twice by insurgency 
hands.231 The failure in some instances is most likely a result of the character and operation 
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patterns of the two sides, leaving an inevitable outcome to a certain degree. The insurgents 
that were part of the “Foco-insurgency” in urban areas weren‟t out in the open and as such 
were unpredictable and demanded heavy intelligence to keep track of. As a position of 
defence often is static, the position of attack will always be the dynamic and more challenging 
to handle and it will apparently look successful even if they only succeed once.  
Protecting its resources however, was a less daunting task. As they got the huge aid-relief 
from France and the western consortium they had an economical buffer, in addition Prime 
Minister Belaid declared a “war economy” as early as 1992. This is beside the fact that they 
always knew that the hydrocarbon sector was the most vital part. To ensure its safety they 
established four restricted zones surrounding the oil fields in the Sahara though not before 
April 1995.232 This may have been due to the fact that the insurgents didn‟t seem to 
understand the importance of this sector, rather attacking the cement factories and other 
governmental industries. That could be one explanation or it could be that the insurgents 
indeed saw the importance of sector and therefore were afraid or unwilling to destroy and 
disrupt too much of it for its own future prospects. The few times the hydrocarbon sector was 
attacked it was foreign personnel that were killed or it was minor disruptions that did not 
hamper production. 
5.4.1 Was there a logical rational behind the tactics deployed by the 
army? 
The army started to train officers who could more effectively fight the insurgency later on in 
an early stage. They recruited officers from abroad to fill the missing Soviet-officers role as 
military liaisons in the struggle. They also recognized their own incompetence, lack of 
experience and the tough battle ahead, making tough choices which resulted in what Luis 
Martinez calls the “let them rot” strategy. This had had two purposes, giving the army 
breathing space as they could concentrate their capacity on battles that could be won or areas 
that could be controlled with higher certainty. This had the added benefit of making the 
populace (the selectorate of the FIS) in these areas see how it “would” be under islamist rule 
(which they probably knew would be bad due to the strain and pressure the fight caused) 
which worked against the islamists (AIS/FIS) best argument – namely a larger selectorate. 
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This interpretation speaks in favour of Anthony H. Cordsman view on the part that the 
massacres from President Zerouals time and onwards were on the army‟s part; “to be more 
sins of neglect than sins of commission. ...the army may have tolerated violence where it finds 
it politically useful, but it is not clear that it actually encouraged it.”233 The neglect or 
toleration may have been part due to it being political useful, or as will be addressed now it 
could simply be a matter of capacity. 
As alluded to earlier the Algerian army was not a very proficient one, the military analyst 
Anthony H. Cordsman goes as far as calling parts of the army; “clumsy and ineffective”.234 
The very purpose of the army has been questionable to say the least. It has been a people‟s 
army, something the mandatory service shows clearly when two thirds of the time serving 
there is spent working on civil works projects rather than acquiring any combat skills. The 
previous insurgency experiences that were dealt with happened on a much smaller scale, and 
as such did not touch upon the army‟s overall fighting capacities, in addition at the time the 
army still had foreign liaison officers who offered expertise on the insurgency issues and with 
regards to equipment, maintenance and keeping the skills up to date.235 These officers were 
for the most part from the Soviet Union, and as such disappeared at the onset of the 
insurgency since it coalesced with the fall of the Soviet Union.  
These two factors, poor training and poor equipment capacity are without a doubt, key factors 
for the handling of the insurgency. The jema’a of officers at the top no doubt knew in what 
condition the army was, something that the hiring of new foreign experts from South Africa to 
fill the gap the Soviet‟s left attests to.236 The initiative to train and educate a new class of 
senior military leaders with a specialization in COIN to better fight the insurgency points to 
the same thing, amending a lack in capacities.237 The importance of these two factors rests on 
the ability to fight. The insurgency were not proficient in every aspect either, but again the 
nature of insurgency demands much more of the counter-insurgents part than the attacking 
insurgent‟s part.238 The insurgents no doubt benefitted from experts in the field who fought 
the soviets in Afghanistan, these the so called “Afghans” returned from 1988 and onwards. 
This meant that the insurgency that spread out all over the greater Algeria, from the east in 
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Batna to the west in Relizane was hard to contain. More importantly, the army existed more to 
serve itself than the people. The lack of fighting strength and knowledge of this in 
combination with the small selectorate and winning coalition it made perfect sense to shrink 
the operational areas in the general strategies. There were of course operations, check points 
and fighting in larger areas than some few select selectorate areas but this was not the overall 
strategy and entered the theater at a later stage, when the selectorate in fact had expanded 
somewhat.  
The premise here is that the army had a poor fighting capacity to fight and that it was more 
self-interested than anything else. In literature on the civil war, that is not written from a 
military point of view it may appear that there is some disagreement on this. Evans and 
Philips write in their book Anger of the Dispossessed on the subject that the army had a lot of 
early success, while Anthony H. Cordsman writes the opposite.239 I think these diverging 
analysis‟ rest on the simple point I am trying to make here, that if you accept that a few in 
what I call the selectorate and winning coalition were important and not the population at 
large, then yes the army was effective. On the other hand, if one wishes to have a more 
subjective view of the situation in which certain values, procedures and such must be taken 
into an overall account than the army failed horribly at protecting the population at large, 
booth from the insurgents and themselves. 
It is these failures that lead Luis Martinez to coin the “Let Them Rot” method of operation. 
He describes it as a situation in which areas with insurgents are isolated, and then the 
abandoning of the local population into what is a less fortunate position of being terrorized. 
This is done to dissuade them from supporting the insurgency.240 As they were not a part of 
the insurgency, and a minimal part of the resource flow – since income taxation was more or 
less non-existent in Algeria - they were dispensable at no political or fiscal cost to the 
regime.241 With that in mind, the terrorizing is the most cost efficient short term way of 
dissuading the local populace from supporting the insurgency. In a country where one for 
example has democracy and the populace is a part of the selectorate the way one would 
approach the matter is entirely different.242 Through investing in the area, with good policing, 
friendly minded soldiers, government programs for improving the situations, but these are all 
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more costly and in the selectorate theory a waste of resources especially when the population 
does not contribute with tax money. The example of King Leopold II serves as a great 
example of this mechanism in play, as he was considered a progressive and popular king in 
Belgium whereas in Congo he governed in a way that only enriched himself and brought 
absolute misery to the natives.243 Algeria was to some extent in the same situation, only it is 
vastly more complex to see it. 
So when analysts of the situation write that “The inability or unwillingness of the state to 
provide basic security was shocking” it is correct that they were unwilling to provide security 
as public goods. It is correct in there being no direct incentive to do so.244 The shocking part 
of it would be for the analyst who fails to see the lack of it and makes a moral judgment call. 
Or if one takes into account not the position of the power holder but rather the ones without 
power or the disenfranchised with other rules governing them in the selectorate theory, 
because in Algeria for the army this made perfect sense. The terror is a simpler, less resource 
demanding and a less costly political way of coercing the population towards creating a 
hostile environment for the insurgents contrary to reform and community build up as 
described in conventional COIN-theory.245 
In the rationalization of the “tactics” chosen to fight of the insurgency, one could emphasize 
the desire not to be formally dependable on the west. As Løchstøer mentions that austerity 
programs and foreign aid were accepted only when in very dire straits.246 So the protecting of 
resources, foreigners and the winning coalition in safe areas it could also be seen as a very 
rational thing to do when one wanted desperately to attract FDI due to the unfruitful oil 
industry. The neglect of the population that did not produce much for the regime or their 
selectorates benefit could then be seen more as a moral evil they were willing to accept. 
5.5 Retaining the divide in two parts 
There was always an imminent danger of division, both within the army and politically 
among the former major players. So when the state of emergency was provided all forces 
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controlled by the Ministry of Interior came under the leadership of the army, boosting their 
capacity to muster troops and their hold on power as there were no other fighting forces other 
than the islamist insurgents that could threaten them. This was a major political and military 
victory for the army, one that ensured that all opposing voices from the former winning 
coalition and the current had little de facto agency. 
In the military and angle of Cordsman‟s writing he perceives the civil war to have divided the 
army to the point that it could be called a civil war. He also traces this and the method used by 
the army all the way back to the independence war and the divide between the officers who 
fought alongside the French before swapping sides and those who fought against the French 
from the start of the independence war.247 His book covers a lot of ground both thematically 
and literary, this could be the reason for his somewhat unique perspective of the divide within 
the army. There was some difference of opinion among the officers, but it was not expressed 
as he claims, in a divided army fighting each other. There was a legitimate concern that there 
would be desertion, but there was not any noticeable numbers swapping sides, neither was the 
disagreement between the French wing within the army‟s top echelons and the more localized 
wing expressed in any proven violent way.248 The few events that happened were rare; since 
loyalty was given a higher priority than capability within the army it ensured some degree of 
safety. The individuals in ANP that showed sympathy for the islamists cause were also moved 
out of the apex of the insurgency near the Mitidja plain, to border stations with Libya and 
Morocco.249 In the instances were soldiers did aid the insurgents it was more on an individual 
level by their own initiative or in small groups that in any event didn‟t signify a mass 
desertion to the cause of the insurgency.250 
The next thing the army did was to ensure there would be no other actors drawing resources 
or power from state institutions in declaring a state of emergency. This automatically put all 
forces controlled by the Ministry of Interior under army command. This was done as early as 
February 9th, 1992.251 They effectively removed the control of all police forces and other 
civilian security forces from possible political opposition which in the end was stripped away 
with the establishment of the HCE. This also bolstered their fighting capabilities with security 
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forces that had actual experience on a broader scale than the army who had not done much 
fighting. The entire method and purpose of the police force was nonetheless soon altered.252 
We have seen the development of tactics on both sides of the conflict; I have discussed their 
meaning and a possible way in which they interacted. As I uphold in this chapter the main 
finding is that due to the criteria for belonging in a selectorate whether the army‟s or the 
insurgents the possibility to sway or coerce enough of the others selectorate away from their 
winning coalition would strip them of support. This was the main goal for both sides, 
discouraging, coercing, simply cutting away at the winning coalition and to frighten off the 
selectorate from supporting the opposing side. As these were the root backers of both 
structures it seems to have been the main point in a rationale that had them attacking each 
other‟s selectorates. This is clear from the way the army treated the population at large in the 
“let them rot” strategy in which they only took care of their own selectorate and left the rest to 
fend for themselves in a volatile environment. Whereas the insurgents on the other hand 
actively tried to kill of the army‟s winning coalition and discourage their selectortorate 
through assassinations, random violence, sabotage and bombs. Why this tactic failed and the 
government‟s tactic to a large extent worked to achieve their goals is a complex question of 
which one part will be answered in the following chapter addressing the “wild card” - briefly 
introduced in this chapter as GIA who made being abandoned by the government a wretched 
thing.  
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6 The Wild Card, how it came to be 
and what part it played 
As soon as the insurgency commenced there was only one coherent organized group in AIS 
who had a large support network around them with the FIS and their sympathizers. After a 
couple of months however, several of these sympathizers and other groups with inclinations 
similar to the FIS started their own insurgency. The effect or cause spread virally. In 
Tamesguida in 1993 an effort was made to join forces, to forge an alliance between the larger 
groups and to formally unite them under Chebouti. GIA was part of this initiative and Allal 
Mohammed one GIA leader had sworn beforehand that he would indeed give up overall 
command to Chebouti. The Algerian state intelligence forces, GIS however had managed to 
pick up on the initiative to the extent that they could attack the meeting of all top insurgent 
leaders in force.253 This sowed distrust and ruined all planned cooperation between the 
different groups, the government forces even managed to destroy a couple entirely from that 
one attack. So with no apparent loyalties among themselves most groups found themselves 
fending for their own, often in cordoned off areas where the government as mentioned in the 
previous chapter had withdrawn. 
In this Chapter we will address the effects this had, one effect in particular in that it made 
room for GIA. First off I will address the early years and start up of GIA, I will then juxtapose 
them up against AIS to point to several apparent differences in ideology and hence in method. 
The difference in ideology affects their view on who comprises their own selectorate and who 
comprises their enemies selectorate, winning coalition and leadership which again results in a 
different method if one applies the theory here. As this is so, I will try and fit GIA into the 
theory. 
To serve as an example we will look at the assassination of Boudiaf, to further point to the 
ambiguity of GIA, “the wild card”. I have named it so as the GIA in many instances seems to 
have executed actions that in the end may have served a purpose on the government‟s part, 
both this assassination and not the least the turf wars that developed and escalated from 1994 
and onwards between GIA and AIS.i The importance of Tamesguida in this result will be 
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addressed as I shall try to make it clear how GIA worked as a catalyst in the decent into a 
savage war. 
6.1 What were the consequences of the “Let them 
rot” strategy? 
The strategy of isolation or “let them rot” and government withdrawal favoured a group or 
groupings known as GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé). They were a somewhat cohesive group, 
with wide networks abroad and within Algeria funnelling resources to help their cause. The 
frustrated youths that had experienced the government response in the October riots, and 
experienced a harsh socioeconomic environment in addition to a total government withdrawal 
in several areas made for easy recruits.254 GIA as an entity was first mentioned in the Algerian 
press in September 1993, before that many among them were those called the “Afghans”. One 
of the first leaders, Abdalhak Layda, was an Afghan veteran.255 The nature of the GIA and the 
way they worked made it even harder for the population to cooperate with the police when 
they sought to clamp down on them. This may seem a bit contradictory to the isolation 
strategy, but the rationale here would be that these groupings worked out of the areas 
abandoned by the government, not only within them. The actions they carried out in other 
urban areas like assassinations and sabotages meant that they were a threat to the army‟s 
selectorate and their resources; therefor the cooperation of the local populace would have 
been valuable to the counter-insurgency forces. They did not manage this to any large extent 
as the armed bands removed any possibility for collaborating with the security forces through 
fear and violence.256  
There were several differences between GIA and the AIS. First and foremost was the 
perspective on the people. While the AIS thought that the war should not be waged against 
the people, the GIA held that terror was the only way to induce the people to collaborate.257 
And after the early attempts by the insurgents to cooperate and make a common stand at 
Tamesguida failed, these differences increased to the point where they were fighting each 
other. GIA established its own Caliphate, with its own government which the FIS explicitly 
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condemned and distanced itself from due to their methods. Those methods included killing 
foreigners, journalists and the extended family of government officials; this in combination 
with the way in which GIA also sought to coerce people into their interpretation of Islam 
pitted most other islamist insurgents against them.258 None of this happened over night 
though, the development of GIA‟s “ideology” or lack of one some might say, escalated over 
time – starting with the radical ideologue Omar El-Eulmi.259 
The difference in ideology and thereby method can also be traced back to the two different 
strains of Algerian islamisme, the FIS and AIS came from a long tradition called the 
djezarists in Algeria. These were as briefly touched upon nationally oriented islamists that 
lacked the global, or at least “umma” orientation of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, but 
in other respects were similar in ideology. The GIA stemmed from another direction, with a 
tradition for violent jihad that had global reache and a heavy influence from the campaign in 
Afghanistan. The difference in method and ideology made for a difference in the approach 
towards a selectorate. Since the FIS saw the people as the source of power in practical terms 
at least, they sought to include them in their selectorate and thereby increase its size making it 
lucrative for the common citizen to support them in their fight. GIA on the other hand were 
from the salafi tradition that does not recognizing the very conception of a modern nation 
state or its borders at all.260  
The results on the two points - violence and area of operation- were that some djazarists 
would agree on violence against the regime, but not all. The GIA also seem broken apart, 
though not necessarily along the same lines. Rather they had no issues with violence and 
seems to have a more relative stance when it came to the geographical location of the fight.  261  
They were not internationally focused or at least not regionally until years later, foreshadowed 
with the airliner hijacking in December 1994.262 But the djazarist were a nationalist-Islamism 
phenomenon that was foremost concerned with Algeria. GIA were more global in the sense 
explained above.  
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So it can be said that the difference between these two main factions appear on two fronts that 
on some subjects overlap. The djazarist faction would be inclined to follow constitutional 
elections and seeing violence as a last resort against tyranny. While the GIA would not accept 
power coming from any other than God, therefore they denied all ideas of elections and the 
pretence of legitimacy and power from the people.  
The other distinct characteristic of the GIA was the criminal architecture of its fundraising. 
Extending beyond being violent through fighting the regime, they carried out bank robberies, 
dealt in drugs, hijackings, racketeering, and even outsourced missions to regular criminals.263 
This was off course all part of their need for resources, but the organized crime certainly set 
them apart from any hallow endeavour to exert the will of God. The AIS handled it 
differently, though some racketeering and fake roadblocks demanding “taxes” certainly took 
place it was a different approach. When the selectorate is big, and a source of income for the 
leadership as it was with the FIS and AIS they also expect something in return. Bouyali 
certainly had made use of criminal gangs and networks in his fight during the 1980‟s but it 
was in no way on the same scale or executed in the same manner or for the same purpose, 
rather to offer a more covert logistical apparatus.264 What the selectorate of the FIS really got 
in return was little though, other than the promise of a better political platform as soon as the 
FIS was in power. 
6.1.1 What were the goals and actions of GIA in the theatre? 
What we can tell of GIA‟s selectorate was that there was not one in the conventional 
framework of my categories, though they according to communiqués, claimed that they 
fought for an entire new system mandated by God – which would make the interpreters of his 
will the winning coalition though no formal requirements other than religious schooling 
would put restrictions on who was in the selectorate.265  
GIA was loosely organized and did not even have one collective initiative other than 
spreading seemingly arbitrary misfortune and havoc. They were led by individuals that if 
powerful enough or violent enough could claim the title of emir, as so many did this it is 
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unclear how exactly and what exactly their goals and workings were. At least this is the 
impression one gets through reading the very in-depth analysis of their works in Luis 
Martinez‟s The Algerian Civil War 1990-1998. Although there are some characteristics one 
can see throughout the groups that over time become more united and have a common set of 
goals. 
In the selectorate theory we would need, as said to have a somewhat different approach to the 
category. Since GIA did not recognize the notion of a nation state and neither the sovereignty 
of the people they at first seem not to fit into the theory.266 These factors are not necessary to 
use the theory however, what the GIA in fact did, with their ideology was to say that every 
Muslim was in the selectorate. Since the sovereignty rests with God it implies that there must 
be believers in God giving him, or ceding to him the power of sovereignty since even he 
needs to be sovereign over something, this could be done by accepting that power is in fact 
with God.  
The coerced conversion of people in their areas to the “correct” Islam can therefore tell us two 
things. First that any Muslim not in line with their way of thinking was not in fact a Muslim 
and therefore not deserving in being part of the selectorate, shrinking it quite a bit. Second, 
anyone who converted to GIA‟s interpretation of Islam inherently - willing or not - had to 
accept the rules or premises set for that particular interpretation of Islam. They thereby 
ensured their loyalty - herein private goods would be in regard to the hereafter making it a 
really cost efficient system. The winning coalition in such a system would by the lack of 
direct divine intervention have to assume the role of the ulama, the interpreters of Gods will 
similar to how Iran or ISIS works today. This would in effect mean that the winning coalition 
would be the leadership as well, only bound by their ability to interpret sharia or Gods law 
and will. Although there were more worldly needs arising even among this hallow armed 
band, the ability to muster forces as discussed earlier certainly gave people in the early 
establishment of the Caliphate weight and positions in the winning coalition as well.267 
To succeed with the endeavour of the caliphate they had the same goals as the AIS, the killing 
of the current winning coalition of the army and the robbing of the resources used to keep 
them loyal. So their method and approach not to say definition of “winning coalition” differed 
from AIS‟s immensely. Something their continued attacks on infrastructure that later even 
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expanded to schools of which they burnt hundreds make vividly clear. The definition of the 
“winning coalition  and selectorate ” that were to be targeted expanded several times, first to 
all government officials, to journalists and intellectuals that either supported the regime or 
criticized GIA, and then to all family members of any government affiliated individual, to 
foreigners and lastly to anyone contributing to the government‟s continuation in power.268 It 
was these acts of violence that served as criteria to rise within their ranks; the slaying of 
“enemies of god” has been interpreted into religious rituals by some.269 Omar El-Eulmi was 
the conveyor of the interpretation behind the first fatwas that argued for the legitimacy of the 
expansion of legitimate targets, he himself was killed by security forces in April 1993, but 
this did not stop the targeting of them by the GIA.270 
There is a clear sense of a systematic method trying to crumble the regime, when GIA started 
to kill of members of the CCN (Conseil Consultatif National) they diverged from what they 
were doing by killing the security forces. This is one of two oddities when it comes to the 
civil war, the first here is the killing of the CCN members, who in reality had no real power. 
They served only with a consulting capacity for the Presidency and HCE and did not come 
close to the role the national assembly had before it.271 They could not direct or affect 
anything, it could be that these were easier targets than the actual HCE members and therefore 
were more practical to assassinate. Killing them would have worked in the GIA‟s favour in 
that it was a strong signal for their own winning coalition, that they actually managed to kill 
someone close to power. The second oddity is the approach the insurgents in general had to 
the hydrocarbon sector, but this will be discussed in chapter 8. The GIA however did manage 
to kill some HCE members as already mentioned, succeeding in their goal but it had little 
effect as they were too few and rapidly replaced.272 
The most controversial killing is that of HCE leader Boudiaf who may and may not have been 
killed by early GIA members. Løchstøer writes in her book that the one who killed Boudiaf, 
was a man named Lembarek Boumaarafi who was a former intelligence officer. She also 
writes that he was sentenced to death but it never came to an execution. Hugh Roberts claims 
that it was a member of the “Special intervention unit” GIS. Their accounts differ on several 
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points, while Anthony HC writes that it was; “a gunman in a squad trooper‟s uniform” that 
shot Boudiaf. 273 Exactly what happened isn‟t so much the issue here, the killing of Boudiaf 
and the handling of it in this analysis says more about the tittle of this chapter; “The Wild 
Card”. One can read in most writings on the Algerian Civil War about how the GIA might 
have been a part of, partly under the control of, allied with or in itself the DRS (Departement 
du Renseignement et de la Securite) – a subdivision of the GIS. There are many reasons for 
this, the regimes goals were fulfilled several times by their actions, like the killings of 
intellectuals and journalists that were critical booth to the regime and the GIA.274 In this 
analysis this is explained without having to delve into conspiracy theories, it has more to do 
with the fact that there were three sides in the war and they all worked the same way 
diverging in who was important to protect, and who was important to kill.  
After some time however GIA seemed to lose its focus, their goals shifted entirely to 
resources rather than a “political” fight, then later when there was a divide in GIA that lead to 
what was known as GSPC (Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat) they started to 
attack security personnel again. This could be an indicator for them realising that their 
definition of the selectorate was wrong or ineffective, intellectuals, journalists and members 
of the CCN were not that important targets after all.275 Whereas the arming of civilians in 
1995-1996 changed things yet again, now that the power play within the regime brought forth 
changes that made them reassess their targets more appropriately to the new situation in what 
has been listed by Stathis Kalyvas to be; 
 
”A particular strategic conjuncture characterized by (a) fragmented and unstable rule 
over the civilian population, (b) mass civilian defections toward incumbents and (c) 
escalation of violence.”276  
What makes the GIA the wild card is the fact that they seem to fit so nicely into a great 
expanse of analyses due to their seemingly aimless or multi directed actions. This stems from 
the loose organisation of the group as well as the shifting conditions. In their negation of 
country borders, their liberal interpretations of legitimate targets in addition to the regime‟s 
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lack of security and control put few restrictions on their actions. This is what led Luis 
Martinez to develop his main argument that violence became a means to get what you wanted. 
GIA became quite proficient in this endeavour, and after a while it would seem like the 
resources they got a hold of was no longer a means to an end but rather the end in itself.277  
What started out as crippling manoeuvres with regards to the regime‟s resources pool in 
which they had some success, became a lucrative business.278 The targeting of private 
businesses and the logistical trade routes in between them rendered them no more than a 
mafia after a while.279 They controlled several important road stretches by 1994, in the cities 
they operated much like a mafia organisation with racketeering and they may even have 
helped manipulate their “allies” competition by ruining the business of competitors.280 When 
the resources became scarce, and the respective insurgent groups had grown larger it 
developed into a turf war between them. The heavy “taxation” of the “clientele” led to a very 
dissatisfied populace that were suffering, robbed of their resources rather than willingly 
supporting the insurgency.281 It was in this respect they had the largest impact within the 
selectorate theory. Since their methods lead them to estrange the FIS and AIS‟s potential 
selectorate towards any islamist group without having the regime expanding theirs.  
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6.2 In what way were the GIA relevant with this 
perspective on the civil war? 
The only success the government‟s forces had in the beginning was keeping the more 
moderate islamists (consisting of AIS (armed) and the FIS (illegal political activity)) from 
forming any solid alliance with GIA. Part of this strategy actually caused such a division 
between them that they were fighting each other. The regime excelled in protecting its 
selectorate, the regime consistently shunned all others than its own selectorate, having some 
casualties due to the assassinations and bombings executed by GIA especially, but few 
important actors in the winning coalition were hit. This shows how well they actually did.282 
In the early days of the insurgency there were attempts to gather all islamists under one 
banner to fight the regime. There were even pledges of alliance between Seddiki - leader of 
the “Afghans” - who would formally unite under the same banner as the MIA.283 More in this 
direction was to be discussed and agreed upon in what probably was one of the best initiatives 
on the insurgent‟s part and one of the greatest successes on the regimes part. The meeting in 
Tamesguida was supposed to consolidate their forces and power since there beforehand had 
been little or none cooperation or co-ordination between the various groups.284 In that way it 
was a great initiative and probably would have given the insurgents a better fighting chance, 
this did not happen due to the effective intelligence system of the regime. They learned about 
the initiative and the meeting place and time. They assaulted a meeting in progress and 
managed to kill several prominent insurgents leader like the GIA leader Allal Mohammed. 
Though Chebouti managed to escape they succeeded in sowing distrust between the various 
groups which killed off the initiative and rather aggravated competition between the groups in 
a divide and let them fight among themselves – set up.285 
Having sown distrust between the insurgents the regime forces had just started their 
manipulation in their offence, as the regime benefitted from GIA in two particular ways.286 
The two points are such that Luis Martinez indicates they prove that GIA were actually being 
controlled by or allied with the regime. What the GIA did without a doubt had a positive 
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effect indirectly since the brutal handling and the killing of unarmed civilians whom the GIA 
deemed legitimate targets discouraged the potential selectorate of the FIS from any 
involvement. It had said effect as their experience was a terrifying one with the insurgents i.e. 
the islamists, this severely weakened the cause of the more moderate fighters. In addition 
those who were capable of pointing to the discrepancy in this logic were assassinated; several 
regime and GIA critical journalists and intellectuals were killed throughout the civil war.287 
Although this argument could be disputed, since the stance of the GIA and their expanded 
definition of legitimate targets after a while rendered pretty much everyone legitimate targets 
it would force the population to take a stance rather than being neutral needing to some extent 
to leave the safety of passivity. There is also the fact that in an area with no governmental 
control, meaning no security this would prompt one to side with the GIA and adopted their 
view becoming a part of their selectorate to avoid danger.288 
The relevance would then be that the GIA were a wild card in the sense that they had no firm 
position or goals. As a wild card can have any suit, colour, number or any other property in a 
game depending on the card holder the GIA are here called just that as they were certainly 
highly unpredictable. At the same time they themselves were very indiscriminate in their 
methods, making them a positive player for the regime in some scenarios in which they 
estranged the populace from other islamists insurgents by treating the populace harshly. In 
addition to the government manipulation that lead both the GIA and the AIS to fight pitched 
battles with each other over turf and selectorate especially later on when both resources and 
supporters became scarce. Rather than being a direct part of the (intelligence apparatus) it 
looks like the GIA was an unstable actor that was manipulated to render the FIS/MIA 
approach harder, even later attempts at merging the two failed - as one in 1994 - and when the 
GIA went too far, MIA did not even consider a merge.289 
The circumstances created by the insurgency and the “let them rot” strategy of the army made 
room for petty criminals and other groups guided by several diverse islamis t ideologies – or 
none - to prosper. The regime protected its selectorate and no one else, and implemented the 
“let them rot” strategy giving these groups room to grow.290 Making the theatre even more 
confusing, though these were not an important part of the equation - they were a part of the 
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abandoned areas. In a theatre where violence is a means to reach an end, and where in general 
(though certainly exceptions exists) the insurgents benefitted the most from the support of this 
particular part of selectorate at the onset, they became a power piece. The criminal nature 
makes this true, the rise of the loosely connected GIA makes this true if one looks at the focus 
they had on resources, both in earning them and sabotaging the states endeavours – however 
misguided they were as appropriately discussed. The way in which GIA interpreted their 
circumstances in accord with their ideology resulted in a view on the populace at large that 
made all connected with the regime plausible targets at worst, this in addition to the results of 
Tamesguida with a non-cohesive, large and mistrusting mass of insurgents made their moves 
unpredictable often ending in utter violence and in turf wars over areas abandoned by the 
army. The second part of the complex question of why the insurgents – both GIA and AIS‟s - 
tactics failed and why the government‟s tactic to a large extent worked to achieve their goals 
will now be addressed as we look at the more grisly parts of the civil war. 
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7 The descent into a “Savage War” 
From 1995 and onwards massacres started to occur besides the killing we have already seen. 
The level of general violence was also immensely high due to a higher strain on the insurgents 
who faced a better trained and equipped army from 1995 and onwards. In addition we see a 
fall in members of the insurgency; this however is also attributed to a higher competency 
level. It is important to note however that only parts of the army were better equipped and 
trained, not the entirety of it. The improvement was a result of the initiatives started in 1993 
with the Biskra academy and a financial sector that improved immensely after 1994 as will be 
discussed in chapter 8. 
In this chapter we start off with a discussion on some of the numbers presented in chapter 
five, on the abilities and material and economic assets of the army. I then discuss if the lack of 
abilities and resources really mattered for what the leadership really wanted to achieve, if the 
lack in skills actually made them fail in their endeavours. With these points established I 
continue with addressing the proliferation of violence and the two main reasons for it. First 
the choice of leaving population centres to “rot” and second a socio economic mechanism that 
can explain the new level of guns and what follows with it. On that note I also find it suitable 
to address the very character of the massacres, as they were of a particularly grisly nature in 
what can be seen as evil, ruthless or barbarian. This hinges on the sheer amount of slit throats, 
and more manual killings which certainly do not make for a pleasant scenario. 
The last part of the chapter concerns the government‟s own reaction to the massacres, or one 
could say their inaction. As it has been seen as an enigma leading to speculations down most 
venues I discuss it and present a possible rationale for it through mandates, capacities in 
addition to some scrutiny onto the critiques of the inaction presenting a more logical scenario 
than evil men killing others for no apparent reason. 
7.1 Why the proliferation of violence? 
The “let them rot” strategy as said was the result of a lack of military capacity at the time and 
the ad hoc nature of the escalating conflict created an uncontrolled vacuum where actors 
could proceed (in certain areas) as they liked. The lack of capacity was a result of poor 
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military training, military training for conventional warfare, similar to what we think of with 
regards to World War II and lack of foreign liaison officers with the proper knowledge and 
skills. Since army officers were part of the potential selectorate the training also contained a 
highly political content rather than skill content for promoted officers, in addition the fact that 
ANP was a people‟s army resulting in much time spent on civil works projects rather than 
actual military training. This therefor restricted the army‟s capacities to commit effective 
forces on a large scale to any other place than where they were absolutely needed. The 
monopoly on violence was as such conceded in general as well as broken by insurgency 
attacks. 
Algeria as many other nations had issues with military equipment, stocking up on new fancy 
equipment looks good on the paper but without the proper follow up with regards to 
maintenance and proper training the equipment will have no actual fighting value.291 This fact 
did not win or lose the entire battle in Algeria but it is in favour of the brutal choices made at 
the onset and throughout the civil war. The state of much of the equipment of the Algerian 
army was close to useless, as it had been appropriated without the proper follow up and 
without the proper training and maintenance. 292 On top of this, though numerous the Algerian 
army had a tradition for being a people‟s army, AHC points to the fact that any conscript in it 
spent a mere six months in military training and the last twelve months of his service working 
civil works projects like building roads and dams.293 These soldiers in an army without recent 
fighting experience, with obsolete equipment and poor training were organized with a very 
rigid command line where the Chief of Staff exercised a direct line of command to the major 
combat units.294 This would hamper any effective fighting, leaving little or no trust in the 
company commanders themselves.  
It is of course a natural mechanism in an army that sees itself as sovereign and holds all power 
in its top echelons that it takes the initiative and the possibility for it from commanders as has 
been an imperative since the classical era which stories are brimming with military usurpers 
in a freer position. This works and there is no need for any other way in times of peace with 
no imminent dangers not demanding any efficient action, the insurgency on the other hand 
created one. The leadership did not reorganize its command lines even so, giving a clear 
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indication that strategic reasons were ranked lower than politics.295 It renders poor fighting 
capabilities but not critical in the Algerian regimes mind-set as autocratic leaders can afford to 
sustain domestic troubles as long as their supporters are provided with private goods. Even 
though these factors meant that they had poorer fighting capabilities and with it less of an 
ability to protect the entire nation and combat the insurgency effectively they seem to have 
been satisfied to an extent in their ability to protect what I have already established as their 
main concern, the selectorate and the winning coalition. But even this came at a price, the 
Algerian pride. There were foreign political and economic partners that helped them along 
with new equipment and financial aid to maintain this something that was not popular in all 
political circles.296  
A lot more could be said about the state of the army, in any case the main point to emphasize 
here is that it was in a poor state that limited the ability to fight an enemy. This in itself would 
not necessarily be reason enough to implement the strategy of “let them rot” but it certainly 
would push any nation and leadership to focus what they had on whatever they deemed 
important. What is important will always vary and be open for discussion but in this regard it 
has been made clear that it was the winning coalition and the selectorate. 
The army are said to have; “failed (spectacularly) in restoring order, keeping a monopoly on 
violence.”297 As facts surrounding casualties and crimes committed came to be known later, it 
also became know that the government in fact did not publish official casualty statistics. This 
was allegedly held back as not to spread fear to the public. Evans and Philips list up the 
killings of civilians, teachers, mayors, robberies, the costs connected to bombing and arson.298 
The numbers are terrifying and high, but these results were not necessarily a failure on the 
government‟s part. 
I would argue that it was no failure, that there never was a wish or a will to necessarily amend 
the monopoly on violence as is normal for a state. The needs of the army and strategic goals 
derived from them never seem to have expanded in this direction at all based on what they 
actually did. The lack of will to negotiate, even the hampering of initiatives leading in that 
direction in combination with the state of the army and the utilization of it in no regard shows 
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a will to end the conflict and regain the monopoly.299 If they thought that negotiations would 
give them more than fighting would - meaning they would remain in power, they would have 
done so, but as for any self-serving leader this is a secondary consideration to staying in 
office.300 Where they actually failed was allowing for the occasional success of the insurgents 
in assassinating the army‟s winning coalition, like the HCE members Ladif Flici and Hafid 
Senhadri whom were killed in broad daylight in March 1993.301 Other than these instances of 
assassinations there seem not to be any apparent reason for any other action, it is even 
speculated that the killings of intellectuals and critics of the regime were “allowed to be 
killed” meaning a passive approach to security drawing it up as a commodity for which the 
price was loyalty and valuable support.302 The bonus of this endeavour has often been the 
rationale explained in other analysis of the method in that the populace was treated in a 
horrible way within the vacuum of government control.303 This would give the populace 
incentive to drop their support for the insurgents having experienced the governance of the 
islamists as discussed in chapter 4. However this is true only as much as it crippled the 
ambitions of the islamist insurgents making their strongest argument – the expansion of the 
selectorate – seem less lucrative. The army had no apparent need for the population being on 
their side. The neutral position the population seem to have assumed some years into the 
conflict suited them well, though their position was at stake from 1995 and onwards with the 
massacres and the mobilization of militias as will be discussed in chapter 7.3 and 9.2.304  
If there were any other initiatives that could represent different conclusions they were quickly 
stumped either by political manoeuvring or by the sudden death of the leader for the initiative. 
President Boudiaf assassination as we have seen is an example of one who may have wanted 
to correct some things in the state of affairs; he had three objectives according to Martin 
Stone; to create a new political front to replace the FLN – the RPN (Rassemblement 
Patriotique National), to end high levels of corruption and to use whatever methods necessary 
to safeguard the secular-nationalist character of independent Algeria and in that the 
prevention of any religious parties coming to power.305 As is evident the first two points could 
seem problematic with regards to what‟s already been discussed, if there was to be a new 
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political formal front for the power holders they would again be restrained to some extent as 
discussed in chapter 3. The pursuit of corruption however is what most analysts on the 
scenario seem to think got him killed if it was not the insurgents.  
The goal contradicted the status quo, and it certainly was not followed up after his death. The 
last point was more in line with the rational of the army, as the “whatever means necessary” 
implies that a rationale of protecting those who were deemed important to keep the character 
of the country as it was would make room for the method chosen, and not necessarily win the 
war outright. Martinez for one identifies or fails to identify any will at all stemming from the 
authorities wanting to end the conflict forcefully or peacefully.306 This sentiment was shared 
by the French Prime Minister Eduard Balladur who worried that Algeria wasn‟t making a 
serious attempt to end the crisis when talking about the Hijacking of Air France A300 in 
1994.307 Quandt on the other hand claims that the state of things was a result of the Algerians 
applying the same tactics the French used during the civil war. This may be, but it could also 
just be a tempting comparison, since if this really were the case it makes no sense. Due to the 
fact that the French lost using the exact same strategies the Algerians who won back then 
were supposedly using facing their own insurgency.308 
The rational above is however disrupted by one ambiguous character, General Zeroual who 
became HCE chairman after Ali Kafi in 1994, and later President in the first presidential 
election in 1995.309 More on his ambitions and the way in which the rational and system was 
challenged by him in chapter 9.1, for now it is to be noted that he sought to manipulate the 
political environment in his favour at some cost but not nearly in the way the FIS wanted. In 
effect he just replaced the current leadership for a small political price. This meant that he as 
well was comfortable with the rationale spelled out above so there were no power holders 
formal or informal beside the FIS through their insurgency power who had any interest in the 
disenfranchised, something that was not communicated clearly due to the nature of their 
fellow islamists, the GIA.  
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7.2 Two reasons for escalating violence in the 
abandoned areas 
On the insurgent‟s part Martinez is correct when he says that violence became the means of 
gaining what you wanted to a certain degree. The situation dictated that if you wanted to have 
a say, you would need to step up to the plate due to the fact that there were armed insurgents 
in the void. So there arose a need to take the same measures as the other actors whom held 
guns in large areas of Algeria. This did not mean that everyone suddenly became more violent 
making a harsh and difficult situation for the soldiers and officers, but rather that there is a 
counter intuitive mechanism at play. I‟ll use an example from a survey on hockey players 
done by Thomas Schelling in behavioural economics to explain, from his book Micromotives 
and Microbehavious.  
In short what he discovered was that when questioned it they would prefer to play with or 
without helmets all players answered that they would prefer not to. At the same time most 
players answered that they would like the rules to demand them to play with helmets. First 
baffled, he then figured out that the reason for this is that it feels better to play without a 
helmet so it gives them a competitive advantage. However they all know that there is more 
risk involved due to injuries. They also know that if there is no rule some would play without 
helmets despite the fact that there is more risk involved due to the advantage it holds counter 
to someone playing with a helmet. So the end result would be that everyone played without a 
helmet to reduce the competitive advantage rendering no competitive advantage and more 
risk. This led them to want a rule levelling the turf while being more protected.310 The 
violence phenomena works the same way only in the absence of a government there is no one 
making and upholding the rules, giving most people the incentive to do something they would 
rather not to keep the playing field levelled – namely arming themselves with guns. This 
made the rules of the game different in addition to the vacuum which made it possible.311 The 
guns in this analogy would work much the same way as playing hockey without helmets, if 
one player gets it the competitive advantage is such that everyone else is prompted to have it 
to even the odds. The monopoly on violence usually functions as the rule, saying everyone 
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should wear helmets or not have guns. Whereas without the government allowing guns to be 
available it turned into a riskier but not better situation. 
What prompted the first to take up the gun might be just the lack of control in itself. Or more 
likely it could be the fact that just some in the beginning carried guns and used it not only 
towards the government. The result was nevertheless that the fear and insecurity tactic 
executed by the government led to so much frustration and anger directed to those whom 
enforced it that what had been a national struggle seemed to become localized. With young 
men taking to the streets with violence in mind to exert violence on those who were thought 
to tip of the police and the police itself that arrested, tortured and robbed them of their 
freedom.312 Then again not every village descended into a violent chaos, Luis Martinez 
attributes this to deep rooted social mechanisms through an informal jema’a in a village 
council in Algeria that would function much like the rule enforcing a monopoly on guns.313 
The new conditions overall certainly changed the atmosphere of Algeria a lot, as the people 
were abandoned by the government they also abandoned them.314 Political support for any 
faction became less of a priority as the people took refuge in survival strategies in what was;” 
passive hostility rather than active support for the fundamentalists”.315 Løchstøer juxtaposes 
the position you could have even more, in the eradicator-negotiator dichotomy. This is on her 
part a fault in my regard, as the passivity and hopeless situation of the population at large 
meant that they were not inclined to be swayed either the one or the other way.316 
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Knives versus shotguns: 
Before we move onto what the massacres can tell us on the nature of the war in general I will 
present a somewhat unorthodox reason as to why the massacres themselves were executed in 
such a grisly way. There are an abundance of discussions on the rationale behind the savagery 
of the killings. They often speak of “pure evil”, rituals of passage or that the enemy, 
especially in a civil war is demonized to justify the killings.317 I think this is wrong for 
Algeria. By killing savagely you demonize none other than yourself. It also seems to be a 
circular argument; because this person is so bad I can kill him in a savage way (due to his lack 
of worth etc.), I kill him so savagely because he is so bad. It might have made more sense if 
the situation had appeared more dichotomous, with clear cut fronts, geographical, ethnic or 
religious distinctions but this was not so. Only to some degree in that the elite or the upper 
strata were a line of separation, but even there it was blurred and they were nonetheless not 
the victims of the massacres.  
Although it is easy to imagine how slit throats screams evil and brutality, there may exists a 
much more rational explanation for this, namely knives versus shotguns. It is mentioned in 
several books, and emphasized (though not to this possibility) in the BBC documentary 
(1994) “Algeria‟s Hidden War” that a large majority of the insurgents firearms were shotguns, 
only 1/3 were automatic weapons.318 This fact could imply two things: First that there was 
resource scarceness. This would mean that any waste of ammunition on an opponent deemed 
not threatening that nonetheless needed to be killed for whatever reason would make it more 
sensible to kill the enemy without spending resources (ammunition). The other is that if the 
weapon - remember the majority of the insurgents were carrying shotguns - is a shotgun a slit 
throat is a rational choice both in terms of efficiency (how long it will take to kill of victims – 
in the most extreme cases up to 400) and with regard to a secure kill – a shotgun blast to the 
torso is not a secure kill (depending on the distance) with the alternative being even more 
savage than a slit throat – a head beyond recognition. As appalling as these arguments may 
seem, I still think this to be a logical reasons for the nature of the killings. However irrational 
the choice to kill all these people were, the way in which it was done if the shotgun count 
indeed is true carries more sense than a particular spirit, mind-set or some such evil at play. If 
killing large quantities of anything with shotguns were efficient they would be used in 
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slaughter house. In fact in this horrendous event the slit throats might even have been seen as 
a small mercy contrary to much more dishevelled corpses.  
7.3 What can the massacres tell us? 
It is discussed when the first massacres took place in Algeria, some claim it happened as far 
back as 1993, but it is at least acknowledged that they occurred with a huge death toll and 
frequently from 1995 and onwards till the 2000‟s. This was one of the most visible signs of 
the violent decay of society the insurgency had led to, also one of the most controversial 
subjects of the civil war since sources are scarce and often biased. What they can tell us in 
this discussion is two things, first; the massacres were a strong argument in the states arming 
of civilians and second they had a very visible effect of the army‟s will to let everyone else 
beside their selectorate and winning coalition be left to their own devices. I will argue my 
case for this drawing on communiqués from the “Free Officers of Algeria” and eyewitness 
accounts who speak about army mandates, and army concerns that concluded in a position of 
no engagement even when massacres took place- even next to army barracks. 
There were several major massacres that took place in Algeria, some of them claiming as 
many as 400 lives as in the western province of Relizane.319 By the end of 1996 a large 
number of villages took on the shape of fortresses that were surrounded by watchtowers 
barbed wires and mines to protect themselves from the massacres which allegedly were 
executed by the GIA.320 There are suspicions and accusations raised at the army for being the 
executer or at least the motivators behind the massacres. But as the killing of people that were 
already outside the army‟s selectorate but nonetheless citizens who already had realized that 
the insurgent‟s governance was a horrible thing at the time the massacres started, the army 
killing them makes no apparent sense. The accusation that the government was behind the 
killing of foreigners is irrational as well. Even though it would have been nice to get rid of 
critical eyes during what is claimed to be a purgatory of all internal opposition, it would also 
imply that they were biting the hand that fed them. Looking at the reshuffle of people 
responsible for the economy in 1993-94 and the courting of foreign companies and states to 
gain resources (in near desperation close to 1994) it is counter intuitive and the price of 
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removing tentative preying eyes that already had shown a will of support contrary to losing 
FDI is too high. Then again one might say that journalists could have reported from Algeria, 
giving a more nuanced picture of what was really going on also hampering international 
support. 
The important thing with concerns to the government was the response to the massacres, not 
if they were a direct result of their actions. Since it is the outcome that is essential – the 
arming of civilians – and not exactly who instigated them it will not be discussed further here. 
The arming of citizens will be addressed in chapter 9.2.What I will argue here and what I 
think is essential about the execution of the massacres and the lack of military action on them 
is that it tells us something important with regards to the selectorate theory. If we apply the 
selectorate theory it is easier to see the unimportance of the population; if not part of the 
selectorate or the winning coalition it is an extreme sign of the uselessness of the population. 
It will become clear how important the capacity argument made earlier is as well. This comes 
into effect in several of the points made in the previous chapter. The inefficiency of the chain 
of command is paramount as it increases the response time of any fighting unit, as was the 
case at barracks just some hundred feet from one of the massacres where the army did not 
intervene.321 When the chain of command demands orders from the chief of staff it is self-
explanatory that the response time will be slow. Especially when it seems like several army 
barracks were under a mandate not to intervene in any incident as is recorded as the answer to 
villagers calling for help at the Beni Messous massacre September 5th, 1997. It was said that 
response to insurgency attacks was under the mandate of the gendarmie, meaning the internal 
security forces.322 Some soldiers were instructed not to leave their army barracks at night 
without written instruction and another source from the MOAL (le Mouvement Algérien des 
Officiers Libres, The Free Algerian Officers) – a secret group of informant officers in the 
ANP - said that there was a fax sent from the Chief of Staff ordering all units to cancel all 
leaves and that further banned all sorties under all circumstances.323 While some forces called 
upon seem to have direct orders not to intervene others seem to have taken advantage of the 
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fact that there were no orders telling them to intervene, leaving yet another village under 
attack defenceless.324 
The result of these massacres - the killing of hundreds of individuals can easily lead one to 
false assumptions - the very extremity of the acts makes no room for any logical or good 
argument for any armed man to abstain from intervening, something that certainly can prompt 
one to speculate in just who were behind the massacres. However cynical it may appear I 
think it is clear that any army division under a mandate is expected to uphold that mandate, 
especially if there are good reasons for it. There could of course be an exception where some 
army commander defies all orders, procedures and leads a counter attack defending the 
civilians. In such an instance he would be cheered on by human hearts for showing a valiant 
nature, but it is in any army essential that orders are to be followed and anyone with the 
command to do such a thing would most likely know or understand the rationale behind it. 
Much as discussed before here I will argue that it rests on capacity and needs. 
Although the academy at Biskra had supplied the army with a new officer class with COIN 
capabilities the army overall still had some issues with regards to fighting insurgency at large. 
This is an important point, as there seems to have been a small cluster of troops throughout 
the LIC (Low intensity conflict) that had capabilities or at least fought and pulled off 
successful operations such as the one at Tamesguida.325 But overall the situation was not as 
good. The government offered excuses with this in mind as well; even a French minister sided 
with the Algerian regime in saying that there were technical reasons for the non-intervention. 
In this he included both apparent dangers for the forces if a counterattack was initiated and 
also the fact that they were under a mandate not to do just that.326 A quote from a General X 
in An Inquiry into The Algerian Massacres is used as an argument to raise suspicions on the 
army‟s actions in favour of them with no reason other than hatred for islamists sympathizers 
letting the massacres happen or even executing them themselves. But this quote can be 
interpreted in two ways as he could just have stated what the status quo was. The army was 
inexperienced in this kind of warfare – meaning insurgency.327   
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Now there is some discussion on the topic of the ANP‟s COIN capabilities at the time, one 
author on the subject M.S. Lalioui points to the fact that the ANP had a COIN doctrine in 
their military academies as part of their colonial legacy. Having the curriculum of a very 
specific way of fighting is however far from implementing training, getting equipment and 
seeing it realized on a larger scale within an army. So it was in their textbooks but it should be 
apparent that the lack of COIN capabilities was an issue from the onset of the civil war and 
that it in no way was their strong suit.328 She goes on in criticizing the army‟s behaviour, as a 
“European special forces veteran” quoted from a news excerpt also claims that the army could 
have gone in and “killed the terrorists”.329 This quote among other things is one used by 
Lalioui to build the case that since the army did not intervene it must have wanted the 
massacres to happen. It pivots towards Hume‟s Law, leading from what is to ought. The 
argument here tries to abstain from that, rather than wanting the massacres to happen, they are 
deemed an uncritical part of the situation on a long term basis since the people at large are not 
part of the selectorate and in the time frame of the massacres with soldiers at hand they are 
deemed useless. This in the words proper meaning prompting one to decide not to engage, as 
there is a rather sound decision being made that it is; both too dangerous due to the 
uncertainties in the surrounding areas and by the lack of skills other than conventional 
training and equipment meant for other types of combat. That a special forces veteran should 
speak on behalf of soldiers he does not know either in capabilities or in person of a situation 
happening under circumstances he is not familiar with also is a weak point by any standard. 
Lalioui on the other hand renders this “excuse” of army incompetence as bizarre, an odd 
statement that definitely follows Hume‟s Law and not any rational logic thinking.330 It is of 
course impossible to know if the army had succeeded in intervening against a massacre since 
they apparently never did, but likely the outcome would have been more deaths and a total 
waste of troops strategically speaking and even without fulfilling any important goal for the 
army jema’a in line with the lack of import of the populace to their continued position in 
power. 
The dangers lightly touched upon must be seen as one of the reasons for the mandate that then 
again hindered operations from the army side. At several massacres sites there were army 
barracks close at hand, the sources for the following security concerns comes from survivors 
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of massacres telling us what response they got when calling on aid trying to object to the non-
intervention.331 So they should not be biased in any way, they only lack or disagree in the 
same understanding of the overall concerns. Several sources mention mines and wires as an 
endangering concern on the soldiers behalf, also the lack of night time capabilities is 
mentioned as a reason not to intervene.332 Now if these concerns were real or not is hard to 
know, but say that they were – something that could be since several villages indeed had 
taken on the appearance of fortresses with barbed wire and mines surrounding them – it 
would be a major unknown variable for any operation. Prodding through minefields takes 
time, and the response time of the operation would be further delayed. Witnesses and 
survivors have commented on the argument of the mine danger saying that ambulances 
arrived freely after the massacres in addition to some fleeing the site meaning that there were 
no mines. This makes it clear that no matter what the army thought the sites were free of 
mines, but that is a discovery made in hindsight and so it does not follow that the army at the 
time should have concluded with the same.333 Although it can strengthen the suspicion that 
the army really did not believe that there were any mines but used it as an excuse, but there is 
no certain way of knowing it and anyhow the mandates from the top seem to have its first 
focus to secure the army as a whole and thereby basing its conclusion on general assumptions. 
So the mines might not have been surrounding the particular incident where the ambulance 
came and went, but there is no doubt that a lot of villages were surrounded by mines. So the 
army would rather spend its energy on what was part of the selectorate and rather use forces 
which were either expendable like the gendarmie who were excluded from it or forces that 
had the proper training and equipment securing a low casualty operation with higher gains. 
The denial and the words spoken seldom really tell you anything real, meaning that it is rather 
to be found following the logic of the power struggle. Lalioui says in a rather odd argument 
for the army having been behind the massacres if not directly executing them then condoning 
them. He puts forth an explanation of several key points from the army in dealing with the 
accusations, first they deny responsibility, and then they provide justification and try to 
rationalize the massacres or discredit sources of information on them. Lastly they claim the 
accuser has no right to criticize, when even this fails they partially acknowledge what they 
cannot explain away, this in his opinion is a strong argument indirectly implying that they 
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knew all along or that they were behind it all.334 It might seem suspicious, but it seems that 
the list could just as well be applied by someone wrongly accused of something, being 
innocent as someone guilty. The course of the argument seems to be the normal course of any 
discussion where one is accused of something, rendering it less convincing in anything other 
than a rhetorical way.  
Two analysts, namely Kalyvas and Cordesman agree that the massacres indeed were not 
perpetrated by the government but rather by insurgency forces, specifically GIA. Their 
reasons were according to Cordsman that they wanted to show the governments forces that 
they had no control over the countryside, the more convincing argument is that of Kalyvas.335 
He sees them as part of a deterrent for unarmed villages in arming themselves as many of the 
villages that suffered massacres were villages in wait for weapons or villages that had asked 
to be armed by the army.336 Perusing the Ministry of Defence‟s own homepage one will find 
that in their own account of why they armed these citizens they acknowledge that; 
 
“It remains that the NPA could not be everywhere at the same time. It is for that and 
with an aim of causing a dynamics and of setting up an organization of protection of the 
citizens, especially the villagers residents in the most moved back regions of the country 
which the groups of legitimate-defence were created.”337  
So as we‟ve seen in this chapter there indeed is a case to be made for the odd behaviour of the 
army with regards to the massacres if one applies the selectorate theory and as such accepts 
the importance or lack of importance of certain groups in society we see it more as an issue of 
prioritizing based on what resources are available. With this in mind the strangeness if not 
completely unravelled at least becomes clearer. Here I also hold that Kalyvas is right in his 
assessment of why the insurgents carried out the massacres and the interesting question of 
why the self-defence militias were created on the other hand will be addressed in chapter 9.2. 
Before that however there is a need to address what‟s only been mentioned briefly, the 
economical aspect into this conflict as it both restricted, enabled and dissuaded several of the 
key players in this war and as was one of the major reasons for the way it was played out. 
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8 The money game, a matter of 
priorities? 
The economic situation of Algeria has so far been told in short, in this chapter I aim to 
address this vital part of the civil war more thoroughly. In short Algeria‟s political program 
that set the wheels spinning was a result of a buckling economy. When the army went forward 
with its coupe the economic situation was as dire and volatile as the political. That‟s why 
France spearheaded an economical rescue mission for Algeria that was given at the onset of 
the civil war. As back then Algeria had a large debt with an all-consuming interest rate giving 
them little room for manoeuvring. A long term solution was needed however and the shuffle 
of prime ministers is a clear indication as to how the discussion on this issue went. Prime 
Minister Abdessalam meant that the safest and best way to restructure the economy was to go 
back to the industry heavy economy initiated in the 1970‟s Algeria, as this did not improve 
the situation during his short lived office he was replaced by Ali Kafi in 1994, a prime 
minister more willing to make radical changes. These changes meant putting the Algerian 
pride of self-sufficiency aside and accepting a restructuring of their debt with terms dictated 
by the IMF. This however did not happen until 1994, though they are closely connected with 
what Luis Martinez calls a plunder economy where seemingly well-meant initiatives in the 
end largely serve a small percentage of the population. The political changes that took place 
in 1995 with the first presidential election since the coupe were of course also connected to 
these terms, but this event and its repercussions will be addressed at length in chapter 9. 
In this chapter I will start by applying the selectorate theory on the economic situation at the 
onset of the civil war, pointing to the importance of private goods as this can explain part of 
the lack in fighting capabilities of the army. It is also a clear reason for some of the immediate 
economic changes like the instigation of a war economy. The repercussions of the war 
economy and an assessment of its effect will lead up to the IMF deal which after all was 
needed to sustain the power position of a hard pressed army. This position could have been 
worse if the insurgents had struck at the most vital part of the Algerian economy, something 
they did not do. I will discuss why they did not and make sense of their inaction. The final 
point of this chapter is closely related to the changes that took place after the IMF deal so I 
will make those apparent before pointing to one example that shows the new found economic 
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position and its consequences. The army faced what could have been a crippling political 
blow through the Sant Egidio meeting of 1995 which was an international effort gathering 
Algerian political parties, including the FIS to work out a document that all could agree on for 
an end to the civil war, however the HCE sent no representatives and neither did the 
eradicator parties listed in chapter 5.2.338 
8.1 What’s the importance of private goods? 
The economy played a huge part in the power shifts, since Algeria was hampered by a huge 
national debt swallowing a staggering percentage of the national budget. The unparalleled 
income source of the country – the hydrocarbon sector - was safeguarded with the same 
priority as the winning coalition from the onset, ending with restriction zones in much of the 
southern country. The debt still held that both the army and the HCE were ill manned to 
handle the insurgency effectively as the army had few resources to spend boosting their 
fighting capabilities.  
As explained, private goods are what keep the winning coalition loyal; therefore it is 
paramount to have it for the leadership and that‟s why they sought guarantees for their 
corporate interests in exchange for the diluted political role when President Chadli started his 
reforms.339 When the situation changed, they knew that their entire power structure rested on 
having access to resources for their continued presence in power. Although one on the other 
hand could say that resources will be a priority to protect or try to extract as much of as 
possible in any war situation for any given country. This is of course not false; the reason for 
it being mentioned here is the special case of Algeria. As the neglect of protecting the 
populace and rather focusing to such a degree on resources makes it apparent that there is 
more to it. William Quandt in his book makes a point of connecting all affluence in Algeria to 
the state tracing it all the way back to Algeria‟s independence. With this he means to say that 
all accumulation of wealth depended on the state – meaning the army - that doled out goods to 
those who were loyal, creating the divide between the winning coalition and the rest.340 This 
broke with the somewhat egalitarian nature of the newly established state over time, creating 
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the elite of which the leadership needed support by way of loyalty, ability to muster forces or 
whatever else they could contribute with to keep them in power. 
To secure the inflow of resources the first thing that was done after the coup was to secure the 
foreign aid as already mentioned. Then the new Prime Minister Abdessalam Belaid mobilized 
a war economy, in which the allocation of resources is a large part.341 The point here is that 
they would be even freer to allocate resources as needed in what Luis Martinez calls “the 
plunder economy”.342 
The oil installations such as the production facilities, pipelines and the harbours were 
vulnerable parts in the overwhelmingly large part it was of the industrial sector so they were 
well guarded. There were a few incidents that prompted actions to better safeguard it. The 
MIA sabotage of a gas pipeline near the southern town of Laghouat, and GIA‟s targeting of 
everyone working in the hydrocarbon sector serves as examples in that they probably were 
part of the reason for the allowance of private security measures for foreign companies.343 
Even with this allowance, from the onset of the civil war, the foreign companies in Algeria 
limited their manpower to the essentials. 
The need to protect the resources also led to the four restriction zones in the southern parts of 
the country, they were sparsely populated and the area where most of the production took 
place. There were some attacks despite the restriction zones like on a facility in Ghardaia in 
the Mzab region where five foreign nationals working for Bechtel were killed.344 Though 
some incidents happened, the few attacks on facilities at least seemed either to fail outright, or 
they didn‟t interrupt production in any significant way. This means that the regime were 
largely successful in protecting their assets something that made them keep the loyalty of their 
supporters and the means to protect them. Despite the apparent success in this, the machinery 
of the economy itself was hampered and the percentage of the GDP that was needed to pay of 
foreign debts did not change, this led to a desperate attempt by Prime Minister Abdessalam 
where he tried to steer the economy back to what had seemed to work in the 1970‟s. When 
this failed Hugh Roberts claims the army buckled to foreign pressure and ousted him for Ali 
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Kafi who was more willing to implement the measures the IMF demanded for rescheduling of 
loans in 1994.345 
8.2 How did the leadership overcome a shrinking 
resources pool? 
The restructuring of the national debt in accord with IMF was a major happening. Since it 
promised the winning coalition the goods they expected to be assured, before this any hold on 
power was shaky at best. This can be glimpsed as several key players from the time of the 
coupe soon were out of the picture, in addition to a volatile situation afterwards with the 
removal and replacement of several key figures in the leadership and winning coalition. The 
country Algeria had since its meagre beginnings been proud of its ability to maintain its 
interest payments, the rescheduling would be a stain on that record therefore there was a lot of 
ill will on rescinding on this and a futile attempt at doing otherwise was made only 8 months 
before the deal for rescheduling.346 This speaks volumes on the issue.  
The resources at hand before the transition, were the aid relief of 550 million USD and 1, 45 
billion USD received from France and the western consortium France convinced to help.347 
For a regime whose main goal was to stay in power and that barely managed to do so and 
lacked the capabilities to protect its winning coalition and selectorate sufficiently, new 
funding was essential. In 1994 a deal was struck with the IMF who put clear restrictions on 
the economic policies of Algeria against a rescheduling and a billion dollars‟ worth of 
loans.348 The loan was a result of external pressure as foreign partners demanded measures of 
security and in controlling the insurgency if they were to operate in the country. Since the 
production of hydrocarbons demanded essential foreign skills and FDI the pressure led 
Algeria to accept what Cathrine Løchstøer calls; “… the most humiliating thing the Algerian 
government could imagine…”349 
The immediate effects were apparent as funds were spent on better equipment to enhance the 
fight against the insurgents to even more tolerable levels, like a number of helicopters bought 
                                                 
345
 Roberts, The Battlefield, 326–327.  
346
 Ibid., 161; Løchstøer, Algerie, 201, 271. 
347
 Cordesman, A Tragedy of Arms, 116.  
348
 Løchstøer, Algerie, 202.  
349
 Freely translated from Norwegian. Roberts, The Battlefield, 161; Løchstøer, Algerie, 201. 
103 
 
from France which David Galula identifies these as one of the most important assets in direct 
fighting with insurgents giving a clear tactical advantage with regards to response time and 
mobility.350 The new funds also came with some reforms that gave incentive to do more 
business, housing support, and some privatization that actually enhanced the situation of 
people at large, something Luis Martinez especially makes a point of. It is at this time he 
claims that the “jihadis” turn to profiteering more than fighting the regime as there are new 
possibilities to enrich oneself.351 This was a twofold thing though, since the increased ability 
to enrich oneself also benefitted the ones still trying to weaken the regime at some points to 
the degree that they could negotiate with the authorities, and hand out official building 
permits and the like in fact coming closer to governing in a way that reflected well on them in 
the areas they operated.352 
A reduction of the hydrocarbon revenues was as we have seen therefore one obstacle that the 
regime never had to overcome in any significant way. The fact that the insurgents had so few 
successful operations on the infrastructure of the hydrocarbon sector rests on the fact that they 
had few operations targeting the sector in general, this goes for both the AIS and the GIA 
groupings. There were some attempts, like the first on Sonatrech where a car park belonging 
to it was struck, and later there were some pipelines that were hit but the output was 
uninterrupted.353 This could be a real blunder by the insurgents, as they focused their attacks 
on the wrong sectors that really did not hurt but rather helped the regime on in some ways.354 
This is the impression one gets when reading Luis Martinez‟s account on the infrastructure 
focus, but with the theory applied here it is a very natural occurrence, since those resources 
especially in a situation of total war are a future prospect for the winning side. If the FIS was 
welcomed back into the fold, or they won a military victory of sorts through AIS these 
resources would be very important for their own governance and power when the dust settled 
to serve as a well of public and private goods. The few attacks that were executed could be 
explained as a tactic to reduce their opponent‟s numbers since they in fact did station forces to 
protect the resources that then again never were much of a battlefield. By not focusing that 
much on the sector they clearly either misunderstood the import of it or they must have had 
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the future in mind. This could also explain the somewhat weird targeting of the GIA; they 
targeted anyone working in the hydrocarbon sector.355 Though technical skills in operating 
and running the facilities would be needed in any future Caliphate of theirs, it was in fact a 
move of minimizing losses.  
The deal with the IMF rendered many of the islamists struggles and rhetoric useless as the 
IMF demands improved the living conditions for the populace at large but more as a side 
effect of the terms dictated by the IMF than any doling out of public goods.356 If one 
emphasizes the capacity argument I have made one could speculate on the willingness of the 
regime to actually care for its entire population. The argument of need, in which there is no 
apparent reason for the regime to dole out any private goods in any way to anyone beside 
those whom mattered in the winning coalition and their selectorate says something else. The 
reforms and programs that were started to help the micro-economy was therefore most likely 
the result of the demands of the IMF or nothing more than a half-hearted effort they with the 
improved economic situation could afford to do. This conclusion rests on the above and the 
clear divide that became apparent after Zerouals rise to presidency, how this prolonged the 
insurgency by competing for the selectorate and the narrow winning coalition rather than 
showing a will to end it all together. 
Moneywise this is clear or at least indicated by the shifting attitude towards renewed deals or 
expansion on existing ones with the IMF the following years, as they did not renew it in 1998, 
but then again they did so in May 1999 when the situation at large had changed considerably 
of which will be written more in the following chapter.357 The assassination of UGTA leader 
Abdelhak Benhamouda who aspired to form his own party, represented a will to end the deals 
with the IMF and kill the terrorists at all cost in 1997 is more likely to indicate a power 
struggle rather than a random assassination by the GIA.358 This “eradication” line was nothing 
new, but in the new situation after the IMF loans they could expand on their capabilities to 
such a degree that their goal became somewhat more realistic. So the path towards dialogue 
was one they were forced to at the onset as they seemed to be incapable and unwilling to win 
battle outright, then when the loan from the IMF made them affluent and so capable again 
they were in a position to continue the dialogue process but from another angle. It meant that 
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they were so much stronger that they could play out negotiations if they so wanted but on 
their own terms.  
8.2.1 How did they utilize the influx of goods available from 1994? 
Having the ability to keep the winning coalition happy in the end was more important than 
any issues of pride and meant a much more effective fight thereafter, both in terms of the 
previous and in terms of actual resources to augment the army‟s capacities by improving their 
assets equipment with new helicopters and night-time equipment which vastly improved their 
operational efficiency.359 Therefore they accepted the demands from the IMF when 
rescheduling its debts in 1994, which started a privatizing cabal that enriched several in the 
winning coalition.360  
While the army got a much firmer hold on power by controlling all state lead armed forces, - 
as is an imperative in a state with a military junta, to have the ability to muster military might 
in support of any leadership – they were politically superior by holding and controlling the 
majority of the seats in HCE and later the loyalty of those who got private goods. Martinez 
identifies that exact process taking place when the privatization started, without a doubt there 
to some extent was an increased flux of public goods, but as he says it; “the privatization 
happened, to please the patronage of the regime” – patronage meaning winning coalition.361 
The influx of fiscal assets was complimented by their will to get rid of trouble makers 
granting them a firm position when they were headed for a more normal state of affairs with 
Zeroual in 1995. The first graduates from Biskra in addition to new equipment also 
contributed to an increased capacity to fight the insurgent leading to a more efficient fight in 
addition to a war torn and tired population - the numbers of the insurgents went down 
following 1995. The drop in numbers reflects the fact that they as well became more 
professional and so relied less on numbers. 
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8.2.2 How was the army in a position to ignore the Sant Egidio 
meeting? 
The double dimension of selectorates and winning coalitions between the FIS and the army 
becomes quite clear with the St.Egidio meeting. It makes the total discrepancy between the 
two clear, in that the meeting was not acknowledged at all by the sitting regime. This was due 
to the fact that it gave neither the leadership, the winning coalition, the now challenging 
President Zeroual nor the selectorate anything they did not already have. It was aimed at the 
larger selectorate the FIS hoped to create. Martine Stone basically points to the same thing 
when he writes of the “National Contract” produced at the meeting, and the different parties 
that acknowledged it.362 The point being that the “outsiders” those who only were tentative 
candidates for being part of the selectorate but that excluded themselves by demanding the 
FIS being let into the fold once again were the only ones signing the document. By doing this 
they did not necessarily want the FIS itself in power, but they indicate that they preferred a 
situation or outcome that would have an expanded selectorate in which they themselves could 
have a possibility for becoming part of the winning coalition. The regime even tried to bait 
leaders of the FIS itself out of their hopes for spots in the alternative selectorate, in this way 
they certainly tried to undermine the machinery the FIS had built up and it was especially a 
blow to FIS leadership in exile as these were the least likely to ever come to the positions they 
coveted unless there was a victory on the FIS‟ part.363  
In this chapter we have seen and discussed the main economic issues throughout the civil war. 
From the dire straits the army found themselves in at the onset to the much improved position 
they had after accepting the IMF‟s terms for debt rescheduling. With a new found ability to 
purchase equipment for a more efficient fight, to the increased ability to please the winning 
coalition with a reinforced ability to dole out private goods. We have also discussed why the 
insurgents never made any critical and debilitating attacks towards the most important 
industrial sector, the hydrocarbon sector as it would be a vital part of their own governance if 
they ever succeeded in their endeavour. The pivotal event in the economic events of the 
1990‟s Algeria is without a doubt the rescheduling deal of 1994, as it wrought the changes 
above but more than that it made the feel safe enough to allow for presidential elections. The 
effect of this seemingly positive political change and how it affected the unfolding of the civil 
war will now be addressed. 
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9 Did the sway on power hold? 
In this last chapter I seek to explain and discuss the last real political conflict that had direct 
effects on the on-going civil war. We find it in President Liamine Zeroual who started out as a 
soldier in the war of independence in 1957, his first position as a politician came in 1993 as 
Minister of Defence which then led him to assume the chairmanship of the HCE in January 
1994 as an army proxy. Following the IMF deal and all the changes it brought about 
presidential elections were held in 1995 of which he was the victor. This chapter describes 
how he much like President Chadli serving as an army proxy in the same manner challenged 
his original leadership – the army jema’a. He did this through several acts; the one I will 
address first is his slow and steady strengthening of institutions and what it meant for the 
power struggle. Following that I will describe at length how he got to be the new president 
and address his deviation from army interests through backdoor negotiations with FIS leaders, 
his attempt at securing his own position and power through a new constitution as well as his 
response to President Chadlis main problem, the inability to muster forces. On that note the 
role, the reason and effect of the civil defence groups will be discussed at length ending with 
the army‟s reaction to all off these challenges with a new election in 1997 that as I claim was 
the beginning of the civil wars end. 
9.1 How did Zeroual challenge the army? 
President Zeroual focused on building up institutions; with this he slowly (and “invisibly”) 
gained a stronger foothold. He seemingly identified the same issue Hugh Roberts claims is the 
single problem that plagues Algeria, dysfunctional institutions.364 He played both sides (it 
could seem) by stating that all insurgents should be wiped out at the same time as he on 
multiple occasions attempted backdoor negotiations with the FIS. A second ousting of an ex-
military national leader would probably seem a bit too much leaving the army with little 
choice other than to fight President Zeroual (whom also had support from the less hardliner 
inclined generals - meaning parts of the winning coalition) on his own terms, namely 
politically. He managed to see through several reshuffles of military commands in addition to 
chiefs of police which in regards to the ability to muster forces was the same thing at the time. 
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This was possible due to the strong legitimacy President Zeroual had, both due to willingness 
or attempts at starting negotiation and the fact that he won an election judged to be fair by 
foreign observers.  
The reshuffles in the winning coalition (generals, ministers etc.) and the added benefits the 
public image gave him towards his winning coalition made him powerful. The new party of 
the sitting Zeroual, the RND (National Rally for Democracy) created mere months before the 
legislative election in 1997 won a sweeping victory. This showed that he held a strong 
position in accord with the questions posed by Hugh Roberts earlier, “why did the army allow 
the islamists to win?”, the implications of it is that either President Zeroual was so powerful 
that he dictated his own victory or the army was in such a squeezed position that they had no 
other option, both alternatives speaking on President Zerouals behalf. On the elections the 
same commentator from Hugh Roberts‟s book goes on to say that they were held in order to 
resolve a certain number of political problems.365 As is written here, if that question is the 
correct one the answer is; no. As the election rather showed that the current president had 
gotten further with the same project that President Chadli tried earlier, so it was more an 
expression of strength in which President Zeroual had gotten ratified – willingly or not - by 
enough forces in the army to continue.366 This is indicated if not proven by the fact that 
President Zeroual sacked the former chief of police, Abas Ghezail a well-known pro-Lamari 
eradicator and then replaced him with one loyal to him, Yayeb Derradji.367 
General Zeroual first became the new leader of the HCE in 1994. He had then migrated from 
being the Mnister of Defence and an individual part of the army‟s leadership jema’a. This 
migration seems to have had the same effect on all who made it. Being the jema’a‟s primary 
representative outside of the army influencing and controlling their will in policy seems to 
have been the vulnerable part of the system they had. As he was now part of the winning 
coalition more than the leadership his interests changed accordingly and the ambitions of the 
winning coalition came to the surface rather than the leaderships, as with President Chadli. 
After the IMF loans the regime found itself in a place strong enough and experienced enough 
to try to normalize the situation, this is what must be interpreted from the presidential 
elections held in 1995. These were in fact two years delayed, since Chadli‟s presidency 
expired in 1993, the HCE with its shaky mandate actually was not supposed to govern that 
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long. Here it will also be seen as a move to appease foreign investors and the IMF who not 
long before gained influence and power over the leadership by way of the deal struck in 1994. 
The elections were successful largely due to a heavy presence of security forces at all voting 
stations maintaining order.368 Foreign observers had few if any negative comments on how 
the elections had been held and all seemed to be working in the army‟s favour. As they now 
had one of “theirs” publicly elected as head of the political apparatus in a legitimate way 
removing or appeasing concerns from abroad, but as mentioned, in a different group other 
ambitions came to the fore.369 He did not stray that far necessarily on the approach to the 
insurgency, at least at the onset. He met the daunting challenge of his office with a combined 
military and economic policy possible with the new funding after 1994, trying to contain the 
overall islamist dissidence with economic reform, building programs and the like that targeted 
the young Algerians in particular. There were not any executions after he took on office 
though, at least not through the court apparatus, the approach was still brutal and without 
compromise.370 
President Zeroual started to deviate from the line held by the jema’a when he initiated 
backdoor negotiations with Abassi the FIS leader who still served time in jail. There had been 
no room for negotiation; there was no compromise as General Lamari the Chief of staff and 
one of the more influential members of the jema’a stated both in words and actions. President 
Zeroual bypassed these opinions in the army when he initiated talks, something that could 
mean two things. Firstly, he started to feel comfortable enough to represent his own ambitions 
and most likely the opinions of some of the other members of the leadership as well judging 
from his reshuffles in it. The other explanation is that it was a cunning plan, in which they 
predicted that the talk initiative would forestall a possible merger between the AIS and the 
GIA as it certainly did.371 Not only that but there was an escalation of violence in the time 
surrounding the talks, but sources here are a bit confusing. Some write that GIA in fact 
wanted negotiations and that is why they started their bomb campaign in 1994 to force 
negotiations with the islamists and the government.372 This could be due to the loose 
organization of GIA or understanding of what it was due to the complex workings and 
diverging goals therein, no matter the last option is probably the least likely since President 
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Zeroual seems to have continued on with his project of fulfilling his ambitions and not 
necessarily using his position to gain a total victory in any way over the insurgents at large. 
His attempt at consolidation of power at the presidency was supported by the constitution that 
had become a somewhat more important part in the attempt at normalizing the situation. The 
new constitution was part of the political renewal needed after three years of civil war in the 
wake of the IMF deal struck in 1994 as discussed in chapter 8. The constitution was a rule 
providing factor in any case, and even from the weak position it had been in with the creation 
of the HCE which clearly broke the previous one, it still shows that there was some respect 
for it even subsequent to that. To make it more actionable the ability to muster forces. This 
was attained through political power to some degree by several reshuffles in the winning 
coalition both within the army and the ministers who now held the same positions as the 
members of the HCE had in the winning coalition.373 President Zeroual managed to position a 
civilian defence minister “of his own”, he also managed to reshuffle in the army command to 
the degree that it became a much more balanced situation for him.374 This was possible due to 
the constitution at the same time as he strengthened its position – more correctly his ability to 
use it in his favour. 
In 1996 the presidential powers expanded dramatically, almost to the extent that he could rule 
by decree in certain situations. He was granted the ability to appoint, magistrates, provincial 
governors and the central bank governor which again gave him the ability to build his own 
winning coalition and get close to the resource pool.375 The reason that he was not ousted in 
the same way as President Chadli was probably the fact that he had certain backers in the 
army jema’a in addition to the safeguards that now were in place for the president under the 
new constitution.376 Not to mention the necessity of the new foreign relations and the 
implications that came along with it after the IMF deal. The rivalry was by no means non-
existent but as mentioned the army had to deal with President Zeroual politically and with the 
powers they had in that regard rather than direct confrontation, though some analyst in the 
field claim the assassinations that occurred on generals and their supporters meaning parts of 
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the leadership and winning coalition had their roots within it and not in the insurgency.377 
Whatever truth there is in these claims they need not be addressed here though, since losses 
were incurred on “both sides” and in effect had little direct effect on the rivalry.378  
Another point to be made with regards to the constitution and the power it provided President 
Zeroual was the strength it leant to his institution building project. The informal political 
groupings in Algeria had always been important as they were bypassing the very weak 
institutions; this gave room for the groups like the “Oujada Group” that existed and had 
political influence in the beginning of the Algerian statehood. From the 1960‟s to mid 1970‟s 
it had a lot of influence in the policy choices as the president of the time also was a part of 
it.379 The army jema’a was no exception to this trait, so President Zerouals institution building 
must be seen in contrast to this. The ousting of all islamist sympathizers could have been an 
excuse to get rid of certain informal structures within the institutions, in the period where they 
were ousted initiation of computerization in the departments was started as well. This gave 
less room for an informal procedure with the paper trail much more accessible.380 Establishing 
his own winning coalition and selectorate much in the same way as the FIS he directly 
opposed to the army. To wrestle power from them, he had to remove the power of the 
informal politics.381 Such was the complex theatre where the FIS vied for power with 
insurgency and pressure groups, President Zeroual opposed the leadership he was supposed to 
represent and then the opposition meaning the other political parties did as best they could in-
between it all. It‟s important to note that several of the parties that first ran for elections in the 
early 1990‟s maintained the position that FIS should be allowed back into the fold. Why is it 
that they did so while others did not? Within the selectorate theory it is a sensible choice. 
Since a new potential leadership - as they would have been at least a much more potent 
winning coalition if not the direct leadership when in power - made it a buyer‟s market for the 
other parties. This would have given them the opportunity to play the FIS and the army 
against one another to secure most possible private goods to their own party. 
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9.2 What were the motivations behind the civil 
defence groups? 
The obvious reasons, or claimed reasons for the civil defence groups was the need to ensure 
the security of the populace falling victims to insurgency raids. The importance of the armed 
civil defence groups had another function as well; it weakened the strong card of the army by 
diluting the ability to muster armed forces effectively making them a new power play piece. 
To such an extent that it has been speculated if both the killing of civilians in massacres and 
the abstaining from intervening in them was all part of an army ploy. This is not proven, but 
there is no doubt that the auxiliary forces shifted power or at least moved it closer to 
equilibrium. The forces amounted to some 100 000.382 
The mobilization of these unconventional forces was first encouraged in 1994, by the then 
Interior Minister Abderrahamane Meziane Cherif. He promised to arm civilian groups who 
wanted to defend themselves against the violence of the insurgents. Cherif was put into his 
position by HCE leader Zeroual a position in which he made many changes within the police 
force to make them into a more effective fighting force.383. This factor meant that the ability 
to muster forces had been diluted, and the army found itself without total control of all armed 
forces. Although if the analysis is correct the encouragement of General Kamel 
Abderrahmane who commanded the western Algerian region on the self-arming implies what 
was a possible argument in the previous chapter, that some forces within the army jema’a 
wanted President Zeroual to succeed with his project.384 
Cherif did not blindly encourage the arming of civilians; at least he said that it would happen 
under strict surveillance and only in isolated areas when it was formally allowed to do so in 
March 1995.385 Despite the encouragement from top officials and the promises of control and 
surveillance this was not to happen, in fact the militias were not lawfully recognized until 
January 1997.386 The reasons behind the creation of the militias and the way in which it 
happened are told in a different way on the Algerian Ministry of defence‟s webpage. In some 
translated communiqués of which they do not present the original Arabic text they speak of; 
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“In the fight relentless [against the terrorists]… the defence of the right so that force 
always remains within the law…In this direction, it engaged operations of raking and 
contributed its share to the creation of structures of proximity (Groups of Legitimate-
defence)… These operations made it possible to avoid many other massacres and to drive 
back the terrorist groups in their last cuttings off.”387 
The somewhat incorrect language doesn‟t render it entirely unclear as to what was made, for 
what reason and seemingly in a legitimate and lawful way. They go in saying that: 
  
 “These legitimate-defence groups are placed under the supervision of the 
Ministry of National Defence. Create and regulated by the executive decree 97-04 of January 
04th, 1997, the groups of Legitimate-defence, are duly authorized by the authorities and made 
up of voluntary citizens.”388  
This backs up my source saying they were not officially lawfully recognized until 1997, 
though the continued usage of the word “legitimate” certainly seem to address something. 
They formally were under the authority of the wali - the governor. They claim these groups 
had a lot of success in defeating the insurgents as they;” knew well the ground and the 
terrorists who, for some ones, were native localities even where they prevailed.”389 These 
“GLD” as their called in the communiqués have an official mission; 
 
”…to prevent or counter [with] the acts of terrorism and subversion directed against 
the sites of dwellings, the places of social life, as well as the public [of] infrastructures and 
social equipment.”390  
What is not addressed at all is the lack of control, the lack of legitimacy and the instances in 
which as Kalyvas claims the armament of citizens lead to more violence. So clearly they 
either failed in some instances, or they were created for other reason or not created at all as 
Martinez claims.391 Here we lean towards the latter, that they were a mere act of desperation, 
a survival strategy that the power brokers in Algeria later capitalized on. The first suggestion 
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might not seem implausible, but the facts surrounding their appearance in Algeria seem to 
negate any greater plan or thought surrounding their purpose. The somewhat delayed lawful 
recognition of them, three years at least indicates the same conclusion. 
Lawful or not they were mobilized and served several purposes, intended and unintended. 
Even if the control of forces had been diluted, the army who always had left most of the 
fighting to the police and civil executive forces now saw them combined with the militias 
fighting the insurgency.392 In this they were part of operations that retook areas abandoned by 
the army in their “let them rot” strategy earlier in the civil war. They managed to limit the 
freedom of action of the insurgents and even drive them out of certain areas;”…The combined 
action of the NPA (ANP) and other forces of safety [the militias] thus showed the elimination 
and the arrest of many terrorist heads…”393 Their management was executed by former 
“mujahedeen” from the independence war and that gave them some ability and a fighting 
chance.394 
As mentioned the militias had two functions. The first described above, the second discussed 
here. The FFS (Front des Forces socialistes) leader Hocine Ait Ahmed warned about the 
dangers of an outright civil war because of the encouragement of the militia establishment, 
and once again encouraged negotiations instead of escalation.395 This is not what happened 
but the situation did escalate, in Kalvvas„s article, “Wanton and Senseless” he describes how 
the militia establishment and the arming of them proved to be a reason behind several village 
massacres contrary to; “The report which in resulted is that all the zones where the citizens 
armed themselves and constituted in legitimate-defence groups are less exposed to the risk of 
terrorist attacks.”396 In this he points out the connection between villages that have applied for 
arms from the government and the targets of GIA rendering much of the alleged intent behind 
the militia encouragement useless.397 Cordsman goes even further in claiming that the local 
militias themselves have carried out massacres and exacted revenge for earlier misdeeds when 
armed, while Martin Stone in his book makes a point of how the militias were misused in a 
bid for land, tracing aggravation between landholders going back to the independence war. 
This allegedly was done though operations guised as attacks on insurgents and islamists when 
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in fact it was control over coveted land that was the goal.398 But these motivations and actions 
were nothing more than side effects of the real purpose, yet another more important reason 
will be discussed in the following chapter concerning the army‟s response to President 
Zerouals threat. 
9.3 How did the army respond to the threat 
President Zeroual had become?  
The army responded by priming on a multiparty system again. By lawfully acknowledging 
some of the civil defence groups they were legally subjugated to the army via the Ministry of 
Defence contrary to a loosely organized paramilitary force. Also by the failure of this power 
play - since they ended up hurting communities that wanted the government‟s protection - the 
army mandated a non-intervention policy with regards to the massacres for conventional 
forces at least as far as we can tell. The acceptance of a multi-party system this time came 
with better prepared rules that were dictated by the army. They created an environment of 
dualism, two islamist parties (not the FIS though), two secular government parties, two berber 
parties, the FLN returned to the fold next to the RND. Even the FLN became pro regime 
again in 1996 when the tides might seem to have turned. This resulted in them being one of 
the two parties played upon, as RND became its regime supporting twin.399 So in fact they did 
not elect governing parties but rather an opposition being the only one with some sway 
against the army in the checks and balances described in chapter 1.400  
This gave the army the possibility to play one of against the other. In this way the selectorate 
was expanded, but in a way that served the army since they had a big enough selectorate that 
none could be assured of anything - least of all making it to the winning coalition - though not 
as big as to remove the power of private goods. The fact that the selectorate consisted of two 
of all actors secured the “seller‟s market” which the army could exploit when recruiting its 
winning coalition. The results of the elections shows just how strong a position the army had 
maintained despite President Zeroual‟s challenge, his party didn‟t even get 10% of the votes 
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in the parliamentary election in 2002, and Zeroual himself did not even try out for the 
presidency in 1999.401  
Before all this though it was clear that the army did not accept the new way things were 
going, something that will be made clear through several points in this chapter. The first 
diversion from the policy of no negotiation was maybe the first sign of the army‟s growing 
concern and disagreement with the new president.402 It seems like the forces within their 
leadership had learned from the experience with President Chadli, as their move was not one 
of a direct military coupe but rather a more extensive use of their winning coalition in what 
became a political battle to wrestle control out of the usurper President Zeroual. This was 
possible due to the opposition which was ever seeking favour with the army, which are those 
who had not politically bound themselves to the FIS by being firm on their return to the fold. 
This soliciting of favours throughout the civil war did not end with President Zerouals 
challenge, some sought favour there, others with the army whom by experience seemed to be 
the safest bet.403 The creation of the new multi-party system was a lesson learned from the 
previous encounter with it, since it now was controlled and formed in a way in which the 
army could manipulate the players towards their goals. The dualism of every party made for a 
textbook example of applying a divide and rule strategy that also gained them some 
appearance of legitimacy since all interests were “represented”. 
On the ability to muster forces the massacres and the militias as mentioned became pieces in 
the power play. The dilution of manpower control was countered with mandates of non-
interference in which it became abundantly clear that President Zeroual still needed the army 
and could do nothing without them since the internal security forces were not as many and the 
militias were local, the army in fact – when it wanted - were better suited to cover larger 
areas. 404 By being passive the army showed President Zeroual that they were strong enough 
to do as they liked and could even “sabotage” his initiatives like the militias or overtake it as 
happened with the lawful recognition of them. There are even some instances where it is 
reported that the army directly hindered the militias from doing what they were supposed on 
the night of a massacre. In Bent Halla the self-defence militia were invited by the next door 
army captain to spend the night in their barracks. This is of course inconclusive evidence of 
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army sabotage of the militia, indeed they also cooperated at several occasions but it could 
indicate that there was a will to see the militias fail in their endeavour.405 
The assassinations of top generals and ministers representing the winning coalition on both 
sides may have weakened one side enough so that the dethroning of President Zeroual became 
a fact.406 One such assassination that no doubt was a striking blow meted out by shadowy 
army backers or the insurgents with no such affiliations was that of Abdelhaq Benhamouda in 
January 1997. He was the labour leader and a close ally of the president.407 There was not an 
attempt to run for a second period by Zeroual, and key players of the army eventually held all 
the important positions giving them the most effective winning coalition within the political 
apparatus leaving Zeroual with a weaker base. This in effect left the army on top, with an 
even better set up for the continuation of their sovereignty. Something that was not to change 
at all until very recently when President Abdelazis Bouteflika somehow got a law passed 
giving him direct control over the republican guard.408 
9.4 Was there an end to it all? 
The war to some extent ended here, with the army‟s final assertion of power. Until the army 
had come up with a system in which it comfortably sat with all the power and the opportunity 
to continue to do so it was in their interest to prolong it. Indeed Martinez claims it was in 
everyone‟s interest; the difference now was that the army no longer had an interest in it.409 
There had been meek attempts at “clemency” acts since 1994, these however proved 
inefficient.410 Although in July 1999 the “Civil Concord” was proposed as an act to mobilize 
the people for peace. With it came a new amnesty that would expire January 13th, 2000. By 
the end date it‟s estimated that about 80% of the insurgents had surrendered.411 The FIS still 
were not allowed to participate in the political contest however, as mentioned the political 
parties representing islamist sentiments were new and probably less obstinate.412 Following 
some “confessions” from the army in which it was admitted that some acts overstepping legal 
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boundaries had occured the Ministry of Interior accepted cases from families filing missing 
person rapports. All news about the war, and even investigating into the conduct of the 
government throughout the war and critique of it remains a criminal offence according to the 
National Reconciliation Charter of 2005 in Algeria – explaining the somewhat murky 
waters.413 And the “confessions” however were not more than what General Lamari 
said;”…atrocities committed by individuals acting in isolation…”414 Of which at least two 
persons were prosecuted, though the result of these prosecutions are unknown. This at least in 
my opinion speaks volumes on the fact, that the savage war of Algeria never was about right 
and wrong, evil and good, legitimate or illegitimate but rather about a collection of people in 
power trying to remain there for no other reasons than just that.415 President Bouteflika who 
was pro army when he assumed the presidency in 1999 served in this capacity only by the 
grace of the general‟s jema’a.416 
The main finding in this chapter is based on the debacle after President Chadli, and the 
challenge of President Zeroual. The army‟s system of leading in the shadows saw a persistent 
problem with their jema’a’s proxy in the winning coalition, whether a president in a single 
party reality, leader of the HCE or a coxed and elected president. As all of the proxies in these 
roles real job was to ensure the will of the army‟s jema’a they all failed, the reasons as 
discussed with both President Chadli, HCE leader Boudiaf were all that they started to act on 
behalf of or in the interest of the formal ruling organ, the winning coalition itself and not the 
leadership as if they forgot who put them there. The same problem occurs when President 
Zeroual tried to consolidate his power from an even stronger and seemingly more legitimate 
position than those preceding him. He deftly manoeuvred around the main issues at hand, the 
ability to muster forces as well as seeing a clear cut weakness in the way the jema’a preferred 
to rule. This observation in and off itself does not answer the preamble directly, but it suggest 
some reasons stemming from the complex power struggle that prompted some of the most 
vicious initiatives and allowances done throughout the civil war. As the civil defence groups, 
the non-intervention mandate of the army and the outright cynical manipulating of the 
different insurgency groups all were results of the weak link between a decided jema’a and 
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their proxies in formal politics and their results affected the disenfranchised group who held 
no political or economic value in a most savage way. 
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10 Conclusion: 
In this paper I‟ve tried to lay out a different understanding of the Algerian civil war. This 
attempt is as stated in the introduction nothing more than just that, an attempt at 
understanding what is perceived as an infinitely complex matter of which one can only 
glimpse the inner workings. This is the reason why an overall theory has been utilized to 
identify certain key categories in the upper – and therefore most likely actionable – strata of 
Algeria. First I identified within the “power house” those making the decisions, those 
supporting this collection of generals in this case and lastly those at the very bottom that 
really empower the machinery. I chose to take advantage of already pre-set categories from a 
theory that in this paper is thought to be useful in explaining certain key aspects of the 
conflict. 
Having done this I continued to explain how one could perceive the reforms of the late 1980‟s 
as a political battle over power in which President Chadli lost. However before this loss was 
incurred, areas of the public sphere of Algeria had changed, we found an army no longer 
constrained by its alliance to the FLN, in addition we found that the islamist faction had been 
given a participatory role however fickle it was. From this I‟ve tried to explain the importance 
of these new realities in that the army who once found itself at least contained to some degree 
within a system of checks and balances was now unshackled. Further the islamist sentiments 
had been allowed room in the public sphere and as we continue even gained ground. As is 
discussed in the chapter the reasons for this are clouded but suggests an army thinking they 
could have their way with them as they had with the FLN. When this failed the conditions for 
“an extension of politics” were set, and as such the insurgency commenced. 
The predicament of this paper asks how to explain the decent into a savage war, so far what 
has been explained leans more towards the reasons behind it, not directly addressing the 
severity. These are however in the author‟s opinion vital in explaining its nature. As the 
identification of each of the categories allows one to follow a certain logic that explains the 
descent with the premise that one in power wish to remain so. This assumption needless to 
say is apparent in the very fact that there was a war. Therefore, following this logic, I‟ve tried 
to explain the overall methods and strategies being implemented by both sides, first of the FIS 
courting the population at large to an expanded selectorate with the gruesome but reasonable 
response being a total disregard for those not important for one‟s own political survival on the 
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other front. For the army‟s part this meant that anyone not part of the army‟s selectorate 
would be left to their own devices, as the army saw its own political survival as a higher 
priority than the actual survival of the people at large actually benefitting from the disastrous 
outcome. As discussed in the paper this is only one reason, as at the onset of the war we find 
the army lacking in its original purpose, in terms of skills and in terms of resources. This was 
however amended in 1994 when a rescheduling of loans took place and the economy got 
better. 
The importance of the economy has been clearly shown through examples and troop 
concentration. However upon mending the army‟s economic position the deal with the IMF 
wrought changes in the political sphere. A new project was started, in which a new conflict 
arose with the army‟s third candidate assuming a political leader position. I find that a 
transition from the army‟s jema’a to a political office is a recurrent challenge for the army 
jema’a. President Zeroual challenged the army in much the same way as President Chadli 
only that he in addition to building institutions making a better political machinery to counter 
its power, also challenged the army‟s ability to muster forces. This was only possible due to 
the “Let them rot” strategy. Since the strategy had created an environment that certainly didn‟t 
give the insurgents much headway it nonetheless resulted in a deprived population.  
The strategy despite its horrendous character worked against the insurgents, as their strategy 
was to include people in a new political reality in which opportunities would be available to 
all. The “Let them rot” strategy was accompanied by manipulating divisions between the 
insurgents, a move that changed what the “islamist” strategy was. Several groupings in a 
disarranged front warred against the government and themselves following the successful 
attack in Tamesguida. This combined with the lack of governance and the horrible conditions 
brought on by the insurgency led to a passive and depoliticized populace that in the end armed 
themselves to at least counter the violence done towards them.  
It was this proliferation of forces fighting the insurgents that became President Zeroual‟s 
strongest asset in his political fight against the army, as it watered down the army‟s total 
control of all armed forces on the counter-insurgents‟ side. This control gained through the 
„state of war‟ condition nevertheless was reclaimed in 1997 when all the militias were 
subjugated to the Ministry of defence. The army is also seen to manipulate the conditions 
surrounding the new elections in 1999 allowing for two political parties of all wings. This 
made it easier to gain support by playing them off against each other. How this is done 
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remains to be figured out, thought the results always seem to imply the logic underlying my 
assumptions as President Zeroual was dethroned and replaced by President Bouteflika who 
back then served at the mercy of the army. 
So we see a country ravaged by war, horrible massacres without intervention perpetrated in a 
very grisly manner, arbitrary bombing, assassinations and systemic mistreatment of its 
citizens due to economics. Economics in its rawest sense, to prioritize ones resources where 
one needs it the most. In this rationale the disenfranchised aren‟t needed and as such are an 
unnecessary price to pay, leaving them to their own devices or when it‟s beneficial taken 
advantage of through political power plays. 
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